Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his 15-year sentence on illegal possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that he qualified as armed career criminal based on his prior Illinois convictions for aggravated battery, residential burglary and armed robbery. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his residential burglary and armed robbery convictions did not qualify as violent felonies under Armed Career Criminal Act.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his Wisc. sexual assault conviction on ground that trial court had improperly applied Wisc. rape-shield law to preclude him from questioning victim as to prior consensual sexual encounters with him. While defendant argued that exclusion of said evidence violated his confrontation right and right to present defense, state court properly applied “inverted balancing test” associated with rape-shield law that favored finding that evidence of victim's sexual history was not relevant in instant criminal proceeding. Moreover, defendant’s proffered evidence did not fall within any exception to rape-shield law, where his proffered evidence that he and victim had prior encounters in which they had fondled each other was too dissimilar to charged conduct involving forced sexual intercourse so as to make defendant’s contention that victim had consented to vaginal intercourse more believable than victim’s claim that defendant had forced himself on her.
In prosecution on robbery and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his confession, even though defendant argued that police officers violated his Miranda rights by questioning him after he had invoked his right to counsel. Defendant’s statement at beginning of interrogation (and after he had received Miranda warnings) that: “I haven’t even gotten a chance to get a lawyer or anything” was too ambiguous so as to constitute clear invocation of right to counsel, since defendant merely indicated that he had not acquired lawyer. As such, police had no obligation to stop questioning defendant.
(Court opinion corrected 3/22/18.) Court properly denied Defendant leave to file 2nd successive postconviction petition, which made claim of actual innocence.Affidavits as to proposed testimony of Defendant's cousins is immaterial, as testimony is irrelevant, cumulative, and not probative of Defendant's innocence under accountability theory. Supreme Court Rule 651 applies to counsel appointed or retained after a pro se petition, but not to counsel that was privately retained by the prisoner to file the initial petition. Trial counsel's failure to call certain witnesses at trial was not an error that so infected entire trial that resulting conviction violates due process.(NEVILLE, concurring; HYMAN, specially concurring.)
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction petition, seeking, among other things, DNA testing under section 116-3 of Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/116-3) of hair and clothing collected by State at issue in his predatory criminal sexual assault conviction, where trial court acted on said petition after denying defendant’s privately-retained counsel's request to enter limited scope appearance under Rule 13(c)(6) to represent defendant on his motion for DNA testing. While trial court, in denying counsel’s request to enter limited appearance, encouraged said counsel to file appearance in post-conviction proceeding, Appellate Court, in reversing denial of defendant’s post-conviction petition, found that trial court’s denial of counsel’s request to enter limited scope appearance was arbitrary and violated defendant’s due process rights. Fact that defendant had other counsel representing him on other pending motions in post-conviction proceeding was irrelevant.
This case presents question as to whether defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to imposition of $57 in fines as part of defendant’s sentence of 24 years on predatory criminal sexual assault of child charge. While defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to $25 judicial facilities fee and $100 VCVA assessment that would have been reduced to $68 had such objection been made, Appellate Court, in rejecting defendant’s claim, found that defendant’s contention concerned only de minimus amount of monetary assessments that did not render counsel's representation of defendant constitutionally deficient. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that imposition of said fines was done in violation of ex post facto principles, and relative small amount of said fines should have no bearing on whether his trial counsel had constitutional duty to object to said fines. (Dissent filed.)
This case presents question as to whether govt. proved defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt on home invasion charge, where defendant, who was subject to court order prohibiting him from going to or entering particular residence, nevertheless went to said residence and was allowed to enter said residence by resident. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s conviction, found that defendant was not guilty of home invasion, where, with resident’s consent, he entered resident’s dwelling, even though doing so was in violation of court order.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to bar govt. re-prosecution of defendant on aggravated criminal sexual abuse charges under circumstances, where: (1) in prior trial on said charges jury told trial court that it was at impasse after three-hour deliberation; (2) without notifying State or defendant, trial court directed bailiff to tell jury to continue deliberating; (3) jury foreman subsequently reported in open court that jury was still at impasse after five hours of deliberation; and (4) trial court denied State’s and defendant’s request to give Prim instruction and sua sponte declared mistrial. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that double jeopardy provisions contained in section 3-4(a)(3) of Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(3)) barred defendant’s retrial on instant charges, where: (1) there was no manifest necessity for trial court’s sua sponte declaration of mistrial; and (2) trial court’s ex parte communication with jury prejudiced defendant. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that Appellate Court wrongly found that defendant’s lack of specific objection to trial court’s mistrial at time it was announced did not preclude him from making subsequent double jeopardy claim.
Court erred in denying Defendant's postconviction petition, as defense counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, which failed to file a substantially comply with Rule 651(c). Record does not establish that defense counsel complied with mandate of Rule 651(c).(CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of disorderly conduct and sentenced him to 68 months in prison Court improperly considered in aggravation expert's written report of Defendant's fitness examination when sentencing Defendant, and this denied Defendant his right to a fair sentencing hearing.(HOLDER WHITE and DeARMOND, concurring.)
