Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 15-year minimum sentence on unlawful possession of firearm charge, after finding that defendant was eligible for treatment under Armed Career Criminal Act, based on defendant’s prior Indiana robbery convictions. Indiana’s robbery statute included as element “use, attempted use of threatened use of physical force against person of another,” and thus qualified as violent felony under elements clause of Armed Career Criminal Act.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder and aggravated battery conviction on ground that trial court violated his 6th Amendment/Confrontation Clause rights by admitting into evidence testimony of surviving victim’s aunt, who stated that said victim identified defendant as culprit shortly after victim had been shot and was awaiting ambulance. Ct., though, found no Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford, 541 US 36, since victim’s hearsay statement was not “testimonial” in nature because it was made as part of effort to deal with ongoing emergency. Moreover, Ct. noted that there has been no Supreme Court case resolving issue as to whether statements made to people who are not law enforcement officers could be testimonial in nature.
Following a bench trial, Defendant, a minor, was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated robbery and adjudged a ward of the court. On direct appeal, Defendant argues that the victim’s identification was too unreliable to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, where the incident lasted less than a minute, where it was dark outside, and where the victim had a gun pointed at her during the encounter. The victim’s identification was reliable. The victim had sufficient opportunity to see Defendant, the victim identified Defendant in open court and in a pretrial photo array, and there was a video that corroborated the victim’s testimony. (REYES and LAMPKIN, concurring.)
Ct. of Appeals dismissed defendants’ appeals of within-guideline, 85-month terms of incarceration on fraud and income tax evasion charges, after finding that defendants had waived any appeal of their sentences based on language contained in their plea agreements that waived any appeal of their sentences, where, as here, said sentences were within advisory guideline range. While defendants argued that they were entitled to appeal their sentences because govt. had breached plea agreement by not recommending acceptance of responsibility reduction for either defendant and by failing to recommend that one defendant be sentenced at low end of sentencing range, defendants waived said argument by failing to raise it in Dist. Ct. Moreover, no breach occurred, since defendants actions were inconsistent with notions of acceptance of responsibility, where one defendant contested amount of loss calculation, even though he stipulated that amount of loss was over $1 million, and other defendant falsely blamed others for his criminal conduct.
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to reduce his 168-month sentence on charge of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, where said motion was based on retroactive two-level reduction in guideline sentencing range, where Dist. Ct. based denial, in part, on misperception that defendant had incurred “recent” disciplinary infraction in prison, and that defendant remained significant danger to community. Record failed to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant’s prison infractions were recent, and Dist. Ct. failed to consider whether defendant was likely to remain danger to community at time of his scheduled release date. Also, Dist. Ct. should consider on remand defendant’s efforts to obtain his GED certificate when determining whether defendant‘s sentence should be reduced.
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, alleging that he was coerced into pleading guilty to Wisconsin first-degree reckless homicide charge, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for raising said issue in his direct appeal. Thorough nature of defendant's plea colloquy refuted claim that defendant’s guilty plea was involuntary, or that defendant had actually been coerced at time of guilty plea so as to allow reviewing court to disregard defendant’s sworn responses during plea colloquy that he had not been coerced. Also, record showed that defendant did not mention said issue to appellate counsel during direct appeal, and that defendant had failed to seek withdrawal of guilty plea with new trial counsel in months between entry of guilty plea and sentencing hearing.
Jury found Defendant guilty of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury with an instruction on mitigation from first degree murder to second degree murder due to provocation. Court did not err. Defendant’s version of the incident does not reveal any evidence of provocation that he willingly entered into the fight with the victim. Instead, his testimony establishes he acted defensively, fearing for his life. Defendant is entitled to a $5 credit for each day he was in presentence custody which can be used toward his court system fine, State’s Attorney records automation fine, and public defender records automation fine. (NEVILLE and SIMON, concurring.)
(McAuliffe, R-Chicago; Morrison, D-Deerfield) authorizes the Illinois Supreme Court to adopt rules to establish a pilot program for the electronic filing of petitions for temporary orders of protection and the issuance of those orders by audio-visual means. Its intent is to accommodate litigants for whom attendance in court would be an undue hardship or risk harm to them.
Jury found Defendant guilty of armed robbery. Defendant appeals, arguing, in part, that the court committed plain error when it: (1) violated the silent witness theory by allowing a witness to narrate the events depicted in a surveillance video; and (2) gave incorrect jury instructions. Court did not commit plain error by allowing the witness's testimony. Even though the witness did not observe the events that took place, the testimony was admissible because it was rationally based on the witness's close scrutiny of the video and helpful to the jury. Court did err by instructing the jury to determine whether Defendant committed the offense with a "dangerous weapon" instead of a "firearm." Despite the fact that the instructions were wrong, however, such error does not amount to plain error, because it did not create a serious risk that the jurors incorrectly convicted Defendant. Defense council was not ineffective for failing to raise the issues above at trial. Defendant also argued, and the State conceded, that the circuit clerk improperly imposed several fines. The fines were vacated, and the cause remanded to the trial court to reimpose the fines. (TURNER and POPE, concurring.)
In prosecution on drug conspiracy and unlawful possession of firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in precluding defendant from cross-examining govt. fingerprint examiner (who identified defendant’s latent partial fingerprint on gun by using ACE-V side-by-side comparison technique) by questioning said examiner about different examiner’s erroneous conclusion in prior case, where said examiner used same technique. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he could not question examiner about prior case, since instant examiner was not examiner in prior case and defendant otherwise was able to question examiner about reliability of ACE-V technique. Moreover, instant limitation did not prevent jury from fully evaluating examiner’s testimony.
