Criminal Law

Court polled the jury after its guilty verdict against Defendant, asking “was this then and is this now your verdict.” Eight jurors answered “yes.” The ninth juror did not immediately answer, and moments later said “that’s now my verdict,” in which Court responded that it was going to ask the jury to continue deliberating. When the juror reiterated that it was “now” their verdict twice, Court moved on. On appeal, Defendant argued, in part, that Court did not conduct an adequate inquiry of the ninth juror. Since Defendant did not contemporaneously object to the trial court’s conduct, plain error review applies. Under these circumstances, the jury verdict was unanimous, and no error occurred. The juror made no request to change his vote, and stated his vote before Court’s response regarding further deliberation. Court’s response was not so serious as to have affected the fairness of the trial or the integrity of the judicial process.

Defendant was found guilty of residential burglary and sentenced to 20 years because of his prior criminal convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the abuse of discretion standard employed by courts reviewing the imposition of a sentence should be abandoned, because it is inconsistent with the Illinois Constitution, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b), and the Unified Code of Corrections. Appellate Court declined to abandon abuse of discretion standard. The Illinois Supreme Court has extensively considered the propriety of using the standard and has repeatedly upheld its use, and Appellate Court has no authority to overrule it. Further, Defendant’s 20-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion, because it was well within his sentencing range of 6 to 30 years, and Court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as Defendant’s rehabilitative potential.

Defendant was found guilty of residential burglary and sentenced to 20 years because of his prior criminal convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the abuse of discretion standard employed by courts reviewing the imposition of a sentence should be abandoned, because it is inconsistent with the Illinois Constitution, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b), and the Unified Code of Corrections. Appellate Court declined to abandon abuse of discretion standard. The Illinois Supreme Court has extensively considered the propriety of using the standard and has repeatedly upheld its use, and the court has no authority to overrule it. Further, Defendant’s 20-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion, because it was well within his sentencing range of 6 to 30 years, and Court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as Defendant’s rehabilitative potential.

Defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction release, and Court appointed counsel to help him with his petition. Counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, but did not amend Defendant’s pro se petition. Court dismissed the petition because its claims were conclusory and legally insufficient. Defendant appealed the dismissal, and Appellate Court held that counsel’s performance was unreasonable and amounted to a total failure of representation. Appellate Court remanded the case to allow Defendant to amend his petition. On remand, Court appointed the same counsel and dismissed the petition again, and Defendant appealed. Court erred by reappointing the same counsel after a finding that his representation was unreasonable. Additionally, counsel was ineffective again during the second proceedings. Thus, remand was necessary again. 

Section 5-2-4(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections does not violate the due process clause of the constitution. Under Section 5-2-4, anyone committed following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity may petition for discharge. Subsection (g) provides that when a defendant files a petition for discharge, he or she must substantiate the petition with clear and convincing evidence that he or she has no mental illness or is not dangerous. Contrary to what defendant argued, even if he presents a prima facia case to show that he no longer suffers from a mental illness, the due process clause does not require the burden to shift to the State to prove that he should still be committed. Defendant must present clear and convincing evidence that he no longer meets the criteria for involuntary commitment before he can obtain discharge from the custody of DHS.

Lower court bench ruling that defendant was guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and armed violence violated one-act, one-crime principals. Defendant’s conduct was a single act, because both convictions were based on the same physical act of Defendant possessing a gun. Under the armed violence conviction, defendant was armed with a handgun while also possessing cocaine, and under the other conviction, he possessed a firearm as a felon. Defendant’s felon status was not “an overt or outward manifestation” but an element of the offense. Thus, Defendant’s multiple convictions were improper, and the less serious conviction must be vacated.