Criminal Law

Defendant, then age 17, pled guilty to criminal sexual abuse, after he and his 15-year-old high school girlfriend had sex. As a result, Defendant is required to register as a sex offender. Eight years later, Defendant accompanied his cousin and her 3 children onto a  bus chartered by Easter Seals, taking parents and children on a field trip; Defendant exited the bus when asked to do so, when a parent on bus recognized him as a sex offender. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful presence at a facility providing services exclusively directed toward children. State failed to prove that Defendant was knowingly present at a facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward children. (CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)

Section 3(a) of  Sex Offender Registration Act requires a 3-consecutive-day temporary absence as the trigger for the notification requirement. A charge under Section 3(a) that is couched in language of Section 3(a) is insufficient and facts that constitute the alleged crime are required to be specifically set forth. THe instrument here alleged that Defendant was temporarily absent for 3 or more days during 3 month period did not contain sufficient particularity to allow Defendant to prepare a defense. (WELCH and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of methamphetamine possession and disorderly conduct. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. Officers' entry into Defendant's trailer to arrest him was unlawful because they lacked a warrant, and exigent circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless intrusion were not present. Nothing in record indicates why slight delay involved in obtaining arrest warrant would have impeded officers' investigation of offense or ultimate apprehension of Defendant. Officers' entry into Defendant's home was neither peaceable nor consensual, as officers tried to grab Defendant through doorway and then chased Defendant inside trailer, and used Taser to subdue him.Officers could have handed Defendant ticket for appearance on disorderly conduct charge, and need not have crossed threshold into his residence.(BARBERIS and WELCH, concurring.)

Court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty to offense of armed robbery. Defendant presented more than a bare allegation that he would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial absent plea counsel's deficient performance. Considering plea counsel's advice, it was possible for Defendant to believe he could reduce his sentence by 50% when, in fact, Defendant was required to serve 85% of his sentence. Plea counsel's testimony corroborates Defendant's position that he entered plea under false impression that he would be eligible to obtain credit against his sentence. Defendant's ple was not truly knowing and voluntary. Even with enough evidence to support a conviction, a decision to reject guilty plea and proceed to trial would have been rational under the circumstances. (BARBERIS and CHAPMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church and other related charges. Defendant filed pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel. At hearing, court did not inquire into Defendant's complaint about his counsel's performance. Remanded for court to conduct inquiry into Defendant's pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to People v. Krankel. Allegations in Defendant's pro se motion were sufficient to trigger court's duty to conduct such inquiry, as Defendant explicitly alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel. (HOLDER WHITE and TURNER, concurring.)

Court denied Defendant's postconviction petition at 2nd stage. Record rebuts presumption that counsel fulfilled requirements of Rule 651(c ) because record shows that counsel failed to make necessary amendments to pro se petition to adequately present Defendant's claims, to shape them into proper legal form. Because counsel's amended petition failed to allege specific facts to support its general claims, there was nothing for court to take as true at 2nd stage, and was not in proper legal form, and counsel provided unreasonable level of assistance. Remanded so that postconviction counsel may file a new amended postconviction petition that adequately presents Defendant's claims, and to obtain and submit supporting affidavits and other evidence with petition.(McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct, for having sent Facebook message, "Hey. Long time no talk. How have you been?" to a minor (16 year old girl), causing minor to be alarmed and disturbed. Minor had first come in contact when she was 12, through text messages which eventually became sexual, and Defendant requested sexual pictures of minor. Minor met Defendant in person, and believed that he intended that meeting to be sexual. Defendant was then convicted of traveling to meet a minor and grooming. Context was relevant here, and evidence was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of disorderly conduct.(ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon while in possession of body armor. Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. Defendant clearly stated his intention to represent himself and thus waived his statutory right to assistance of counsel.Nothing in record suggests that Defendant sought counsel's assistance in amending petition. As Defendant discharged his postconviction counsel and elected to proceed pro se, he cannot complain about counsel's representation, including failure to amend postconviction petition. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)

Section 11.9.4-1(b) of Criminal Code provides that it is unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any publiv park building or on real property comprising any public park.There is a rational relation between protecting the public, especially children, from sex offenders and prohibiting sex offenders who have been convicted of crimes against minors from being present in public parks across the state.Section 11.9.4-1(b) is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and is not facially constitutional under substantive due process. Remanded for consideration of Defendant's as-applied ex post facto clause claim.(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)