Defendant was convicted of robbery, and challenged on appeal the fines and fees imposed. Remanded for a statutorily compliant hearing on whether Defendant should be required to reimburse State for any part of cost of his representation by public defender's office. Defendant's fines and fees order directed to be modified to accurately reflect presentence incarceration credit to which Defendant is entitled. (PIERCE and HARRIS, concurring.)
A Krankel-like procedure for preliminary inquiry should apply to situations where a defendant makes a claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel at 3rd stage of proceedings. Defendant does not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during postconviction collateral proceeding. A defendant is guaranteed only the "reasonable" assistance of appointed counsel during postconviction proceedings. An inquiry into defendant's pro se claim of unreasonable assistance permits court to determine if new counsel needs to be appointed to avoid any conflict.(HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on receipt and possession of child pornography, where said pornography was found on laptop and desktop computers found in defendant’s home. While defendant argued that govt. failed to prove him guilty beyond reasonable, where both he and his wife used said computers, forensic evidence indicated that defendant was culprit, where: (1) account used to download and share pornography was registered under defendant’s name and business email address; (2) icon used to access said account program was located in same folder as icon used to access defendant’s email; and (3) other files, including defendant’s business and financial records, his cigar receipts and his golf-handicap spreadsheet, corroborated fact that instant computers were defendant’s computers. Moreover, defendant’s prior conviction on charge of sexual abuse of minor was proof of motive in instant charged offenses, where defendant had long-standing sexual interest in children.
Court properly granted Defendants' motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Officer had probable cause to stop vehicle for failure to signal a lane change. Officer yelled "hey, no talking" at Defendants, thus indicating that compliance with officer's request might be compelled, and was in the nature of an order, along with other demands officer made of Defendants within a short period of time. Thus, a reasonable person would not believe that he was allowed to leave the scene completely. Thus, as officer had neither probable cause nor reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Defendants, and encounter from that point on was not consensual, improper seizure occurred. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of obstructing identification for giving a false name to an officer who had good cause ot believe that Defendant was a witness to a crime. Officer must have, at the time that he requests identification, probable cause to believe that Defendant is a witness to a crime; but here, officer did not have that belief at that time, and did not issue traffic citation to anyone. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
In prosecution on armed robbery, drug and unlawful possession of firearm offenses, Dist. Ct. did not violate defendant’s 6th Amendment right to public trial, even though on both days of trial Dist. Ct. allowed proceedings to continue beyond 5:00 p.m. closing time when courthouse doors were locked, but courtroom doors were open. On first day of trial, Dist. Ct. allowed three witness to testify beyond 5:00 p.m. closing time, and on second day of trial, closing arguments began on 4:01 p.m., and jury retired at 6:40 p.m. and came back with verdict at 9:16 p.m. Defendant failed to object at trial to continuation of proceedings beyond 5:00 p.m., and Defendant otherwise failed to establish clear and obvious error that violated his 6th Amendment rights, where: (1) locked courthouse doors were limited in duration and concerned only limited portion of trial; (2) testimonies of witnesses while courthouse doors were locked did not play significant part of trial; and (3) defendant failed to show that anyone tried to attend trial after 5:00 p.m., but could not get into courthouse. Defendant, though, was entitled to limited remand for determination as to whether Dist. Ct. would impose same 96-month term of incarceration, where Dist. Ct. improperly believed, in contravention to Dean, 137 S.Ct. 1170, that it could not consider mandatory minimum nature of defendant’s consecutive sentence on firearms charge when determining sentence on other charges.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of aggravated DUI, after his pickup truck collided with a motorcycle, killing the driver and seriously injuring passenger.Court could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant's driving proximately caused driver's death and passenger's injuries. Multiple eyewitnesses testified that Defendant attempted a lef-hand turn during a yellow light, while motorcycle approached form opposite direction.Court did not abuse its discretion in preventing State's accident reconstruction expert from testifying as to color of traffic lights or opining as to who was at fault for collision. It was reasonable for court to instead rely on eyewitnesses' trial testimony as to color of lights, and to conclude that expert's opinion on "fault" would not be helpful. (CONNORS adn DELORT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to below-Guidelines, 120-month term of incarceration on charge of attempting to provide material support to foreign terrorist organization, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant qualified for “terrorism” enhancement under section 3A1.4 of USSG because defendant’s crime was calculated to influence or affect conduct of govt. by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against govt. conduct. Defendant’s writings established direct causal link between his hatred of U.S. govt. and his desire to join ISIS “for war against American liars” and to “kill me some American soldier boys.” While defendant described his anti-U.S. rants as mere venting, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s decision to join ISIS’s war against U.S. was act of retaliation. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant’s argument that he wanted to join ISIS solely to help less fortunate individuals or to seek shelter from impending holy war.
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of burglary and sentenced as a Class X offender to 8 years. Order of fines, fees, and costs (totaling $749) is modified. Parties may seek agreed remand in trial court for purpose of correcting fines and fees orders, and stipulate to presentence credit against these assessments.(PUCINSKI, concurring; NEVILLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Section 24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) of the unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) statute, which prohibits an individual from carrying or possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a public park, is unconstitutional. As the law functions as a categorical prohibition without providing an exception for law-abiding persons, it is a severe burden on second amendment right of self-defense. The unconstitutional portion of the statute is severable from the remaining portions of statute. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)
