Criminal Law

Defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to unlawful possession of cocaine and was sentenced to 24 months' 1st-offender probation, or "410 probation". Less than 2 years later, INS notified Defendant that he was charged with being subject to deportation based on guilty plea relating to controlled substance, and he was ordered deported. As consequences of guilty plea to this offense are clear, certain and succinct (as Defendant was automatically subjected to deportation with no opportunity for discretionary relief, based on his guilty plea to this offense and 410 probation), trial counsel cannot satisfy his obligation with advice that is vague and equivocal. Court's admonishments did not definitively articulate immigration consequences of plea.Defendant's petition for ineffective assistance of counsel stated the gist of claim of deficient performance and a meritorious allegation of prejudice.(McLAREN and SPENCE, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/17/18.) Defendant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty to violating order of protection. Defense counsel's Rule 604(d) certification was insufficient as it did not state whether counsel consulted with Defendant on the sentence. Requirement of strict compliance with Rule 604(d) is not limited to open pleas, as Rule is directed at court's acceptance of plea and imposition of sentence, not parties' agreement as to a specific sentence. (PUCINSKI and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder for shooting death, and sentenced to 51 years. Court did not err when it instructed jury as to reasonable doubt. State did not err in its comments in closing arguments, "Don't let the defendant walk out those doors", as comments do not make reference to Defendant being in custody. Evidence at trial was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of murder. Witness was consistent throughout his identifications of Defendant as the shooter. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 1/12/18.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 5 counts of home invasion, 2 counts of armed robbery, and 1 count of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Mittimus should be corrected to reflect court’s oral pronouncement that home-invasion convictions should be merged together and that the armed-robbery convictions should be merged together. Defendant is eligible to receive day-for-day good-tie credit on his home-invasion sentence. IPI Criminal Jury Instruction No. 3.06-3.07 applies to a defendant’s self-incriminating statements relating to the charged offense. Court erred in giving that instruction in this case; no self-incriminating statements by Defendant were put before jury, but error was forfeited and was harmless, and did not prejudice Defendant. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as court conducted sufficient Krankel inquiry as to Defendant’s claim as to his counsel’s refusal to allow him to testify, and as to his objecting to counsel’s choice of defense theory.   (BURKE and GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of theft of a credenza but found not guilty of theft of engine.Court ordered $1,100 in restitution, which was testimony of victim as to value of credenza as noted in PSI. Court specifically found that State failed to prove that credenza had a fair market value over $500. Thus, court incorrectly ordered restitution in an amount unsupported by evidence, and essentially sentenced Defendant for the felony theft of which he had been acquitted. Thus, error was structural and 2nd-prong plain error. Order of restitution vacated on plain-error grounds. Remanded for proper inquiry concerning imposition of public defendant fee.(HUDSON and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Defendant claimed that his court-appointed counsel for his Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment failed to provide adequate assistance for failing to amend his petition to overcome procedural bar of timeliness.  Appointed counsel proceeded under the incorrect belief that he was not required to review the record or make any amendments to Defendant's pro se petition, counsel provided inadequate assistance. (LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)