Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery and aggravated domestic battery by strangulation of his ex-girlfriend. Court did not violate Defendant's confrontation rights by applying forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception to admit victim's prior out-of-court statements into evidence. State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant's wrongful communications with victim, trying to pressure her to not testify or to change her testimony, caused her to be unavailable so as to render her statements admissible under that exception. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to 16 years; Defendant had extensive criminal history, and court considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of counterfeit trademark violation, for selling counterfeit handbag. Defendant told undercover officer that handbag was only $20 because it was fake. Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that handbags in question bore counterfeit marks. Purpose of Counterfeit Trademark Act is not only to penalize persons selling counterfeit items under the guise that the items are authentic, but also to penalize those who disclaim to the consumer, as in this case.If a person knows an item is a counterfeit item, and sells or intends to sell it, that person has committed a crime under Section 2 of the Act.(HOFFMAN and DELORT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted 1st-degree murder. Court appointed counsel to represent Defendant on his pro se postconviction petition, but then allowed counsel to withdraw, and court dismissed postconviction petition on motion of State. Postconviction counsel failed to demonstrate compliance with mandate of Supreme Court Rule 651(c ) that counsel ascertain the defendant's contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights. Although counsel attempted twice to state the claims in pro se petition, it cannot be concluded that counsel ascertained the claim that she failed to mention in those two attempts. (McLAREN and ZENOFF, concurring.)

An undercover purchased commercially packaged products from smoke shop owned by Defendant. Lab results revealed that products contained lab-manufactured synthetic cannabinoids. Defendant appealed his convictions of delivery of a controlled substance and unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Rational inference to ble drawn from all evidence was that Defendant knew that he possessed and sold products containing illegal substances. A rational fact finder could determine that the State met its burden of proof that the Defendant knew that the substance was illegal. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 7/2/18.) Case on remand from supervisory order of Illinois Supreme Court. Defendant, then age 15, was charge with 2st degree murder for shooting of 13-year old. Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult in criminal court. Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murder, and sentenced to 50 years. Defendant's 50-year sentence, pursuant to which he will not be eligible for release until age 65, is not a de facto life sentence and thus consideration of the "distinctive attributes of youth" was not required. Sentence does not violate 8th amendment or proportionate penalties clause. (HARRIS, concurring; MIKVA, dissenting in part.)

Court dismissed Defendants pro se petition for relief from judgment. Defendant was deprived of due process when court dismissed his petition before he had an opportunity to meaningfully respond.If Defendant had been allowed to respond to States motion to dismiss, he could have responded prior to court ruling on motion, and if court ruled against him, he could then have filed a motion to reconsider, to raise alleged errors in courts application of the law and/or then filed an appeal. The deprivation of one responsive option rises to the level of a constitutional violation of due process. (HUDSON and McLAREN, concurring.)

Defendant was, after bench trial, convicted of resisting a peace officer. Prior to trial, parties reached a written stipulation, signed by both counsel and read into the record and referenced in written order, as to what testimony would be given by a civilian witness, whom State intended to call but who would be unavailable for trial the next day. Court erred when it allowed State, which did not allege that facts contained therein were untrue or incorrect, to unilaterally withdraw stipulation that parties had agreed to the day before trial. Request to withdraw stipulation was not seasonably made, as it was just moments before opening statements and defense had no time to react to change in case. (O’BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance. Officer saw Defendant crouched down near entrance to an abandoned building, and after Defendant ran, officer pursued him and took him into custody.There was evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant possessed the baggies of heroin based on witness testimony that Defendant had something in his hand as he reached behind the stairs, and he did not have anything in his hand as he ran away, and 9 baggies of suspect heroin were recovered from behind the stairs. (HYMAN, concurring; PUCINSKI, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of violating order of protection, stalking, and aggravated stalking. Evidence showed that Defendant created a fictitious Facebook account in the name of friend of ex-wife of Defendant, downloaded pictures of her and her family, and  obtained mail addressed to her, which constituted monitoring, under the constitutional portion of the aggravated stalking statute. Court reasonably found that Defendant knew or should have known that this conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer other emotional distress.(HUDSON and McLAREN, concurring.)