Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to above-guideline, 93-month term of incarceration on charge of felon in unlawful possession of firearm charge, even though applicable guideline range for said offense was 51 to 63 months incarceration. Dist. Ct. could look to defendant’s prior criminal history, as well as bar fight incident to justify instant sentence, where bar fight incident resulted in defendant drawing knife on third party and encouraging fellow gang member to come to his aid under circumstances where gun-shots were fired. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could view defendant’s actions during bar fight as aggravated assault.

In prosecution on charge of felon in unlawful possession of firearms, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress firearms gathered during search of defendant’s home that was executed pursuant to warrant listing various electronic devices as items to be seized. While defendant argued that police exceeded scope of warrant by continuing search after some items in warrant had been located, record showed that not all items in warrant had been located at time firearms had been discovered. As such, police could have continued search until all listed items had been found. Moreover, police found firearms in locations where said electronic devices could have been placed.

In prosecution on charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress her confession that was made after police had made warrantless entry into her home, where police had previously learned that defendant’s 7-year-old child made report to school counselor indicating that defendant’s one-year-old son had sustained unspecified injury to his head. Record showed that police officer, after learning of school report, knocked on defendant’s door to investigate matter and heard fast-paced walking from within said home and believed that door had just been locked. As such, emergency aid exception to warrantless search prohibition under 4^th Amendment applied, where officer had reasonable belief that there was urgent need to provide care to toddler given claim made to counselor that toddler’s head was still “puffy,” and where officer believed that someone inside home was actively trying not to speak to him. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that: (1) there was no evidence of ongoing emergency because officers were responding on Monday to alleged incident that had occurred during prior weekend; and (2) officers had failed to behave in way demonstrating that they actually had believed that emergency existed, where officer initially sought child protective services and had called for backup prior to attempting to enter defendant’s home.

In prosecution on fraud charge stemming from scheme in which defendant induced others to spend between $10,000 and $50,000 to apply for opportunity to obtain between $50 million and $1 billion in loans under circumstances where defendant’s companies had no funds to lend, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea that was entered on 4^th day of trial. While defendant argued that said withdrawal was warranted because his attorney was so ill-prepared for trial that he had no other choice but to enter into said guilty plea, defendant was not entitled to withdraw his plea, since he indicated during his plea colloquy that he was fully satisfied with counsel and that his counsel was “excellent.” Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 64-month term of incarceration, even though defendant had claimed that Dist. Ct. had failed to consider his main arguments in mitigation. While Dist. Ct. had failed to orally mention said mitigation during sentencing hearing, it had discussed in some detail said argument during his written explanation for defendant’s sentence. (Partial Dissent filed.)

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendants’ convictions on mail and wire fraud charges, stemming from scheme in which defendants submitted false statements regarding identity and number of children receiving day-care services in effort to obtain greater subsidies from State agency. Record showed that defendants were aware of and actively participated in said scheme by using aliases to submit falsified certification forms that showed that defendants had over-billed State regarding children’s attendance at day-care sites. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in conducting joint trial, even though defendant argued that co-defendant’s admission of certain conduct during trial had incriminated defendant. Defendant failed to show that she was prejudiced by said joint trial, since: (1) defendant's counsel could have taken measures to combat any inculpatory effect of co-defendant’s statement: and (2) co-defendant’s conduct, in calling govt. witnesses liars and introducing irrelevant facts, did not deprive defendant of fair trial.

In prosecution on series of drug distribution charges, prosecutor did not commit plain error during closing argument, when he relegated defendant to innermost circle of hell as depicted in Dante’s Inferno. While prosecutor’s reference to Dante’s Inferno constituted improper appeal to jury’s passion rather than to reason or evidence, outcome of trial was not affected by said reference, where multiple witnesses described defendant’s heroin trafficking in substantial detail, as well as linked defendant’s text and phone records to dose of heroin that was involved in victim’s fatal overdose. Moreover, prosecutor’s observation during closing argument that “heroin kills” was reasonable inference of evidence in record, while prosecutor’s comments that specific witness was “straight citizen” and “not an addict” did not constitute improper vouching, but rather were statements based on undisputed evidence. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting deceased victim’s statement that he stole jewelry as means to pay debt to defendant, since said statement was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) as statement against victim’s penal interest.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charges of illegal transportation and possession of child pornography, after police traced to defendant’s computers internet postings of over 1,000 images of minors engaging in sexual intercourse with both minors and adults. While defendant argued that govt. had failed to present evidence establishing that he was individual who actually posted said images or was aware of images’ content, record showed that: (1) said postings from his computer occurred under defendant’s user name and were posted from computers located at his home, in which he was sole occupant; and (2) said images were deleted from separate locations in computers’ hard drive, where they had been stored at previous time. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that instant imposition of $400,000 fine was unreasonable, where said fine was within applicable guideline range, and where defendant had financial ability to pay said fine.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of selling heroin that caused death of individual who had purchased said heroin. While defendant argued that govt. had failed to prove that heroin was but-for cause of victim’s death, Ct. found that defendant had waived said issue for failing to raise it in Dist. Ct and for conceding before Dist. Ct. that victim had died from heroin overdose. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that section 841(b)(1)(c) of Substance Controlled Act, which imposed 20-year minimum sentence arising out of purchaser’s death, was either unconstitutionally vague or was in violation of 8^th Amendment’s proportionality of sentencing requirements, where Ct. observed that: (1) said statute puts individuals on clear notice of punishment if people die from using drugs that are distributed to them; and (2) harshness of defendant’s 280-month sentence was not grossly disproportional to gravity of offense.