Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly imposed certain conditions of probation as part of defendant’s sentence on charges of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault arising out of defendant’s criminal acts against his 13-year-old sister. Said conditions included prohibition on living in same apartment complex/mobile home park as known convicted sex offender, as well as prohibition on having access to certain social networking websites, contact with persons under the age of 18, possession of pornographic material, use of computer scrub software, or use of Internet without prior approval. Appellate Court rejected defendant’s claim that said conditions were overly broad and otherwise unconstitutional. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argues that restriction on Internet use conflicted with holding in Packingham, 137 S.Ct. 1730.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly dismissed defendant’s post-conviction petition that challenged trial court’s additional imposition of 25-year sentence on murder charge, as well as 20-years sentence on attempted murder charge based on firearm enhancement, where said sentences were imposed following State’s motion to modify sentences that had been pending at time defendant had filed his notice of appeal. While defendant argued that modified sentences were void ,since they had been imposed after he had filed his notice of appeal, Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition, found that trial court had jurisdiction to enter modified sentences, since defendant had prematurely filed his notice of appeal due to pending nature of State’s motion to modify his sentences. Ct. rejected defendant’s arguments that: (1) under Rule 606(b), only motion to modify filed by defendant rendered any subsequently-filed notice of appeal ineffective; and (2) his firearm enhancement for attempted murder conviction was void, since said crime was committed at time that said enhancement had been temporarily been found to be unconstitutional.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence, where description of items listed in warrant pertained to investigation of drug offense, and where items actually seized related to murder investigation. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, noted that although complaint for warrant and accompanying affidavit established probable cause to seize evidence of murder offense, description of items related to only drug investigation. Moreover, Ct. rejected State’s claim that inclusion of drug items in warrant was harmless scrivener’s error, since excising of drug investigation items would  have left police officials with only general search warrant that would have been unconstitutional under 4^th Amendment. Also, warrant did not otherwise incorporate information in complaint for warrant. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to reconsider its prior denial of defendant’s post-conviction petition, where defendant alleged that his post-conviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance by merely stating at third-stage post-conviction hearing on defendant’s pro se motion to reconsider that defendant’s motion “speaks for itself” and failing to call defendant’s girlfriend to support allegations in his motion to reconsider. While defendant was not present at said hearing, Appellate Court, in reversing trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider, found that trial court should have conducted Krankel-like inquiry into defendant’s pro se claim of unreasonable assistance of post-conviction counsel to allow trial court to determine if new counsel needed to be appointed for purpose of avoiding conflict, developing record regarding defendant’s claim, or limiting any issues on appeal. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Court wrongfully extended holding in Krankel to proceedings under Post-Conviction Act.

In prosecution on first-degree murder charge arising out of defendant’s participation in high speed hit-and-run accident that resulted in killing of one bystander and injuring of another, trial court erred in failing to give jury reckless homicide instruction as lesser-included offense, where record showed that accident occurred in context of defendant’s high-speed chase away from police. Ct. further found that record failed to support defendant’s conviction on charge of failure to report accident, since record showed that defendant was arrested within 10 minutes of accident. Also, Ct. held that section 11-501.2(c)(22) of Illinois Vehicle Code was unconstitutional insofar as it permits compelled chemical testing of blood and urine, under circumstances where: (1) officer had probable cause to believe that driver had caused personal injuries; and (2) instant record failed to show presence of any exigency that would have prevented officer from obtaining warrant. (Dissent filed.)

Record lacked sufficient evidence to allow Appellate Court to consider in defendant’s direct appeal, defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to quash defendant’s arrest based upon claim that police lacked authority to enter his property, where record was insufficient for determination as to whether defendant was lawfully arrested, whether said failure to file motion to quash was strategic or whether such motion would have been successful. While Appellate Court also observed that defendant could file post-conviction motion to resolve defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant argued in its petition for leave to appeal that Appellate Court’s proposed remedy lacked due process since said remedy is non-existent, where he cannot file post-conviction petition because he has already served his sentence.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly admitted victim’s hearsay statement made to nurse in trial on charge of aggravated battery of child, where said statement identified defendant as individual who forcible held six-year-old victim under scalding water. Appellate Court found that said statement did not qualify as exception to hearsay rule under section 803(4), since victim’s statement to nurse was not made to assist nurse in victim’s medical diagnosis or treatment. Appellate Court further found that outright reversal as opposed to remand for new trial was appropriate, since admissible evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. State, though, in its petition for leave to appeal, argues that Appellate Court should have considered excluded hearsay statement, in conjunction with remaining admissible evidence, to determine whether remand or outright reversal is appropriate remedy. (Partial dissent filed.)