Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing without hearing defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failing to apprise him of applicable law, which, in turn, caused him to reject offer of 30-year sentence in exchange for plea agreement. While defendant argued that he would have accepted proffered plea agreement if he would have been correctly apprised of applicable law, dismissal of habeas petition was appropriate where defendant presented nothing but his bare assertion that govt. had actually offered him any plea agreement.

Defendant was not entitled to withdrawal of his guilty plea on conspiracy to commit armed robbery charge, where defendant argued that facts supporting said plea were insufficient to establish conviction on charged offense, since he could not be held accountable for three weapons found in toolbox at arrest scene. Record supported entry of guilty plea where defendant admitted that he and others had agreed to rob drug stash house by using firearms, and that foreseeable consequence of said agreement was existence of toolbox containing subject firearms. Fact that defendant claimed that he was unaware as to number of firearms or how they were stored was irrelevant, where defendant admitted that robbery plans called for use of firearms by his co-conspirators.

In prosecution on drug and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 440-month term of incarceration, even though defendant would be almost 64 years old at time of release, since said sentence was within Guideline range, and defendant otherwise made only perfunctory argument when seeking lower sentence. Ct., though, invited Dist. Ct. to consider resentencing defendant to lower term in light of legitimate cost concerns associated with incarcerating “aging prisoners,” as well as concerns regarding incarceration of individuals to periods beyond any deterrent or incapacitative effect on their propensity to commit future crimes.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment based on violation of Speedy Trial Act, where defendant alleged that 6-month continuance of trial date should have counted against 70-day statutory deadline for bringing his case to trial. Although Dist. Ct. made “ends of justice” finding to justify instant 6-month delay, said delay should have been counted so as to establish Speedy Trial Act violation, where: (1) Dist. Ct. failed to articulate at time of continuance factors it used when granting said continuance; (2) Dist. Ct.’s eventual explanation that delay was justified due to complexity of case, and fact that defendant’s case was joined with others who had not requested speedy trial either was not supported by record or was insufficient to warrant continuance; and (3) transcript of continuance hearing strongly suggested that actual reason for continuance was crowded nature of court calendar, which could not support ends of justice continuance.

In prosecution on charge of abusive sexual contact under 18 USC section 2244(b) arising out of incident in which defendant touched in sexual manner inner thigh of female airline passenger, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence regarding two prior state-court, sexual assault convictions that involved defendant touching breast of two female airline passengers. Such evidence was admissible under Rule 413(a), where: (1) defendant's state-court convictions concerned past sexual offenses; and (2) evidence concerning state-court convictions was relevant to show that defendant had propensity to commit charged sexual assault offense and to show that defendant had knowingly engaged in sexual contact as required under section 2244(b). Ct. rejected defendant’s claims that various factual differences between state-court convictions and instant charged offense rendered state-court convictions irrelevant.