Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from defendant as result of his arrest following traffic stop. Record showed that defendant was passenger in car under circumstances where agent had previously purchased heroin from driver of car in full view of defendant, who was seated next to driver and was talking on cell phone at time of drug transaction. As such, agent could have reasonably inferred that defendant was probably involved in unlawful drug enterprise so as to justify defendant’s arrest and search. Fact that officer arrested defendant for purpose of bringing defendant to parole officer did not require different result since officer’s subjective justification for arrest is irrelevant, where, as here, there was objective probable cause for defendant’s arrest for criminal offense. Moreover, police's warrantless search of defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, although currently not permissible under Riley, 134 S.Ct. 2473, was permissible under existing case law in 2009 when instant arrest occurred.

Record failed to support defendant’s guilty verdict on charge of drug conspiracy, where record showed, at most, buyer-seller relationship between defendant and one of two purported co-conspirators, since: (1) except for one transaction, defendant never fronted buyer for drugs sold by defendant throughout lengthy series of spot transactions between 2002 and 2013; (2) defendant never expressed approval for what buyer eventually charged his customers for cocaine purchased from defendant; (3) govt.’s evidence of alleged return policy with respect to cocaine sold by defendant was vague and incomplete. Fact that defendant had some sort of personal relationship with buyer did not require finding that conspiracy existed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion under 18 USC section 3582(c) to reduce his 88-month, below Guideline sentence on drug-related charges to sentence of 51 months, where said motion was based on fact that retroactive guidelines had lowered applicable offense level to defendant’s offenses. Dist. Ct. eventually lowered sentence to 83-month term of incarceration, which was approximately 30 percent below low end of amended guideline range, and which matched 30 percent reduction from original guideline range that Dist. Ct. had used to impose original 88-month sentence.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to concurrent 120-month terms of incarceration on charges of possession of destructive device and unlawful possession of firearm. Instant sentence was nearly three times high end of Guideline sentencing range, and Dist. Ct.’s perfunctory explanation for said sentence was inadequate to justify said departure, since it did not provide compelling explanation for why defendant must be punished more seriously than most defendants who receive within-Guidelines sentence. Dist. Ct. also failed to address defendant’s two mitigation arguments.

In prosecution on mail fraud conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 3-year term of incarceration based in part on 2-level enhancement under section 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) of USSG, where Dist. Ct. found that defendant had relocated her mail fraud scheme in order to evade law enforcement. While defendant’s mail fraud scheme originated in Detroit and then defendant took trips to other states to open additional fraudulent credit card accounts to obtain merchandise, record showed that her trips to other states were always part of her original scheme. Thus, there was no “relocation” as contemplated under section 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consider and consult with expert to review pathologist report that supported govt. theory that defendant had intentionally strangled victim, who was defendant’s former spouse. Defendant presented report of another forensic expert, who opined that lack of external bruises on victim’s neck was consistent with defendant’s statement that he accidentally strangled victim with his forearm during voluntary sex session. Thus, trial counsel’s performance was deficient, since reasonable counsel would have consulted expert to support defendant’s theory of case. Moreover, said supportive expert testimony, in light of lack of any signs of struggle on part of defendant or victim, would have provided medical basis upon which jury could have found reasonable doubt on instant intentional murder charge.

In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress gun seized from defendant at time of arrest, where defendant had been initially stopped by police on suspicion of having parked illegally in crosswalk, and where defendant, during time police had possession of his license, suddenly fled scene on foot, only to be apprehended with gun located at scene of defendant’s arrest. While defendant argued that he was free to leave police after their initial encounter, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was seized at time police confronted him about traffic violation, and that police had reasonable suspicion at that time to believe that defendant had broken traffic law. Moreover, when defendant fled scene, police had probable to arrest him on charge of interference with performance of their duty and had probable cause to arrest him on unlawful carrying of firearm charge once police officer had observed defendant remove gun from his pocket during foot chase. Also, gun was subject to seizure incident to defendant’s arrest after foot chase.