Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, even though defendant had claimed that govt. breached said agreement by informing Dist. Ct. about facts surrounding defendant’s holding woman hostage that formed part of relevant conduct calculation. Language in plea agreement did not preclude govt. from informing Dist. Ct. about hostage incident and affirmatively allowed govt. to present negative information about defendant. Fact that defendant successfully had facts surrounding hostage incident removed from language of plea agreement did not require different result. Moreover, defendant’s plea colloquy precluded any claim that defendant did not truly understand plea agreement.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1) for new trial on Clean Air Act charges stemming from his improper removal of asbestos from building, where defendant claimed that he had obtained new evidence (that had been withheld from him), which discredited key govt. witness. Defendant claimed that newly discovered evidence established that witness had cooperated with federal authorities investigating said witness on unrelated criminal matter, and that said witness had steered defendant into violating Clean Air Act unintentionally. While Dist. Ct. believed that defendant's claims could only be addressed in habeas petition, Ct. of Appeals found that post-trial motions based on newly discovered evidence that invoke constitutional theories can be addressed under either Rule 33(b)(1) or habeas petition, and that defendant should have been allowed to pursue his relief under instant motion.

Dist. Ct. erred in re-sentencing 54-year-old defendant to 176-month term of incarceration on charge of unlawful possession of firearm. Record showed that at time of re-sentencing, defendant had serious vision problems and had been model prisoner during prior 140 months of his incarceration, and that instant sentence was more than twice defendant’s applicable guideline range of 70 to 87 months. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not adequately justify instant length of sentence based on defendant's criminal history and his prior written complaints against judicial officials, where defendant’s criminal history generally concerned offenses that occurred prior to 2000, and where defendant’s prior written complaints against judicial personnel would not be reliable factor in predicting likelihood that defendant would commit future crimes given his health concerns.

Defendant was entitled to second remand for new sentencing hearing, where Ct. of Appeals had remanded matter for new sentencing hearing after initially finding that Dist. Ct. had failed to provide sufficient rationale for imposing certain terms of supervised release, and where Dist. Ct. indicated during remand that it was limited to only addressing issues with respect to terms of defendant’s supervised release, after rejecting defendant’s attempt to argue and present evidence on issue of length of his prison sentence. Ct. made clear that remands to clarify rationale for imposing terms of supervised release are “full remands,” such that defendant would be free to reopen issues with respect to length of his term of incarceration, as well as terms of his supervised release. Here, remand was required because Dist. Ct. had failed to acknowledge that it had authority to hear new evidence on both issues.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s request for 4^th substitution of counsel or in finding that defendant had eventually waived his right to counsel for purposes of proceeding pro se at his trial. Dist. Ct. held several hearings with respect to granting defendant’s first three motions for substitution of counsel and subjected defendant to thorough examination with respect to his 4^th request for substitution of counsel, where, during said examination: (1) Dist. Ct. resolved defendant’s disputes with respect to receipt of discovery; (2) defendant merely stated that he did not trust his counsel; (3) defendant acknowledged that he refused to meet with current counsel. Moreover, record supported finding that defendant had voluntarily waived his right to counsel, where: (1) over course of case, Dist. Ct. gave defendant two Faretta hearings that explained dangers of proceeding pro se; and (2) defendant, who had 11^th grade education, indicated that he wished to proceed pro se after acknowledging that he understood said dangers, along with criminal charges and potential penalties, as well as applicable rules of procedure and evidence. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. had forced him to waive his right to counsel.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his Indiana state-court conviction that prohibited his possession of drugs within 1,000 feet of “youth program center,” where defendant alleged that said statute violated his due process rights since definition of “youth program center” was unconstitutionally vague because he had no way of knowing that church located within 1,000 feet of his possession had on “regular basis” recreational, vocational, academic, social or other programs for persons less than 18 years old. Ct., in agreeing with defendant, found that said statute was unconstitutional as applied to defendant since no one in defendant’s position could have known that instant church would fall within definition of youth program center simply because it hosted between 4 and 6 children’s events each week and otherwise bore no indicia of conducting children’s activities within church.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his felony murder conviction that was based on “mob action” felony. While defendant argued that his 6^th Amendment right to have jury determine every factual element required for his conviction was violated in that jury was not instructed to determine whether underlying offense of mob action had felonious purpose independent of instant killing, Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim, after observing that Ill. statute defining felony murder does not include “independent felonious intent” element.