Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of threatening a public and unlawful restraint, for yelling obscenities at an assistant state's attorney and following her down hallway of courthouse to her office. State failed to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of threatening a public official. State presented no evidence that Defendant meant to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an unlawful act of violence. That Defendant used offensive language in a loud voice does not create a reasonable inference that he intended to use violence. Remanded for court to impose sentence on unlawful restraint conviction. (HOFFMAN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of incident, was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted 1st degree murder and attempted armed robbery, and sentenced to consecutive terms of 45 years and 5 years. Sentence did not violate proportionate penalties clause. Evidence indicated that Defendant and his codefendants planned the armed robbery, and store clerk would have died had he not received emergency treatment. Court was aware of Defendant's age, considered his culpability, and stated that it considered mitigating and aggravating factors. Court was not required to give his rehabilitative potential greater weight than the seriousness of the offense. Video surveillance camera showed sequence of events, including that Defendant fired at clerk in the chest, about one and a half feet away. Jury could infer that Defendant intended to kill clerk. (PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of drug-induced homicide.As a matter of state law, IPI Criminal 4th 7.15 properly sets forth the principles of causation established by Illinois Supreme Court. THis instruction should be modified in cases of drug-induced homicide where the defendant delivers multiple controlled substances to the victim but is charged based on only one of the deliveries. Evidence was sufficient to convicte Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of drug-induced homicide. (KARMEIER, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder and sentenced to 40 years, with 215 days of presentence custody credit. Defendant's claim is procedurally defaulted because it was asserted for the first time on appeal from postconviction proceedings.Normal rules of procedural default apply to claims for presentence custody credit.  Supreme Court Rule 615(b) does not authorize relief where a statutory claim for presentence custody credit is presented for the first time on appeal from dismissal fo initial or successive postconviction petition. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery, elevated to a Class 4 felony due to prior aggravated battery conviction. Crime Stoppers assessment was erroneously imposed, as it applies only where a defendant has been sentenced to probation or conditional discharge, which was not the case for Defendant here. "Civil process", as defined in ordinance, includes service of subpoenas in criminal cases, and is sufficient to cover sheriff's fee imposed. (THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial in 2014, of felony theft. Defendant had a prior conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault in 1983, but he was not required to register as a sex offender at the time as conviction was prior to enactment of Sex Offender Registration Act. Under Act as amended in 2011, 2014 felony theft conviction triggered required that he register as a sex offender becuase of 1983 conviction. Defendant cannot raise his as-applied constitutional challenge for the first time in the reviewing court in a collateral proceeding without benefit of a factual record. (KARMEIER, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)