Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, and sentenced to life in prison, for 1989 murders of 2 persons. Key evidence in State's case was an incriminating admission Defendant made to Area 3  detectives under command of Jon Burge.  Two of the accused officers invoked their 5^th-amendment rights against self-incrimination. Circuit court declined to draw an adverse inference against those two officers, although court had no defensible reason to so decline. This error could have changed outcome of hearing. Evidentiary hearing on a claim referred by Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission (TIRC) is a “postconviction hearing”, within meaning of Rule 1101, and thus Rules of Evidence do not apply.  (BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)

After bench trial, 16-year-old Defendant, tried as an adult, was convicted of 1^st degree murder and 2 counts of attempted murder, and was sentenced to 71 years. Record lacks affirmative proof that court erroneously shifted burden of proof to Defendant. Court thoroughly considered and tested Defendant’s theories, including argument that lack of DNA evidence exonerated him. Court was limited by sentencing scheme and thus did not expressly consider Miller factors which are required when sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term. Sentence violated 8^th amendment. Remanded for resentencing. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

After joint jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm. Court erred in admitting detective’s testimony as to historical cell site analysis (HCSA) evidence. This was inadmissible hearsay and was prejudicial. That detective used Google Earth to convert raw coordinate data from T-Mobile report into comprehensible format did not change its character as hearsay. Court’s blanket prohibition against defense counsel using trial transcript, on which he had written notes to assist with his closing argument, was an abuse of discretion, as court was effectively barring defense counsel from using his own notes. (HOFFMAN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of predatory criminal sexual assault as to 12-year-old victim. Sentence of 10 years is not cruel, unusual, or disproportionate. Counsel was not ineffective for not moving to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when there was no speedy-trial violation. Statute governing predatory criminal sexual assault was not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant. (BURKE and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, traveling to meet a minor, and grooming. Evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Court properly admitted transcript of text messages into evidence. There was direct and circumstantial evidence that text transcript was what State claimed it to be; undercover officer testified that he personally sent and received text messages to and from Defendant, and that he confirmed that text messages on phone matched those on computer.Tet messages are documentary evidence, and need not be authenticated as a computer-generated record. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of aggravated DUI; counts charged different minimum levels of blood-alcohol content (BAC). Parties stipulated to and court took judicial notice of Defendant's BAC level. Defense counsel cleared up any possible ambiguity by conceding to court, repeatedly, that State had established Defendant's BAC level. The 2 convictions violate the one act, one crime rule, as they are based on same physical act of driving.(BURKE and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery. Defendant did not make a clear and unequivocal statement of a desire to waive his appointed counsel and to proceed pro se following jury selection. Thus, court did not improperly deprive Defendant of his 6th amendment right to self-representation.(LYTTON, concurring; McDADE, dissenting).

Defendant was charged with 1st-degree murder of his wife. Court properly granted Defendant's motion to quash arrest warrant and suppress evidence seized as a result of execution of warrant. Items to be seized, as described on face of warrant, did not relate to murder investigation, and would have pertained to investigation of a drug offense.Valid portion of warrant cannot be severed from invalid description of items to be seized. Warrant did not expressly adopt complaint's description of items to be seized, but only acknowledged complaint and expressed a different description of items to be seized.(JORGENSEN, concurring; SPENCE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to 40 years. Court improperly allowed and considered State's objection to Defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction position. Court must conduct independent inquiry, without input from State, into whether motion should be granted. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)