Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of child abduction by a noncustodial parent. On appeal, Defendant argued that State failed to present sufficient evidence that he took the child without the mother’s consent. Evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Defendant picked his son up from his mother at 3:30 a.m. to take him to breakfast. While the child’s mother testified that she had given Defendant permission to take the child to breakfast, she testified that she had just simply not anticipated him that early. Additionally, she denied saying anything to Defendant when he was leaving with the child nor making any attempt to contact Defendant after he left. Instead, she called the police. No rational fact finder would believe that a mother who was objecting to a child’s removal would remain completely silent under these circumstances. Thus, the evidence showed that the mother consented to the taking, and Defendant was not guilty of child abduction by a noncustodial parent.

Defendant appealed his conviction for domestic battery, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for requesting a self-defense instruction. Defendant argued the evidence did not meet the minimal threshold required for the instruction to be given, because Defendant testified and denied committing the necessary act (a battery). Counsel was not ineffective. Even though Defendant denied committing the act when he took the stand, evidence that Defendant admitted to the act came in during the State’s case-in-chief. Since evidence of Defendant’s admission to the act was introduced, Court properly delivered the self-defense jury instruction. Defendant’s counsel could not have been constitutionally deficient for requesting a jury instruction to which Defendant was legally entitled. Defendant also argued that his counsel had a conflict of interest in posttrial proceedings, because the only issue she raised was her own ineffectiveness at trial. While it is possible that a defense attorney may zealously and competently argue his or own ineffectiveness, Defendant’s counsel failed to do so by failing to track down evidence and placing the blame on Defendant and miscommunication.

Defendant was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault. On appeal, Defendant argued that he presented an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to investigate his negative chlamydia test results, and to present that evidence in support of his contention that the victim's positive chlamydia test results should have been admitted. Court properly found that Defendant’s counsel was not ineffective, because counsel did present this argument in court. Additionally, even if his counsel had failed to present the evidence such failure would not constitute deficient performance, because Court did not exclude the test results because counsel did not make an adequate offer of proof or because Court did not believe that evidence of Defendant's negative results existed. Instead, Court considered the relevance of the test results, and determined that their probative value did not outweigh the interests protected under the rape shield law.

The State’s Attorney of La Salle County appointed a special investigator pursuant to section 3-9005(b) of the Counties Code. The special investigator conducted a traffic stop against each Defendant, where he found a controlled substance. Defendants were charged with felony drug offenses, and each Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence contending that the investigator lacked the authority to conduct a traffic stop. Court granted the motions, and Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the conduct of the investigator exceeded the scope of section 3-9005(b). Court properly found that the investigator was not authorized to conduct traffic stops, because the statute only granted investigators the power to conduct investigations which “assist the State’s Attorney in the performance of his duties.” Even though one of the duties of the State’s Attorney was to investigate suspected illegal activity, this duty is limited to circumstances where other law enforcement agencies inadequately deal with such investigation.  Since the State did not show that any law enforcement agencies inadequately dealt with such investigation or that any law enforcement agency asked the State’s Attorney for assistance, the investigator’s traffic stops fell outside this scope of his permissible actions.

Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued Court committed reversible error by failing to conduct an adequate voir dire of a juror who indicated she did not understand the principle that the presumption of innocence stays with the defendant throughout the trial. Defendant argued that Court failed to (1) conduct any further inquiry concerning the juror’s understanding and acceptance of the fundamental principle, and (2) adequately inquire into the juror’s comprehension of English. Court’s error in failing to ascertain whether the juror understood and agreed with the principal was not so serious as to deny Defendant a fair trial. Additionally, Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the juror did not struggle to understand English, because Court’s other questions and her answers adequately demonstrated her understanding of English. Defendant also argued that Court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of 45-years’ imprisonment for murder and an additional consecutive 45-year term because he personally discharged the firearm that cause the victim’s death. Court did not abuse its discretion. The 45-year sentence for murder fell within the 20 to 60-year statutory sentencing range for which Defendant was eligible, and the other 45-year sentence fell within the 25 years to natural life statutory range for which he was also eligible.

On direct appeal from his first-degree murder conviction, Defendant argued, in part, that Court erred in admitting a Facebook post without sufficient authentication. During trial, court admitted a screenshot of a Facebook post on a profile under the name “Lorenzo Luckii Santos.” The screenshot showed a photograph of someone allegedly resembling Defendant and an undated post that stated, “its my way or the highway…..leave em dead n his driveway.” The State argued that the Facebook post was properly authenticated by evidence that Defendant’s nickname was “Luckii,” the victim was killed in his driveway, and the photograph allegedly resembled Defendant. This information did not provide circumstantial evidence sufficient for authentication, because the State failed to present any evidence that it was not public knowledge, which would tend to show that Defendant or someone acting on his behalf was responsible for the communication. Additionally, the State pointed to a detective’s testimony about the fleeting nature of the post. The detective testified that, on the day after the shooting, he discovered the post about 2 p.m. but it was deleted later that day. The State’s theory was that, after Defendant shot the victim, he created the post to boast of the offense, but thought better of making an incriminating statement on the Internet and deleted the post. However, the detective could not say when the post was created, and he had no way of knowing that its disappearance from his view was due to deletion and not a change in privacy settings. The State presented no evidence that Defendant ever accessed Facebook or even used the Internet, nor circumstances surrounding the post’s creation to show that Defendant was responsible for its contents. Thus, Court committed reversible error in admitting the Facebook post and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. 

After Defendant plead guilty to two crimes and was sentenced, he filed a pro se motion to correct the mittimus to reflect a different custody date for purposes of calculating presentence detention credit, which Court denied. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion. On appeal, he abandoned his initial claim, and contended for the first time that his fines and fees were erroneously assessed and that he was entitled to presentencing detention credit. Since Defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment or a motion to reconsider sentence within 30 days, Appellate Court could not consider his appeal on the merits. Additionally, Court’s denial of Defendant’s motion was not a final and appealable order over which Appellate Court had jurisdiction to review. In denying the motion, Court found that it committed no clerical error in entering those judgments and, therefore, left the original judgments in place. Thus, Court did not enter any new judgment from which Defendant could appeal.

During a bench trial, after the State closed both its case-in chief and rebuttal case, Court stated that it wanted to see the wallet involved and granted the State a continuance to admit the wallet into evidence. After conviction, Defendant appealed arguing that Court departed from the role of a neutral magistrate and took on the role of a prosecutor when it requested the State to present corroborating evidence. Court did not abuse its discretion in requesting to see the evidence. Court’s request was not an extraordinary course of action, and was done in a fair and impartial manner. Since it was a bench trial, Court possessed wide latitude, the question related to its fact-finding role, and the risk of prejudice to Defendant was low.