Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting State’s motion for extension of time to comply with terms of conditional writ that required State to either release defendant within 120 days or grant him within same time period leave to file new direct appeal with assistance of counsel. Record showed that State filed instant motion on day after expiration of 120-day period (and on same day that defendant had filed motion seeking his immediate release), and Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in finding that State’s confusion as to whether it or defendant should have filed pleading to initiate new appeal was understandable. Ct. further found that State’s request for extension of time was properly characterized as motion under Rule 60(b)(1), which can be filed up to one year after entry of underlying order at issue in motion.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on wire fraud charges stemming from defendant’s scheme to submit home loan applications with declarations of inflated income and other false statements through use of straw buyers that resulted in defendant obtaining loan proceeds, as well as title to homes that had been facing foreclosure. Defendant failed to present evidence to support her claim that govt. had secretly agreed to change proposed sentence for one of its witnesses and further failed for purposes of establishing Brady violation to show that govt. had suppressed knowledge of potential probation sentence that was ultimately received by said witness. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in failing to ask prospective jurors: (1) their understanding of applicable burden of proof and presumption of innocence, where applicable case law did not require such inquiry; and (2) their experiences with home foreclosure businesses or with lawyers, since jurors knowledge about said topics would not normally incite passions within jury members. Too, defendant failed to show that Dist. Ct. lacked impartiality, as well as displayed hostility and contempt towards defendant’s counsel, even though Dist. Ct. had few instances of unprofessional comments towards defendant’s counsel, where outbursts from defendant’s counsel toward Dist. Ct. were frequent and serious and involved improper accusations that Dist. Ct. was helping govt. establish its case against defendant.

In prosecution on bank fraud charges, Dist. Ct. did not interfere with defendant’s presentation of his evidence/defense theory, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct: (1) failed to allow him to present evidence concerning true purpose of Scott Pippen loan that, according to defendant, would have bolstered his defense to instant fraud charges; and (2) interfered with his testimony about his own understanding of his net worth. Record, though, showed that defendant was able to offer testimony about true purpose of Pippen loan. Moreover, fact regarding defendant’s net worth was not relevant to issue as to whether defendant had submitted loan applications containing false statements and forged signatures. Also, defendant was not denied fair trial, where he largely succeeded in being able to present testimony that he wished jury to hear, and where defendant’s proposed jury instruction regarding his good-faith when submitting instant loan applications was properly rejected as being redundant to other instructions given to jury.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing on remand same 14-month term of incarceration that Dist. Ct. had imposed at initial sentencing hearing on charge that defendant-police officer used unreasonable and excessive force during arrests of two men who were already in control of other officers. Instant sentence was 19 months below applicable 33-to-41-month guideline range, and Dist. Ct. failed to adequately explain or justify instant below guideline sentence. Moreover, while Dist. Ct. justified sentencing by citing to victims’ wrongful conduct, as well as defendant’s history and characteristics, record did not factually support said citations. Also, record did not support Dist. Ct.’s claim that defendant had accepted responsibility for incidents that led to charged offense, or that reduction of sentence was warranted in light of defendant’s current employment or his attendance at 8-week anger management class. Too, instant below-guideline sentence was inconsistent with defendant’s prior misconduct that included assaults on three-year-old child and child’s mother.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 15-year statutory minimum term of incarceration on felon in possession of firearm charge, after finding that defendant qualified as armed career criminal under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on Minnesota convictions for simple robbery and felony domestic assault. Both offenses qualified as crimes of violence under ACCA, where: (1) under Maxwell, 823 F.3d 1057, simple robbery under Minnesota statute required proof of either intentional infliction or attempt to inflict physical pain or injury upon another or proof of act that placed person in fear of physical injury; and (2) under Yang, 799 F.3d 750, instant felony domestic assault charge required proof of intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or to inflict bodily harm. While defendant argued that there were hypothetical possibilities that individuals could be convicted under either offense without inflicting bodily harm, defendant failed to cite any cases that found anyone guilty of either offense that involved defendant’s hypothetical facts.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing defendant’s habeas petition challenging his drug-offense conviction on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for misinforming him that he would not be eligible for Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) sentence reduction if he pleaded guilty to instant charge. Defendant asserted that he would have pleaded guilty (instead of taking case to trial) if he had been properly advised of potential for FSA treatment, and while Dist. Ct. could properly fail to follow instant Magistrate Judge’s findings that defendant was credible in his claim, and that defendant’s counsel was not credible in his claim that defendant always wanted to take case to trial, Dist. Ct. could not do so here in denying defendant’s habeas petition, where it had failed to conduct its own de novo evidentiary hearing to assess credibility of defendant and his trial counsel.