(Gordon-Booth, D-Peoria; Harmon, D-Oak Park) prohibits a court from denying a sealing or expungement petition because the petitioner has not satisfied an outstanding legal financial obligation established by a court; law enforcement agency; or state, county, or other unit of local government. It exempts an obligation that is court-ordered restitution unless the restitution has been converted to a civil judgment. Effective August 10, 2018.
(Harris, D-Harvey; Davis, D-East Hazel Crest) extends from one year to two years in which a restricted driving permit is effective. The fee for the permit will continue to be imposed annually. Effective Jan. 1, 2019.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, on all counts relating to manufacture and possession of methamphetamine. Convictions are not based upon precisely the same physical act, but based on separate and distinct acts, and thus do not violate the one-act, one-crime rule. Possession is not a lesser-included offense of participating in manufacturing. Although errors occurred in closing argument of State, evidence against Defendant was overwhelming, and errors were not so serious that a structural error occurred. (HOLDER WHITE and TURNER, concurring.)
(Morrison, D-Deerfield; Olsen, R-Amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to provide that an "order of protection status" includes status as a person protected under the Protective Orders Article of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the Stalking No Contact Order Act and the Civil No Contact Order Act. Effective January 1, 2019.
(Feigenholtz, D-Chicago; Hunter, D-Chicago) amends the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 and the Protective Orders Article of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. It adds to the list of protected persons any of the following persons abused by a family or household member of a child: (1) a foster parent of that child if the child has been placed in the foster parent's home by the Department of Children and Family Services or by another state's public child welfare agency; (2) a legally appointed guardian or legally appointed custodian of that child; (3) an adoptive parent of that child; or (4) a prospective adoptive parent of that child if the child has been placed in the prospective adoptive parent's home pursuant to the Adoption Act or pursuant to another state's law. Authorizes these persons to file a petition for an order of protection. Effective January 1, 2019.
After separate but simultaneous jury trial, court convicted both Defendants of murder and attempt (murder). Defendant Davis (age 17 at time of offense) was sentenced to total 55 years for murder and 25 for attempt (murder), to run consecutively. Court sentenced Defendant Graham to total 50 years for murder and 25 years for attempt (murder), to run consecutively. No error in rebuttal of prosecutor, who was responding to argument of Defendant that witnesses conspired to frame Defendants. No error in argument of prosecutor which was a deconstruction of conspiracy theory of defense counsel. No error in admitting gang evidence, as it was admitted for limited purpose of showing motive and intent. Court considered youth of Defendant Daivs and its attendant characteristics at time of sentencing. (COBBS and FITZGERALD SMITH, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and of having discharged a firearm that caused death.Court properly admitted evidence of other crimes, as to prior battery conviction, as it was admissible under common law and Section 115-7.4 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Statements of Defendant admitting to gun ownership established material fact that Defendant had possessed guns and was familiar with them. Evidence of guilt, without firearms evidence, was overwhelming, and thus error in admitting his statements about his ownership of firearms was harmless. (HUTCHINSON and BURKE, concurring.)
Court properly denied motion of Defendant to dismiss indictment for aggravated DUI under influence of a controlled substance. Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. Length of delay was not extremely protracted and did not present a threat to fairness of his trial. Prejudice suffered by Defendant due to delay of State in producing him for court on felony charges does not warrant a finding that his speedy-trial right was violated. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his drug distribution and unlawful possession of firearm charges, even though defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to search warrant that had been issued based on information supplied by confidential informant. While Dist. Ct. agreed that warrant lacked probable cause because record failed to indicate length of time between when tipster observed defendant with drugs and when tipster informed police of said encounter, defendant could not establish any prejudice in counsel’s failure to file suppression motion, since good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied because objectively reasonable officers executing warrant could have relied in good faith that warrant was valid. Moreover, language in warrant application could reasonably be construed that tipster gave tip to police one day after his alleged drug encounter with defendant, and officer stated in application for warrant that tipster had provided reliable information to police on six other occasions prior to instant warrant application. Fact that officer made only minimal efforts to independently corroborate information supplied by tipster or inform court issuing warrant that tipster had criminal history did not require different result.
In prosecution on drug conspiracy and drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in allowing witness to testify that on certain drug run, defendant put gun to her head and threatened to kill her if she talked to police. While defendant argued that admission of said evidence violated Rule 403 because it was too prejudicial due to its reference to potential murder of witness and was cumulative to other admitted evidence, Ct. of Appeals found that said testimony was admissible because it was brief, not cumulative, and probative, since it explained why witness was initially reluctant to name defendant as member of conspiracy once witness had been detained by police, and why defendant was able to control some members of said conspiracy. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument that denied him fair trial, since remarks linking him to Dante’s Inferno were brief, and since record contained overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt on charged offenses, where: (1) defendant admitted he was drug dealer; and (2) record showed existence of pooled funds as well as shared drug supplier and customers, and existence of coordination among defendant and others in distribution of drugs.
