Criminal Law

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, was tried as an adult and convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder in  gang-related drive-by shooting of 18-year-old victim. Jury found that Defendant personally discharged the firearm that caused victim's death. Defendant was sentenced to 45 years, which was to run consecutively to a prior sentence of 20 years in an unrelated case for attempted 1st degree murder, when he was 19. Sentence, which is a de facto life sentence, is vacated, as it was a result of mandatory sentencing laws. Remanded for resentencing under new sentencing scheme. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as decision whether to call an alibi witness at trial was a reasonable strategy, to keep evidence of Defendant's gang affiliation from the jury.(McBRIDE, specially concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of home invasion and 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Court granted State's motion to use evidence of other sex offenses; State alleged that in both instances (within 1 month), Defendant, armed with a knife, broke into victim's dwelling and sexually assaulted her. Similarities between those 2 cases were stark and overwhelming, and DNA evidence against Defendant was substantial. Requirement of Krankel hearing applies only to posttrial claims raised by a defendant pro se.  

(DeARMOND and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant and 3 police officers engaged in confrontation in parking lot of a sports bar. Details of confrontation were thoroughly disputed at trial. After close of evidence, court continued case without hearing closing arguments, and when case was eventually recalled 3 months later, court immediately announced its findings, that officers were more credible than defense witnesses, and found Defendant guilty of several of the charged counts.  Reopening a bench trial after a premature judgment preserves a defendant's constitutional right to make a closing argument, unless the record shows that trial judge was unable or unwilling to give defense counsel's belated argument all due consideration before finalizing its judgment of guilt. Defendant was then convicted, after bench trial was reopened, of aggravated battery of a peace officer and criminal damage to government-supported property. Court could reasonably find that testifying officers were more credible than Defendant and his witnesses.(FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of home invasion; on appeal, one conviction and sentence were vacated. Successor judge properly sua sponte dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. No evidence or allegations of "judge shopping", and prior judge's ruling was not one that involved exercise of discretion. Record amply supports successor judge's ultimate determination that prior judge's partial denial of State's motion to dismiss was erroneous. Defendant's postconviction petition was insufficient to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce medical records and medical testimony at hearing on his motion to suppress. Defense counsel's strategy as to what evidence to present was sound.(KNECHT and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and attempted murder. Court instructed jury on self-defense as to both charges and on 2nd degree murder based on "imperfect" or "unreasonable" self-defense, although defense counsel did not argue either theory, but argued a theory of reasonable doubt as to identification. Jury understood who was the attempted-murder victim, and jury convicted Defendant of that charge because it found that he shot that victim with the specific intent to kill him. There were no unusual facts that required a modification of IPI instructions. Defense counsel is not required to argue a defense simply because jury was instructed on it. As these 2 theories as to self-defense were weak, it was not unreasonable for counsel to argue a different theory, and this decision did not affect the verdict. (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 9/28/18.) (adding link) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of residential burglary and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. State's cross-examination of Defendant as to his location prior to traffic stop was relevant to suppression hearing and factored into whether officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. By testifying, Defendant placed his credibility in issue.Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for a Terry stop, as his vehicle matched description of vehicle involved in burglary, and was seen close by to site of burglary immediately after radio call. Defendant's flight from stop further ripened into probable cause to arrest. Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived right to jury trial; waiver was in writing, and Defendant orally affirmed his understood his right to jury trial. Evidence failed to establish the essential element that officers were in uniform, and thus conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude peace officer is reversed.  (HOWSE, concurring; and ELLIS, dissenting.) 

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery based on insulting or provoking physical contact. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 911 recording into evidence, as content of the call was corroborated by other circumstances identifying victim as the caller. Prosecutor's comments, in closing argument, to jury to use their common sense as to why victim did not testify was not reversible; court instructed jury that closing arguments are not evidence, and prosecutor had reasonable concern that jurors might question why she was not present. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of methamphetamine. Defense counsel's strategy to challenge whether Defendant knowingly possessed it, strategy did not require stipulating to weight of the substance. Stipulation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and resulted in State not being required to prove an important element of its case by providing testimony of chemist. Defense counsel was aware of commingling before entering into stipulation. Stipulation prejudiced Defendant, as if Defendant had not stipulated to weight, there would have likely been a different outcome. Remanded for new trial. (DELORT and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder of police officer, and of attempted 1st degree murder of 4 other officers, disarming of a peace officer, and armed robbery while personally discharging a firearm.State sufficiently proved beyond a reasonable doubt that officer was killed while in the course of performing his official duties. Court, as factfinder, could find that any action taken by that officer to prevent the commission of any crime, including a crime committed against himself, was in performance of his official duties.(GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)