Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of robbery. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress robbery victim's identification testimony. The fact that Defendant was handcuffed and in police custody is not, standing alone, sufficient for Defendant to carry burden to show that identification procedure was unduly suggestive. Under the circumstances, police had ample reason to conduct a showup, as opposed to waiting to assemble a multi-person lineup or photo array at police station. No ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to have a 3rd party witness her conversation with robbery victim, in hallway outside courtroom. (HOFFMAN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search. Officer recovered a blue bag from above inside doorframe of outer door. State failed to present evidence that building was a multi-unit building and that area searched was accessible to others, and thus the entire building is considered a single-family home, which includes area above the inside doorframe. Officer's act of reaching above the inside doorframe was well beyond what an ordinary private citizen could do, where officer physically intruded on inside of home to gather evidence. Even though bag was found to contain suspect narcotics, incriminating nature of bag was not readily apparent, and thus plain view doctrine did not apply. No exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder in shooting death. Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition at 2nd stage of proceedings, finding that in light of State's strong evidence of Defendant's guilt, his "new" witnesses did not conclusively disprove State's theory of case, and Defendant was not prejudiced by alleged mistakes of his counsel. (HYMAN and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery in two separate, but related cases. In one of Defendant's cases there was a valid jury waiver, and in the other there was no discussion with Defendant about his right to a jury trial except a brief statement by court during arraignment.  Defendant's right to jury trial was violated, and is a plain error; thus, conviction in that case reversed, and remanded for new trial. (ELLIS and McBRIDE, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 6/15/17.) Defendant, age 18 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder by accountability and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. Defendant's personal history included significant mental health issues and traumas. Defendant played a critical role in developing criminal plan, which included concealing bodies of 2 persons who had been lured to apartment where they were robbed and killed, and was actively complicit in execution of robbery. Natural life sentence was not unconstitutional as applied. (CARTER and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed habitual criminal (AHC) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF).  Defendant's felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) was alleged as an element of the AHC offense, and may serve as a predicate felony, which State used to prove Defendant's status as a felon for UUWF, because there is no evidence presented that this conviction for AUUW was vacated. (SIMON, concurring; HYMAN, specially concurring.)

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. Court, after hearing, granted Defendant's motion to quash warrant and suppress evidence. At time of search, both U.SD. Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Court had already ruled that a dog sniff of front door of a residence was a 4th amendment search.  Thus, officer could not reasonably rely on older case law decisions involving dog sniffs in other contexts to authorize warrantless dog sniff of the front door of Defendant's residence in this case. Officer could not reasonably rely on a search warrant that was issued based on warrantless police dog sniff of front door of Defendant's apartment, as that practice had not been specifically authorized by any established precedent. Thus, good faith exception to exclusionary rule does not apply.  (O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, dissenting.)

Defendant entered plea of guilty to 2 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Defendant, 6 years later, filed pro se Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment, and argues, for the first time on appeal that he is entitled to a statutory $5-per-day presentence incarceration credit. The per diem credit is not a part of Defendant's sentencing calculus, and thus its exclusion does not increase available punishment. Subsection 110-14(b) is not barred by ex post facto concerns, and renders Defendant ineligible to receive the per diem credit. (O'BRIEN, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed habitual criminal (AHC), and was acquitted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Defendant, through counsel, had stipulated that his conviction of aggravated battery of a peace officer was a qualifying offense for purposes of AHC. Defendant's conviction for AHC should be reversed, as absent the stipulation, State could not have proved Defendant guilty of the offense. Both UUWF offenses contain the same elements, and prohibition against double jeopardy precludes entry of a conviction on the latter following his acquittal of the former. (HYMAN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)