Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted 1st degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, for a shooting in 2010. Defendant was sentenced, in 2015, to concurrent sentences of 38 years and 10 years. State presented no evidence linking Defendant to offense except for identifications by victim and his girlfriend, who gave description immediately after offense that offenders were Hispanic men dressed in black. No introduced link between Defendant and the shooting except for selection, by victim and his girlfriend, of Defendant from photo spread and lineup. Police conduct in conducting photo array and lineups may have undermined reliability of identification. Court erred in denying evidence of Defendant's tattoos, as that evidence, and 2 additional witnesses who claim victim admitted that Defendant did not shoot him, may change result. Reversed and remanded for new trial. (McBRIDE, specially concurring; BURKE, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 10/3/18.)  Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse of his daughter, who was under age 13. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that, had his trial counsel objected to officer's testimony about other victims' outcries, outcome of trial might have been different. Court 's failure to ask potential jurors whether they understood that a Defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his behalf because Defendant did offer evidence on his behalf at trial. Evidence was not closely balanced. Court could reasonably conclude that any impeachment material in victim's mental health treatment records, prior to her accusations, was available from other sources. (MIKVA and WALKER, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to burglary, and was sentenced, as a Class X offender based on prior convictions, to 20 years. Deterrence was an appropriate consideration in sentencing. Although certain testimony contained hearsay, it was relevant to issues presented and reliable, and concerned information compiled during official police investigation. Court properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN)

Defendant was convicted of one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (his stepdaughter, age 13) and 4 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Court did not plainly err when it failed to inquire whether jurors understood the Rule 431(b) principles for jury instruction. State did not impermissibly shift or lessen the burden of proof during closing argument. Inconsistencies in victim's testimony was likely due to her young age and the time that passed between events and trial, and there was some corroboration of her allegations. State's comment that it welcomed the standard of burden of proof and that it was routinely used was permissible.(McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with driving while license suspended. Court denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant's post-stop observation that Defendant "was driving the black Expedition" must be suppressed. As that observation was not made until after officer stopped the vehicle, it is not attenuated from the illegal stop and is thus suppressible. Anonymous tip was neither reliable nor sufficiently detailed to justify a stop, and officer's reliance on that tip to make stop violated Defendant's 4th amendment rights. As officer lacked reasonable suspicion to perform traffic stop, that stop is a "poisonous tree", and any evidence obtained from stop must be suppressed.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of his predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, his stepdaughter. Although evidence was focused on events that occurred in Illinois on a specific date, there was also evidence that Defendant abused victim in Indiana. Error occurred as not all jurors were clearly asked whether they both understood and accepted each of the Zehr principles. Victim's statements constituted strong corroborating evidence for her testimony. Most of Defendant's evidence did not contradict victim's statement. Evidence was not so closely balanced that court's error during voir dire could have tipped the balance against Defendant.(CATES and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted burglary. Prior to trial, court granted Defendant's motion in limine barring State from presenting other crimes evidence at trial. Defendant counsel did not object ot State admitting unedited copies of videotaped confessions, thus exposing jury to prejudicial other crimes evidence. Defense counsel had an actual conflict of interest when he argued posttrial motion, as he had to argue that his own error resulted in unfair trial. Defense counsel's failure to make any effort to show either prong of Strickland standard, and record shows that his failure to do so was due to conflict of interest in having to argue his own ineffectiveness. Defendant was thus denied his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at posttrial stage of proceedings. (CHAPMAN and CATES, concurring.)