Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 181-month term of incarceration on bank robbery and unlawful use of firearm charges, where said sentence was based, in part, on imposition of death-threat enhancement under section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of USSG. Application Note 4 to section 2K2.4 of USSG prohibited imposition of death-threat enhancement where, as here, defendant also received sentence for committing firearms offense under 18 USC section 924(c), and where sentence under section 924(c) already accounted for instant bomb threat uttered by co-conspirator during bank robbery.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his carjacking resulting in death conviction on grounds that State of Wisconsin violated his right to counsel when it stopped paying his state-appointed counsel during defendant’s direct appeal that resulted in counsel not pursuing equal protection challenge on carjacking statute, under circumstances where counsel subsequently remained in case and completed briefing on other issues and filed petition for review with Wisc. Supreme Ct. without obtaining compensation. Defendant waived any argument that such stopped payment constituted complete denial of counsel, where defendant had failed to raise said theory in state court. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant’s claim that said stoppage of payment denied him effective assistance of counsel because said stoppage created financial conflict of interest between defendant and his counsel, since: (1) Supreme Ct. has not yet extended its multiple-representation conflict of interest decisions to instant financial conflict of interest case; and (2) it cannot be said that state court’s rejection of instant financial conflict of interest claim was contrary to or constituted unreasonable application of Supreme Ct. case law. Ct. further noted that any financial conflict of interest in instant case had no adverse consequence, where any assertion of equal protection claim by counsel would have been untimely.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his first-degree reckless homicide conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress identification evidence from uncounseled post-indictment lineup. State court could properly find that defendant failed to establish any prejudice arising out of said failure, where record showed that two witnesses who did not participate in said lineup identified defendant as culprit, and other evidence pointed to defendant’s guilt on charged offense.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of methamphetamine conspiracy and sentenced to 30 years. Defendant's conviction is reduced to the offense of methamphetamine conspiracy based on his participation in the manufacture of 100 or more grams but less than 400 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Remanded for resentencing. Evidence sufficiently established that this quantity, rather than quantity charged, was attributable to Defendant.aivNo ineffective assistance of counsel, as it was sound trial strategy for defense counsel to challenge testimony from deputy that accuracy of co-conspirator's statements increased over time; and other errors were minor. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, with criminal sexual abuse. Both Defendant, then age 18, and female victim, then under age 18, were in high school together and had known each other for several years. Sex offender registry scheme has morphed from civil regulation into punitive scheme. The rigid technical strictures of sex offender statutes are grossly disproportionate to Defendant's crime and violate 8th amendment of U.S. Constitution and proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution.(CARTER and LYTTON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder of his wife. Defendant was prejudiced by improper introduction of a former FBI profiler's "crime-scene-analysis" testimony, which was a subjective opinion that State's evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant. Medical evidence of cause of victim's death was necessary, because a lay person of average intelligence would not know what killed her. The former FBI profiler's was not qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to opinion on cause and manner of victim's death.(JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
In 1978, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. In 2016, he moved under Section 116-3 of Code of Criminal Procedure to allow fingerprint and DNA analysis of certain items of evidence secured in relation to his plea and conviction. State did not respond. Section 116-3 is to be construed liberally to favor its purpose of making criminal process more reliable by allowing, where there is a reasonable basis, the acquisition of sound scientific evidence probative on issue of identity. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)
Police officer stopped Defendant and gave him a warning for an obstructed windshield, and ended the traffic stop. Officer then lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant further for a dog sniff. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to suppress cannabis dog smelled in vehicle and which police found in an ensuing search. No reasonable suspicion, including fact that Defendant did not look directly at officer and seemed nervous, and presence of snack food wrappers and energy drink containers, and absence of luggage, to justify detaining Defendant for dog sniff. (HARRIS and TURNER, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted in absentia of being an armed habitual criminal and of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. State is not required to explicitly move for a trial in absentia before such a trial may commence; it is sufficient that that State stood silent when Defendant failed to appear and defense counsel moved for a continuance. State presented a prima facie case of willful absence when Defendant was admonished that he could be tried in absentia, and did not appear for trial. (ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of parental kidnapping under 18 USC section 1204, where defendant, on eve of state-court decision that defendant believed would award ex-spouse full custody of their child, took child and went to Canada and remained there even after learning that trial court had in fact awarded full-custody of child to ex-spouse. Fact that ex-spouse had temporary limitations on his visitation rights with child at time defendant took child to Canada did not require different result. Defendant also failed to present sufficient evidence to support affirmative defense that defendant fled to Canada to avoid domestic violence from ex-spouse, since Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s allegations of emotional, psychological and financial abuse against ex-spouse did not qualify as “domestic violence” for purposes of establishing instant affirmative defense.
