Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of burglary, after he attempted to take video recording system from retail store without paying for it. Entry of a public building with intent to commit theft constitutes an entry "without authority". Court conducted balancing test and found that probative value of Defendant's prior residential burglary and burglary convictions outweighed danger of unfair prejudice. Neither convictions were remote in time to offenses at issue. Defendant's retail theft conviction was similar to burglary charge. Court gave IPI Criminal No. 3.13, stating that prior convictions were to be considered only as to Defendant's credibility and not as evidence of Defendant's guilt. (KNECHT and DeARMOND, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 3/27/18.) Defendant was sentenced to 12 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault with a dangerous weapon. Defendant forfeited his argument that sentencing was too lenient. Plain error does not apply, as Defendant was not prejudiced or deprived of a fair sentencing hearing. Court's error in sentencing benefited Defendant, as he was given an unlawfully lenient sentencing range. Although parties and court were misinformed, hearing was lengthy, thorough, and fair. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI and driving while license revoked or suspended with 3 prior convictions for driving while license revoked or suspended, a Class 4 felony. Gas station employee testified that he observed Defendant's vehicle enter parking lot and pull to gas pump, and that vehicle remained there for 20-30 minutes when it started to overheat; then, employee shook Defendant to wake him up. State presented sufficient evidence for jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated DUI. Charge was permissible as part of plea bargaining negotiations, and was not vindictive prosecution. Defendant was given a chance to plead "open" to lesser charge before trial, and Defendant acknowledged he understood the risk. Court was within its discretion to allow officers' testimony to come in at trial because it laid foundation for officers' opinions of Defendant's intoxication. Defendant was not denied a fair trial based on officers' in limine testimony coming in at trial. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, on accountability theory of 1st degree murder of one person and attempted murder  and aggravated discharge of a firearm as to 2 other persons. State's use of unsubstantiated assertions as to Defendant's alleged threat to intended victim's motion deprived him of a fair trial and was plain error in light of closeness of the evidence. State improperly bolstered otherwise admissible statement of identification by the only witness who testified that Defendant had a gun, by repeatedly showing jury photo arrays on which witness had written those statements.(PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery for beating his brother-in-law. Court satisfied inquiry requirement as to Defendant's ineffective of counsel claim, as court gave Defendant ample opportunity to explain each allegation. Court questioned Defendant and trial counsel, and adequately inquired into and considered Defendant's allegations in his court filing. Defendant's 15-year sentence, as a Class X offender, is not excessive and falls within applicable statutory guidelines. (STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault, and is thus subject to restrictions and obligations set forth in SORA (Sex Offender Registration Act). These restrictions and obligations do not violate Defendant's substantive and procedural due process rights. As Defendant presented no evidence of evaluations assessing his risk to reoffend, record is insufficient to determine whether imposing lifetime registration requirements is grossly disproportionate to Defendant's crime.(LYTTON, concurring; McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant asked court during voir dire to question venire about whether evidence that  he had engaged services of a prostitute would influence their judgment in any way. Court refused, and Defendant was found guilty on 3 counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Appellate court reversed and remanded for new trial. It was disputed whether victim and Defendant's previous sexual assault victim were prostitutes. Thus, Defendant's proposed question was a preliminary argument as to a disputed question of fact, a type of questioning generally not permitted during voir dire. Jury heard extensive testimony as to sexual conduct committed by Defendant, much of which given by Defendant himself. Refusing Defendant's proffered question as to prostitutiondid not  render voir dire proceeding fundamentally unfair. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDER, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring.)

The inability of jurors to unanimously agree upon whether a mitigating factor exists, for purposes of 2nd degree murder, results in a finding of 1st degree murder, as charged, and as necessarily found by the jury in the required statutory progression. A defendant's failure to sustain his burden of convincing all 12 jurors that a mitigating factor exists for purposes of 2nd degree murder does not nullify the jurors' unanimous finding that State has proven Defendant guilty of 1st degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Petitioner, State's Attorney, sought mandamus, asking Supreme Court to direct circuit court to vacate Defendant's 1-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and impose mandatory 4-year MSR term. Defendant had entered partially negotiated guilty plea to violating order of protection, a Class 4 felony based on his prior conviction for that same offense. Section 5-8-1(d)(6) of Unified Code of Corrections requires that Defendant's sentence  on that conviction include mandatory 4 years of MSR. A new sentencing hearing is not necessary. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)