Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder. Court erred in its 2nd-stage dismissal of actual innocence claim, but court properly entered 3rd-stage denial of ineffective assistance claim, in amended postconviction petition. Hearsay affidavits of 2 witnesses were material and noncumulative, and were newly discovered, and were admissible under Rule 1101(b)(3) and must be taken as true when determining whether to advance petition to a 3rd-stage hearing. Defendant made a substantial showing of actual innocence sufficient to advance petition to a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. Counsel made determination to not call alibi witnesses as a matter of trial strategy, and no prejudice from failure of alibi witnesses to testify. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of armed robbery. Court properly denied postconviction petition after 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing.Question of comment by Defendant, about a lawyer, was made before officer had read Defendant Miranda warnings and before he started asking Defendant questiions bout the offense. It was ambiguous and was not a clear invocation of right to counsel that would have required officer to stop questioning him until an attorney was present. (McDADE and OBRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of felony child endangerment as to his 26-month-old daughter, who died. Decision of court to partially close courtroom during voir dire did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial and did not undermine integrity of the judicial process.Court could reasonably conclude that Defendant willfully endangered life or health of his child, as he admitted that he roughly forced her into her daybed for her nap. Court did not err in giving jury instruction that used the word willfully rather than the word knowingly, as both terms reflect the same state of mind for child endangerment offenses.(WRIGHT, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed violence, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The acts of armed violence based on drug possession and possession of a weapon by a felon are separate acts. Even though both offenses involve possession of a gun, the armed violence count also includes the separate act of simultaneously possessing drugs. Unlawful possession of a gun by a felon is not a lesser-included offense of armed violence. Entry of judgment on both convictions did not violate 1-act, 1-crime principles and was not error. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person (SVP). Court later conditionally released Respondent, but court revoked that on petition of State.  Court did not abuse its discretion in revoking conditional release. Court considered all relevant factors, and its determination was well supported by evidence presented, as Respondent refused to participate in the conditions of his release. State sufficiently disclosed testimony of its expert and gave Respondent reasonable notice of it. (REYES and HALL, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, entered negotiated ple of 18 years; State agreed to amend charge from armed robbery with a firearm (which excluded Defendant from juvenile court) to armed robbery with a dangerous weapon.State was not required to request a hearing for adult sentencing when both parties already agreed upon exact sentence to be imposed. (HARIS and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant entered a nonnegotiated guilty plea to 1st-degree murder of her newborn daughter. Sixth amendment guarantees the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel, not appellate counsel. Although a postconviction petition must be given a liberal construction, the reference in petition to the sixth amendment did not transform her claim into one of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Thus, court properly dismissed postconviction petition, which made no reference to appellate counsel.(ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 7/20/18.) Defendant, age 21 at the time, began a relationship with female who was 16 but who represented herself to be 18. Court properly admitted and published a voicemail recording during Defendant's cross-examination. Defendant's lifetime subjection to sex offender statutes is grossly disproportionate punishment as applied to him. No evidence suggested that Defendant intentionally preyed upon underage girls.(LYTTON, concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of disorderly conduct and assault. His pro se 4-sentence motion to reconsider did not sufficiently raise a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and did not mandate that court conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. (HUDSON and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)