Criminal Law

Riley v. Calloway

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Collateral Estoppel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-1831
Decision Date: 
February 20, 2018
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his armed habitual criminal conviction, which was based on his possession of firearm during incident which victim was murdered, as well as his prior felony convictions, where defendant argued that govt. was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him as armed habitual criminal due to his acquittal on murder charge stemming from same incident. Collateral estoppel did not apply so as to preclude instant subsequent prosecution on armed habitual criminal charge, since factual issues necessarily decided at murder trial were not identical to any pertinent fact at issue in armed habitual criminal trial, since jury in murder trial only found that defendant (as opposed to others) did not personally discharge firearm that proximately caused death of victim and did not resolve question as to whether defendant had merely possessed firearm during incident that was focus of armed habitual criminal charge.

U.S. v. Cureton

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 15-3575 & 15-3581 Cons.
Decision Date: 
February 16, 2018
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Remanded

Ct. of Appeals remanded for Dist. Ct.’s reconsideration of defendant’s 444-month sentence on charges of using firearm during crime of violence and other related crimes, where instant sentence was based on Dist. Ct.’s belief that it could not consider nature of mandatory minimum sentence for defendant’s section 924(c) firearm conviction when determining defendant’s sentence on his other related convictions. Dist. Ct.’s belief ran contrary to U.S. Supreme Ct. decision in Dean, 137 S. Ct. 1170, and thus limited remand was required to allow Dist. Ct. to determine whether it would have imposed same sentence knowing that it could consider mandatory sentence for section 924(c) conviction when deciding sentence for other convictions. Defendant, though, had argued for full resentencing on remand.

U.S. v. Bailey

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-1031
Decision Date: 
February 16, 2018
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime under 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A) under circumstances, where: (1) defendant offered to sell marijuana to informant at time when informant had already brokered purchase of firearm from defendant; and (2) informant had accepted defendant’s offer and purchased $40 worth of marijuana contemporaneously with firearm purchase. While defendant argued that record lacked evidence tying firearm with marijuana purchase so as to demonstrate that firearm actually furthered marijuana sale, record contained sufficient evidence of said linkage, where it was opportunity to purchase firearm that brought informant to defendant and made possible secondary sale of marijuana to informant.

Cates v. U.S.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 16-1778
Decision Date: 
February 20, 2018
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 24-year term of incarceration on charge that defendant-police officer deprived victim of her civil rights under color of law (18 USC section 242), arising out of defendant’s sexual assault of victim during defendant’s investigation of victim’s report of neighborhood dispute. Said sentence was based on jury’s finding that defendant’s conduct amounted to “aggravated sexual abuse,” that in turn increased maximum penalty for said offense from one year to life in prison. Moreover, defendant’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge govt.’s proposed instruction that improperly allowed jury to find that defendant had engaged in aggravated sexual abuse through use of psychological coercion or through implied threat based on defendant’s physical size or his status as police officer, rather than through use of physical force, as required for said finding under Boyles, 57 F.3d 535.

People v. Cook

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL App (1st) 142134
Decision Date: 
Friday, February 16, 2018
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div,
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
LAMPKIN

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm.Court did not err in denying Defendant's posttrial ineffective assistance of counsel motion without appointing new counsel and conducting a hearing because Defendant's claims pertained only to matters of trial strategy and did not show possible neglect of the case. Error in admitting hearsay testimony, the essence of which was properly admitted through another witness' prior inconsistent statements, did not severely threaten to tip scales of justice against Defendant. (REYES and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

People v. Johnson

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL App (5th) 140486
Decision Date: 
Friday, February 16, 2018
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Montgomery Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
CHAPMAN

Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing.Defendant filed pro se petition for relief from judgment, and then a pro se postconviction petition. Court allowed appointed counsel to withdraw, then appointed a new public defender who court also allowed to withdraw. Court then granted State's motion to dismiss. Court's ruling deprived Defendant of his statutory right to reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel. Before a court may grant an attorney's motion to withdraw and require defendant to proceed pro se against a State motion to dismiss, court must evaluate counsel's assertions and make its own determination that petition is frivolous and patently without merit.(MOORE and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson

Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Forfeiture
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL 121636
Decision Date: 
Friday, February 16, 2018
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Crawford Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court reversed; circuit court court affirmed.
Justice: 
KILBRIDE

Court properly concluded that State provided sufficient proof to establish statutory prerequisites for civil forfeiture of claimant's motorcycle by preponderance of the evidence. Claimant admitted that she knowingly gave her husband consent to drive her motorcycle although she knew he was intoxicated and his license was revoked. As claimant did not present sufficient evidence of value of motorcycle to enable court to determine whether forfeiture was an unconstitutionally excessive penalty, she failed to meet her substantial burden of proof in challenging constitutionality of forfeiture statute as applied.(FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring; KARMEIER, dissenting; BURKE, dissenting.)

U.S. v. Haynes

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Search and Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-2044
Decision Date: 
February 15, 2018
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., W. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

In prosecution on drug possession and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and firearm seized from defendant’s home pursuant to issuance of search warrant, even though defendant argued that affidavit supporting issuance of warrant did not establish probable cause because there were no statements that established reliability of information supplied by confidential informant, who otherwise could not name defendant as culprit. Police deputies corroborated information supplied by informant by conducting their own surveillance of defendant’s home and executing their own controlled buy that involved defendant. Also, properly executed controlled drug buy can establish probable cause even when tip that prompted it might not have been credible.

People v. Curry

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Possession of a Controlled Substance
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL App (1st) 152616
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, February 13, 2018
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Justice: 
CUNNINGHAM

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed violence and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Plain reading of armed violence statute requires a defendant to be armed during a confrontation with police or during commission of a felony offense. Possession of a gun while possessing drugs with intent to deliver establishes defendant's guilt for armed violence. regardless of how quickly he threw away gun while fleeing police. Court erred in convicting defendant for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, as it was the lesser-included offense of armed violence conviction. (CONNORS and DELORT, concurring.)

People v. McDonald

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL App (3d) 150507
Decision Date: 
Thursday, January 4, 2018
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Henry Co.
Holding: 
Vacated and remanded with instructions.
Justice: 
McDADE

(Modified upon denial of rehearing.) Defendant was in custody at time he filed pro se postconviction petition, but was subsequently released. A defendant who timely files a postconviction petition while in custody is eligible for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, regardless of whether he is released from custody in the intervening time. Pro se petition did not state a legally sufficient claim and thus required amendment by counsel so that such a claim could be formed. Defendant received unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, as neither of them filed an amended petition. (LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)