Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 84-month term of incarceration on drug distribution, possession of firearm in furtherance of drug distribution and felon in possession of firearm charges, even though Dist. Ct. did not group together defendant’s drug distribution and felon in possession of firearm charges for purposes of sentencing. Ct. in Sinclair, 770 F.3d 1148, specifically precluded Dist. Ct. from grouping said offenses because felon in possession charge had no impact on guideline range for drug distribution charge, and defendant otherwise failed to provide any convincing argument to overrule Sinclair. Ct. also rejected defendant’s contention that Sinclair was implicitly overturned in Cherry, 855 F.3d 813.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that trial court improperly disqualified defendant’s trial counsel, after finding that trial counsel had potential conflict of interest. While law recognizes presumption in favor of defendant’s counsel of choice, instant disqualification was not improper where: (1) according to state, witness heard from third-party that third-party and defendant were involved in subject shooting; (2) trial counsel had previously represented third-party in separate criminal matter and had held recent communication with witness; and (3) trial court could find that trial counsel’s simultaneous representation of third-party and defendant could create per se conflict of interest that could leave any conviction of defendant subject to reversal. Fact that third-party never testified did not require different result. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call certain witnesses, where record supported finding that said failure was matter of trial strategy; and (2) prosecution knowingly allowed witness to commit perjury, where defendant had failed to show that either police or state had coerced false testimony or that prosecutor had been aware of any perjury.

Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in denying defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas to wire fraud and unlawful financial transactions charges. While defendant argued that instant plea colloquies were inadequate because they did not sufficiently explore potential effects of defendant’s bipolar disorder that could have impacted his decision to enter into guilty pleas, defendant failed to point to any evidence that his judgment was significantly impaired during plea-agreement negotiations or during either plea colloquy. Moreover, defendant testified that he was not under influence of drugs or alcohol and agreed with magistrate’s assessment that he was “fully in the moment and understanding what’s going on.” Ct. further rejected notion that fact that defendant had mental illness was sufficient by itself to establish that said illness obstructed his ability to understand his pleas. Also, fact that magistrate elicited only one-word responses to questions posed during colloquy did not require different result.