Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged imposition of second term of special parole that was entered as part of new sentence after defendant had violated first term of special parole. Under Evans v. U.S. Parole Commission, 78 F.3d 262, Parole Commission could not re-impose special parole that had been imposed, along with prison sentence, on finding of violation of first term of special parole. Moreover, while U.S. Supreme Court, in Johnson v. U.S., 529 US 694, found that Dist. Ct. could re-impose term of supervised release upon revocation of first term of supervised release, differences between special parole statute (21 USC section 841(c)) and supervised release statute (18 USC section 3583(e)) precluded Dist. Ct. from finding that holding in Johnson undermined holding in Evans so as to support imposition of instant second term of special parole. As such, remand was required for issuance of order vacating imposition of special parole in favor of order imposing regular parole instead.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition, alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that state trial court violated his constitutional rights during his guilty plea hearing by erroneously admonishing him that his mandatory minimum sentence on murder and attempted armed robbery charges was 20 years, instead of 26 years. Record showed that trial court correctly informed defendant that he could face either life imprisonment or death sentence, and Ct. of Appeals found that although trial court erred in informing defendant about wrong mandatory minimum sentence, said error was subject to harmless error analysis. Moreover, said error had no substantial and injurious effect on defendant’s guilty plea hearing, where: (1) record contained no evidence that defendant would have changed his “blind” guilty plea had he known of actual mandatory minimum sentence; (2) at time of guilty plea hearing, defendant was more concerned about avoiding potential of death sentence; and (3) although defendant ultimately received 80-year sentence, he expected to receive about 40-year term of incarceration by pleading guilty.

In prosecution on charge of possession of firearm as felon, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress gun seized from defendant’s vehicle, where police encountered defendant, who matched 911 caller’s description of culprit who had accosted her with gun, at scene of said encounter within minutes of 911 call. Police had probable cause to arrest defendant on violation of state statute and Chicago ordinance prohibiting carrying of loaded gun in public based on contents of 911 call. Moreover, reasonable officer would have considered it likely that defendant had stashed gun in his nearby car, and automobile exception to 4th Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches allowed police to search defendant’s vehicle, where, as here, there was probable cause to believe it contained evidence of criminal activity. Dist. Ct., erred, though, in holding concurrent suppression hearing and trial in violation of Rule 12, where Dist. Ct. made no specific good cause finding to do so. However, defendant failed to establish any prejudice, where he requested bench trial prior to first hearing on otherwise untimely suppression motion.

In prosecution on charge of possession of drugs with intent to distribute, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant’s home pursuant to search warrant. Although affidavit attached to warrant request failed to contain detailed facts to establish informant’s credibility, instant search of defendant’s home survived any motion to suppress, since good-faith exception applied where defendant failed to show that officer’s affidavit was materially inferior on informant credibility issue. Moreover, record showed that officer submitting affidavit had corroborated some information supplied by informant, and informant had some history of supplying information to police in another case that led to informant making controlled purchase of drugs on behalf of police.