Criminal Law

Senate Bill 804

Topic: 
Court-security fee
(Haine, D-Alton; Moffitt, R-Galesburg) allows the current court security-fee to exceed $25 for every party in a civil suit if it is set according to an acceptable cost study under the Counties Code. This fee is also added to a plea of guilty or conviction for defendants in traffic, ordinance, and criminal cases. Passed both chambers.

House Bill 1453

Topic: 
Speeding and supervision
(Walsh, D-Joliet; Mulroe, D-Chicago) prohibits a court from awarding supervision for speeding in a school zone or aggravated speeding in a construction zone or urban district (more than 26 miles an hour higher than the posted limit). Allows the court to award supervision for other aggravated speeding offenses once in a person’s lifetime. Passed both chambers

People v. Evans

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Evidence
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 130991
Decision Date: 
Monday, June 8, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed as modified.
Justice: 
HARRIS
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of cannabis. State presented sufficient evidence to sustain conviction. Evidence showed that Defendant threw bag of cannabis into a room and shut the door before complying with officer's instructions to show his hands and to step toward him. Reasonable inference is that Defendant disposed of bag by throwing it. Where possession has been shown, inference of guilty knowledge can be drawn from surrounding facts and circumstances. (DELORT and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

U.S. v. Moore

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-3559
Decision Date: 
June 8, 2015
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed and vacated in part and remanded
In prosecution on charge of possession of at least 15 unauthorized debit and credit cards, Dist. Ct. did not err in calculating loss by attributing loss at $500 for each card, unless govt. established that defendant actually used said cards for greater loss. Dist. Ct. could properly apply section 2B1.1(f)(i) of USSG to assign $500 loss for each card, regardless of whether defendant had actually used said card. However, remand was required with respect to Dist. Ct.’s imposition of terms of supervised release, where Dist. Ct. had failed to make finding that any term of supervised release was necessary.

U.S. v. Aleshire

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Search and Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-1192
Decision Date: 
June 5, 2015
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on child pornography charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to warrant, where issuance of warrant was based in part on report from 9-year-old girl that she had “dream” that defendant had pulled down her pajama pants and photographed her “privates,” and where defendant had admitted to being in girl’s room on night of alleged occurrence. While defendant argued that issuance of warrant cannot be based on “dream,” Dist. Ct. could properly find that girl’s use of word “dream” may have been euphemism because she was uncomfortable describing acts she narrated, and because child’s mother indicated that girl had used word “dream” to describe other actual events. Ct. further noted that under McIntire, 516 F3d 576, warrant-authorized search must be sustained unless it is obvious that judge who issued warrant exceeded constitutional bounds.

People v. Sanders

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sexual Assault
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (4th) 130881
Decision Date: 
Friday, June 5, 2015
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
McLean Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
KNECHT
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of two counts of criminal sexual assault, alleging that he knew the victim was unable to give consent due to intoxication. Defendant was a a bartender who had been providing victim with free alcohol all night. As nothing in record indicates Defendant knew what victim was saying in her text messages to bouncer, content of messages was irrelevant, and court allowed bouncer to testify as to victim's cognitive abilities during messaging. Court properly denied Defendant's Batson challenge, and did not err by failing to sua sponte address factors other than deciding that no pattern of discrimination had been shown. Court properly prohibited defense counsel from introducing content of sexually suggestive text messages victim sent to bouncer on night of offense. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

People v. Risper

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Fair Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 130993
Decision Date: 
Thursday, June 4, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
ELLIS
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted robbery. Three references made at trial (one in opening statement and two during police officer testimony) to a nontestifying witness's identification of Defendant as a culprit was error, but errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If a Defendant cannot establish that callenged testimony is hearsay, he cannot prevail on a claim under confrontation clause. In two instances where Defendant objected, court promptly ruled, sustaining objection to one officer's testimony and instructing jury to disregard it, and instructing jury to consider testiony only as to detective's course of conduct and not as to truth of statements made to him by nontestifying witnesses. Court twice instructed jury that opening statements are not evidence. State presented strong evidence of Defendant's guilt, and errors did not deny Defendant right to fair trial. (HOWSE and COBBS, concurring.)

U.S. v. Bania

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2317
Decision Date: 
June 4, 2015
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s “Motion to Terminate” $900,936 restitution order in his mail fraud and theft convictions, where said order had been entered more than four years prior to said motion. While defendant argued that restitution order had not been properly calculated, defendant failed to file direct appeal from restitution order, and defendant’s current motion was otherwise untimely, since defendant had only 14 days to file either appeal from restitution order under Rule 4(b) or to file under Rule 35(a) any motion to correct his sentence