Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery with a firearm, on theory of accountability; his co-hort, Nesbit, used a gun. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a prosecution witness's conviction of armed robbery with a firearm. Because Defendant conceded that he committed the robbery, the sole issue for jury was whether gun used by Nesbit was a real firearm. Nesbit's conviction of a recent armed robbery with a firearm was relevant to that issue. Probative value of that conviction was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (HUTCHINSON and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree felony murder predicated on attempted armed robbery while armed with a firearm.Defendant was aware that charge of felony murder was predicated on attempted armed robbery with a firearm and his attorney presented a defense to that charge.The lack of specificity in felony murder charge did not prejudice Defendant in preparing a defense, nor would it hamper Defendant's ability to plead his murder conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of same conduct.(KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of several offenses, including being an armed habitual criminal and armed violence. Under the one-act, one-crime analysis, Defendant's conduct consisted of multiple acts. A defendant's status is not factored into the analysis to determine whether a defendant's conduct consists of one act or several acts. The gun possession and the drug possession were separate acts.When the issue of lesser-included offenses arises in the context of a one-act, one-crime issue where the defendant was convicted of both offenses, the abstract elements approach is to be applied, as opposed to determining whether an uncharged offense is a lesser-included offense to a charged offense using the charging instrument approach. The one-act, one-crime rule did not prohibit Defendant's multiple convictions as they were separate acts. (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/19/18.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder of his 3rd ex-wife, Kathleen Savio. At the time of Kathleen's death, Defendant was married to Stacy Cales, who later went missing. Court's finding that Defendant murdered Stacy at least in part to prevent her from reporting or testifying about Defendant's involvement in death was not against manifest weight of evidence. Thus, no error in admission of Kathleen's and Stacy's hearsay statements at trial pursuant to doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. Defendant failed to show that counsel's decision to call Attorney Harry Smith (Kathleen's divorce attorney) as a trial witness was not within the realm of trial strategy, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel. Smith's conversation with Stacy was not subject to attorney-client privilege, as Smith had declined to represent Stacy. No per se conflict of interest arose when defense attorney Joel Brodsky entered into media contract. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts, as witness testified that Defendant offered him $25,000 to have his 3rd wife "taken care of". (KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 1/19/18.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 33 years. Court clearly abused its discretion when it denied Defendant's unequivocal and unambiguous request to represent himself, based on its belief that request was not in Defendant's best interest, rather than deytermining whether Defendant's request was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Error is second-prong plain error. Remanded for new trial. (HUDSON and BURKE, concurring.)