Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 7/11/18.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen and robbery. Convictions violate the one-act, one-crime principle, as the basis for both convictions was Defendant's single physical act of punching the victim.  There was no evidence that Defendant used another act of force to take the money from victim. Conviction for aggravated battery of a senior citizen is less serious than robbery of a senior citizen, and is thus vacated. (NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 7/11/18.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) in a public park. The firearm restrictions within a public park provision continues to accomplish the aim of protecting the police and public from dangerous weapons, without effectively prohibiting possession of a firearm for self-defense within a vast majority of acreage in Chicago. That section of UUW statute is not facially unconstitutional. (CUNNINGHAM, concurring; HOFFMAN, specially concurring).

Defendant, age 20 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that any prejudicial effect of witness lineup testimony was outweighed by its probative value. Police were not required to inform Defendant, prior to questioning asnd as part of their Miranda warnings, that he had the right to terminate questioning at any time. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 40 years. Defendant was on probation at time of offense, and court found that Defendant was, and still is, an active gang member. (BURKE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 4 counts of 1st degree murder and 1 count of 1st degree felony murder, in stabbing death of woman, and was sentenced to natural life in prison. Court sufficiently considered Defendants youth and its attendant characteristics prior to sentencing him.(HARRIS and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Prosecutor misled jury during closing arguments as to victim’s testimony. State’s evidence did not establish element of penetration and thus was insufficient to sustain a conviction of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Thus, Defendant mad e substantial showing of a constitutional violation as to his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. (JORGENSEN, specially concurring; HUTCHINSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver more than 2000 but not more than 5000 grams of cannabis, and was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, but then court reconsidered and changed to 48 months probation; but then, on motion of State, resentenced Defendant to 4 years. Court erred in granting motion of State to reconsider, as order of probation was not an illegal sentence, even if court beleived that its rationale was flawed when it entered that sentence. (HUDSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant, then age 17, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of an 11-year-old boy. Defendant confessed to police in writing after 50 hours in custody without a probable cause determination. Court had ruled that Defendants confession was voluntary. Defendants mandated lifetime registration under Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) is not punishment imposed as a result of his conviction. The 8th Amendment and proportionate penalties clause do not apply unless and until a statute imposes punishment or a penalty. Subsection (i) of Juvenile SORA is a non-punitive jurisdictional statute that does not apply to Defedant.Defendant was provided his Miranda rights before questioning, the police questioning was not unreasonable in duration, and Defendant placed a call to his grandmother after 15 hours in custody. Totality of circumstances do not warrant suppression of confession.(PIERCE and MIKVA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to 3 years of felony probation. Court dismissed postconviction petition, filed 5 months after satisfactory termination of his probation. Court acted promptly and within 90 days after docketing (which is date when clerk of court entered petition into the case file and set it for hearing) of refiled petition. Filing and docketing are two different acts. Sex offender registration status does not qualify as imprisoned under Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Thus, Defendant lacked standing to file his petition, and court properly dismissed it. (BURKE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of  several offenses which were merged into single offense of armed habitual criminal. The armed habitual criminal statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant, who committed 2 prior felonies.Statute is a valid exercise of the right of Illinois to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens from the potential danger posed by convicted felons in possession of firearms. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)