Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach certain witnesses who were at murder scene and for representing him while suffering from alcoholism. Defendant procedurally defaulted certain aspects of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where he failed to include in state court petition for leave to appeal precise contentions as to why his trial counsel was ineffective. As to defendant’s non-defaulted claim that counsel should have impeached one witness who placed defendant at murder scene, defendant could not show that any failure to impeach said witness was prejudicial, where credibility of said witness was undermined by other evidence. Also, counsel’s personal problems with alcoholism, without evidence of any specific alcohol-related incident, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Too, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant’s claim that prosecutor withheld helpful evidence regarding existence of sentencing deals given to certain witnesses testifying on behalf of State, where all court documents regarding said sentences were available to public. Moreover, other withheld evidence pertaining to fact that one witness merely sought deal with prosecutor would not have changed outcome of trial.

In prosecution on several counts of distribution of sexually explicit pictures, Dist. Ct. erred in accepting defendant’s guilty plea without giving defendant required Rule 11 colloquy to establish that said plea was knowing and voluntary. Record showed that defendant had previously entered into guilty plea in which Dist. Ct. had given Rule 11 colloquy, but that defendant thereafter was granted leave to withdraw said plea. As such, Dist. Ct. was required to give new Rule 11 colloquy when defendant again wished to enter guilty plea, especially where record showed existence of defendant’s confusion as to: (1) what and how many counts were covered by said plea; and (2) whether govt. was going to abide by terms of original guilty plea. On remand, Dist. Ct. must allow defendant to enter either guilty or not guilty plea, and prosecution will thereafter be able to decide whether to pursue any plea agreement.

In prosecution on drug distribution and related firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing govt. witness to give expert testimony without examining credentials of said witness or determining whether expert testimony would assist jury in resolution of case. No Daubert hearing was necessary in instant case, where: (1) said witness was DEA agent, who had 16 years experience and had been involved in many drug cases; and (2) witness’ training and expertise was of sort that was helpful to jury in drug distribution case. Moreover, said witness properly did not give opinion as to whether defendant had requisite mental state to constitute element of charged offense, where said witness couched his testimony in light of his expertise. Also, said witness could properly opine as to whether quantity of drugs linked to defendant was consistent with average user’s personal consumption. Additionally, Dist. Ct. could properly refuse defendant’s request for access to grand jury materials, where information from grand jury is presumptively secret, and where defendant otherwise failed to show that his need for disclosure of said materials outweighed need for secrecy. Too, prosecutor’s statement to defendant that he would seek superceding indictment with more charges if defendant rejected proposed plea offer did not establish claim that prosecutor was vindictive, even though defendant eventually rejected plea offer and trial on superceding indictment proceeded.

Dist. Ct. erred in proceeding with sentencing hearing on charges of possession of ammunition by felon, where, on day of sentencing hearing, defendant had made request to represent himself at said hearing, and where Dist. Ct. summarily denied said request. Defendant disputed proposed enhancement that he had fired handgun during incident that led to his arrest, and defendant made combined request to have his appointed counsel withdraw from case and for continuance so that he could personally be prepared for sentencing hearing. Dist. Ct. could not summarily deny defendant’s request, where: (1) request clearly indicated that defendant wished to proceed pro se; (2) Dist. Ct. confirmed to defendant that it was denying instant request to proceed pro se; and (3) Dist. Ct. failed to give defendant required Faretta (422 U.S. 806) colloquy to address his request for self-representation. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in finding that defendant’s prior Indiana conviction on crime of strangulation qualified as crime of violence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines.

Dist. Ct. abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to five-year term of probation on charges of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, where instant sentence was 151 months lower than applicable guidelines range and 57 months lower than sentence recommended by defendant’s lawyer. At time of his arrest, defendant, who had career-offender designation, was subject to two separate 4-year felony conditional discharge sentences for possessing and selling marijuana imposed in August of 2012, and Dist. Ct. otherwise neglected considerations of deterrence when considering section 3553(a) sentencing factors relevant to defendant’s sentence of probation. Also, while defendant presented mitigation evidence that concerned his troubled childhood and negative impact that term of incarceration would have on his employment and family support, said mitigation was not so extraordinary so as to justify degree of downward departure from guideline range.