Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed habitual criminal (AHC), aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, and 3 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Because Defendant' conviction for aggravated battery to a peace officer is not an enumerated offense in the AHC statute and does not meet the definition of forcible felony in section 2-8, it cannot serve as a predicate offense to support his AHC conviction. Remand for resentencing is unnecessary because court already sentenced Defendant to 6 years for the 3 AUUW convictions. (HARRIS and SIMON, concurring.)
In 2003, court found Plaintiff to be a sexually violent person (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, based on offense committed at age 16. In 2017, court properly denied Plaintiff's complaint for habeas corpus relief, as such relief is available only for a narrow scope of errors identified in Section 10-124 of Code of Civil Procedure, and not other errors, even if denial of constitutional right is involved. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on RICO/drug conspiracy charges stemming from defendant’s leadership role in street gang that operated drug distribution enterprise. Applicable charges required only that govt. establish that defendant knew about and agreed to facilitate commission of two predicate acts by another member of drug enterprise, and Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that govt. was required to show that he was personally involved in two or more predicate acts. Also, various witnesses supported instant conviction, where they testified about defendant’s role as manager of open-air drug market, and jury could properly believe govt. witness who testified that defendant ordered shooting of third-party for reasons related to defendant’s membership in gang. Fact that Ct. of Appeals could have assessed said witness’ credibility differently was irrelevant. Ct. further rejected defendant’s current double jeopardy argument stemming from his claim that he was being punished twice for same conduct at issue in prior 2011 conviction on drug charges, where: (1) Ct. of Appeals had previously rejected defendant’s double jeopardy argument in prior appeal of denial of his motion to dismiss instant charges; and (2) law of case doctrine precluded reconsideration of issue in absence of either change of law, finding that instant trial produced substantially different evidence, or finding that prior court decision was clearly erroneous.
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for new trial following jury’s guilty verdict on three counts of bank fraud stemming from defendant‘s receipt of proceeds from construction loans that defendant spent on property that was different from property he asserted in loan application. Basis of said motion was defendant’s receipt of newly discovered audiotape of conversation involving key govt. witness (who was officer at subject bank) that was generated during different criminal investigation, where contents of audiotape cast doubt on witness’ testimony that disputed defendant’s claim that defendant did not read or sign subject loan applications prior to their submission to bank. Record supported finding of Brady violation involving govt. withholding of said audiotape that contained favorable and material evidence that tended to impeach bank officer’s testimony, where: (1) content of audiotape indicated that bank had filled out false Suspicious Activity Report related to different loan application; (2) govt. had never prosecuted said bank officer, even though bank officer indicated that he might be subject to criminal charges; (3) it could be inferred that witness had received some benefit from govt. for his favorable testimony, where no charges had been filed against him; and (4) if jury did not believe bank officer, it could have found defendant more credible. (Dissent filed.)
Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, and was sentenced to 16 years, 5 years, and 12 years, to run concurrently. Defendant was found with over 1500 grams of cocaine and over 2 pounds of marijuana. Court properly considered amount of drugs possessed or sold as aggravating factor, within context of determining seriousness of offense, need to protect community, need for deterrence, and to punish Defendant. (HARRIS and KNECHT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. On appeal, Defendant argued that court failed to follow procedures in Rule 430 before allowing him to be shackled during his bench trial. As there is no possibility that shackling contributed to Defendant's conviction, plain-error doctrine does not apply, and shackling issue is forfeited. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Defendant, age 18 at time of offenses, was convicted of 1st degree murders for violent stabbing deaths of his girlfriend, age 17; her mother, age 43; and her younger sister, age 11. Court sentenced Defendant to mandatory term of natural life in prison. Eighth amendment protections, including as to mandatory sentence of natural life, are not implicated here, as Defendant was an adult at time of offenses. Sentence does not shock moral sense of community, and does not violate proportionate penalties clause.(BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)
Court entered 2nd-stage dismissal of Defendant's postconviction petition, which raised claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Court expressly found that at least one of Defendant's claims was not frivolous or patently without merit. Postconviction counsel did not amend Defendant's petition because he did not believe that there were any amendments he could make to present meritorious arguments. Court granted State's motion to dismiss, and found that Defendant's claims were forfeited because they could have been raised in direct appeal. Record does not explicitly show that postconviction counsel complied with all requirements of Rule 651. It was necessary to amend petition to allege ineffective assistance of postplea counsel and appellate counsel to allow Defendant's petition to survive State's motion to dismiss.(MOORE and OVERSTREET, concurring.)
Respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person (SVP) in 2010. Court's 2016 judgmernt finding no probable cause to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Respondent is still an SVP was proper. Section 65(b)(1) of SVP Commitment Act did not impose a legal duty on court to admit the 2016 reexamination report, which became available only after the parties had rested, and thus court did not abuse its discretion by excluding that report.(SCHOSTOK and SPENCER, concurring.)
Defendant, having been arrested and charged in domestic battery case for the 3rd time, rejected services of 6 attorneys and was urged by trial judge to accept services of attorney, and indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se. Defendant's waiver of counsel was not rendered ineffective by judge failing to specifically advise him at time of waiver about sentencing range. Defendant's statements and conduct show that he possessed a high degree of knowledge about charge, and he stated in opening that he was charged with a misdemeanor. State's comment in closing argument that Defendant was really a witness for the State, as he continued to victimize the victim during his cross-examination of her, was not sufficiently prejudicial to have affected fairness of trial. (PIERCE and HARRIS, concurring.)
