Criminal Law

Defendant appeals from order following a hearing which he refused to attend conducted per Sections 104-25(g)(2) and (g)(2)(i) of Code of Criminal Procedure. Treatment plan reviews during Section 104-25(g)(2) period of treatment and hearings conducted pursuant to section (g)(2)(i) are not fitness hearings. Thus, Section 104-16(c of Criminal Code does not apply to such proceedings. Although Defendant had a right to attend hearing, he rejected court's attempts to facilitate his attendance. (HUTCHINSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was acquitted, after jury trial, of attempted first degree murder, but convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm and aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant presented arguable basis for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on trial court’s consideration of improper factor in aggravation. Appellate and trial counsel performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness, as court improperly considered level of intent and conduct for which Defendant was acquitted. Court’s comments indicated that it believed that Defendant intended that the bullet would hit the officer, but jury’s verdict negates that. (CUNNINGHAM, concurring; DELORT, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/23/15.) Defendant was convicted, 30 years ago, of first-degree murder in shooting deaths of three people. Court properly summarily dismissed his third pro se postconviction petition, as petition presents neither newly discovered, noncumulative exculpatory evidence nor material evidence of a conclusive character that would likely change outcome on retrial. As issue of another shooter was litigated at trial, and as Defendant failed to present any newly discovered evidence, doctrine of res judicata bars issue. (LAVIN, concurring; PUCINSKI, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of 7 counts of first degree murder, including 2 counts of knowing murder and 5 counts of felony murder. Innocent bystander was struck by bullet from nearby gunfight in 2007, and was rendered quadriplegic and was dependent on ventilator, and died in 2010. As victim had not yet died at time of trial, double jeopardy did not preclude 2013 murder prosecution after victim had died. State was estopped from prosecuting Defendant for intentional first degree murder after his 2009 acquittal for attempted murder. Collateral estoppel effect did not preclude charges of knowing or felony murder. Directed verdict in Defendant's favor on charges of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm indicates finding of insufficient evidence that Defendant knowingly fired in direction of victim or caused victim's injury. Thus, collateral estoppel precludes first degree murder conviction. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/22/15.) Court properly dismissed, sua sponte, Defendant’s pro se petition for postjudgment relief, finding it frivolous and patently without merit. Petition alleged that truth-in-sentencing statute is unconstitutional. Statute was amended and constitutional infirmity was corrective, and thus act is no longer unconstitutional as applied to offenses committed after June 1998. Defendant’s offenses were committed in August 1999. Time for State to respond to petition was not short-circuited. State received petition prior to date it was file-stamped, State had actual notice, and chose not to object to dismissal thus waiving any objection to improper service. (REYES, concurring; GORDON, dissenting.)

(Correcting case citation and link.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of cannabis and sentenced to 24 months probation. Court erred in denying motion to quash Defendant's arrest and suppress evidence. Officers improperly executed search by arresting Defendant before he opened a package containing narcotics that had been fitted by police with electronic monitoring and breakaway filament device. Officers knew that device had produced no information that package had been opened, and possessed no prior knowledge connecting Defendant to package or its contents. Officers were aware of ambiguity reflected on face of warrant, which broadly authorized search of "S. Harris or anyone taking possession of" the package. Without any further information, officers could not have reasonably believed that warrant authorized a search of anyone who picked up package without opening it, and good faith exception does not apply.(LAVIN and HYMAN, concurring.)