Criminal Law

Court did not err in treating Defendant's "Successive" and "Amended" postconviction petitions as successive petitions, as a defendant may not amend a postconviction petition following a first-stage dismissal. A court may properly dismiss an initial postconviction petition on forfeiture grounds. (POPE and TURNER, concurring.)

Although a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a bench trial, it is not required that defendant be given admonishments of his right to a bench trial or that a written waiver of a bench trial must be executed to receive a jury trial. Parole officers are justified in conducting warrantless search of a parolee's residence, and also justified in handcuffing a parolee prior to conducting the search, in the interest of officer safety. (HOLDRIDGE and McDADE, concurring.)

The failure to provide a notarized affidavit as required by Section 122-1(b) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is not a sufficient basis for summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition. Instead, the court should consider the merits of the petition. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant simultaneously possessed cannabis and two handguns, both discovered during same search at same time and place, and were thus the object of the same act of constructive possession. Thus, Defendant's simultaneous possession of cannabis and handguns was the same "act" per compulsory joinder statute because multiple offenses arose from this one act. (KILBRIDE, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant was stopped by officer for walking down the middle of a street, a petty offense in violation of Motor Vehicle Code and contrary to municipal ordinance. Defendant was arrested and, at police station, was searched for contraband, and cocaine was found in his sock. Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine. Neither U.S. Constitution nor Illinois Constitution prohibits arrests for a minor, fine-only offense, unless any of the narrow exceptions in the Illinois Constitution apply. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of incident, was convicted of first degree felony murder and armed robbery. Under totality of circumstances, Defendant's confession during fifth, recorded interview was involuntarily given. He was of a young and impressionable age, was groggy after being awakened for interview, and he was not afforded a juvenile officer for interview. Detective made misleading promises of leniency, and Defendant's questions indicated that these promises weighed significantly in his decision to confess. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, for sexual touching of two boys in his swim class. State's comment, in closing argument, that kids disappear in front of their parents was a direct response to defense argument that State had failed to produce eyewitness to crimes, and was thus a reasonable invited response to defense argument that because pool was well-lit, yet no one witnessed the touching, that the offenses did not occur. That State made isolated, brief comments about reasonable doubt were unlkely to mislead the jury, as jury was properly instructed. Court properly tailored closure of courtroom, during minor's testimony, and no one sought to enter courtroom during trial, thus no violation of right to a public trial. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault. Jury could reasonably draw inferences that prosecutor argued: that Defendant was apologizing for his sexual misconduct with 15-year-old friend of his son, by making apologies to victim, her mother, and the police, and that such apologies were "evidence of a guilty man". Court is required to conduct a hearing into a defendant's financial resources as a precondition to ordering reimbursement for court-appointed counsel. (APPLETON and POPE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of child abduction, charged with attempting to lure a child to his home from a grocery store. Defendant approached child near exit of store, and though his van was in the parking lot, it was readily accessible, and child's family, though nearby in the checkout lane of store, were not close enough to hear. Evidence was sufficient to show that there was a dangerous proximity of success of abduction of child. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)