Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of his girlfriend's 17-month-old child, for which he originally received mandatory natural life sentence. Defendant pursued claims through Post-Conviction Hearing Act; court granted new sentencing hearing, at which time Defendant received 60 years imprisonment. Defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced by State's nondisclosure of recording of conversation between him and his girlfriend. No evidence that Defendant's having been on psychotropic medication at time of trial affected his fitness for trial. Totality of evidence presented indicated Defendant took an intentional all-or-nothing approach, so no ineffective assistance of counsel in not offering the lesser-included offense jury instructions. (O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, based on evidence that he knowingly exposed his penis and masturbated in the presence of a female minor. Court properly denied Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel's failure to introduce photographs did not prejudice Defendant, as photos were cumulative and not exculpatory. Court found minor credible, and implicitly reaffirmed that finding in denying ineffectiveness claim. Terms of imprisonment and probation imposed were valid because they did not exceed the maximums prescried. (HUTCHINSON and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and of personally discharging the firearm that caused her death. Defendant's statement was not attenuated from an illegal arrestand thus must be suppressed under 4th amendment. Duration between illegal arrest was short and thus did not provide time for independent reflection; and event that prompted confession was the bogus gunshot residue test, which did not qualify as an intervening circumstance purging taint of illegal arrest. State presented sufficient other evidence such that a retrial does not violate double jeopardy clause. (REYES, specially concurring; LAMPKIN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant filed pro se postconviction petition. Appointed counsel filed amended postconviction petition, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Allegations in petition and supporting record, as to defense counsel's inability to introduce evidence and counsel's other errors make a substantial showing that counsel's representation was deficient and that this deficient performance may have resulted in unfair prejudice.Thus, Defendant is entitled to 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. (CHAPMAN and BARBERIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault of a child, criminal sexual assault, and criminal sexual abuse. Court's comment misstating the law of conspiracy was error; however, because evidence was not closely balanced, it does not rise to level of plain error; and error was not so serious that it affected the fairness of Defendant's trial and challenged integrity of judicial process. Defendant did not assert a clear claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as to warrant a Krankel inquiry.(HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of retail theft and sentenced to 2 years. Plain-view doctrine applies, and court properly denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress UPC labels seized from Defendant's car. Officers could draw inference from totality of information available to them that UPC labels were related to recent theft. Officers were investigating Defendant for possible retail theft, but soon discovered he was driving without valid license and initiated traffic stop, and had reason to believe that a more serious crime had occurred. (NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant filed a third motion for discharge, alleging a speedy-trial violation. State was entitled to 240 total days to bring Defendant to trial. Because only 162 days of delay are attributable to State, court erred in granting Defendant's motion for discharge. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Court denied Respondent's petition for discharge and granted State's motion for a finding that no probable cause existed to discharge him from commitment pursuant to Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Change in Respondent's diagnosis from paraphilia, not otherwise specified to "sexual sadism" did not violate his due process rights and was not barred by res judicata. Respondent failed to establish a plausible account that he is not longer a sexually violent person.(GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of resisting a peace officer, and sentenced to 2 years. Trial court committed reversible error, as the evidence was closely balanced, in admonishing prospective jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b). Court asked jurors whether they "had any problems with" or "believed in" the four Zehr principles, but did not ask them whether they understand and accept the four Zehr principles.(THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and GARMAN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/1/17.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of a controlled substance. Hidden location of contraband and State's failure to prove that Defendant ever entered the home creates a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's knowledge of contraband in hallway closet trap. Evidence presented at trial does not support a finding that Defendant committed essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.(GORDON and REYES, concurring.)