Criminal Law

People v. Easley

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Easley
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
March 27, 2013
Docket Number: 
No. 115581
District: 
1st Dist.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant to 9-year term of incarceration on charge of unlawful use of weapon by felon under section 24-1.1(a) of Criminal Code. Appellate Court, in remanding case for new sentence, found that: (1) defendant’s Class 2 conviction under section 24-1.1(a) was “enhanced” from Class 3 version found in section 24-1.1(a); (2) prosecution was therefore required to provide notice of its intention to seek enhanced sentence and give defendant notice of prior conviction used to support said enhancement; and (3) while prosecutor gave defendant notice of defendant’s prior conviction, prosecution did not state its intention to seek enhanced sentence. Fact that instant sentence was still within appropriate special Class 3 penalty range for instant offense did not require different result.

People v. Davis

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
March 27, 2013
Docket Number: 
No. 115595
District: 
1st Dist. Rule 23 Order.
This case presents question as to whether U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, applied retroactively so as to require new sentencing hearing where defendant received natural life sentence on his two murder convictions at time when defendant was juvenile. In Miller, Court found that natural life sentence for juvenile, who had been found guilty of murder, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment under certain circumstances, and Appellate Court found, in response to trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive post-conviction motion that raised instant 8th Amendment issue with respect to his sentence, that Miller applied retroactively due to fact that Miller decision was “watershed rule of criminal procedure.” As such, defendant was entitled to new sentencing hearing to allow trial court to consider factors regarding defendant’s youth that could potentially reduce instant natural life sentence to lesser sentence.

People v. Bailey

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People v. Bailey
Criminal Court
Jurisdiction
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
March 27, 2013
Docket Number: 
No. 115459
District: 
2nd Dist.
This case presents question as to whether trial court has jurisdiction pursuant to revestment doctrine to consider defendant’s untimely motion to vacate his guilty plea and sentence to charge of criminal sexual abuse, where govt. did not challenge timeliness of motion, but rather argued that trial court’s admonishment that defendant was not required to register as sex offender did not render his guilty plea or sentence void. Appellate Court found that although revestment doctrine might apply to untimely post plea motions under Rule 604(d), govt.’s submission of argument on merits of defendant’s post plea motion, that was filed 3.5 years after his sentence, did not revest trial court with jurisdiction to consider his post plea motion, where state’s argument against post plea motion was not inconsistent with prior judgment. (Dissent filed.)

People v. Purcell

People v. Purcell
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (2d) 110810
Decision Date: 
Thursday, March 21, 2013
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Winnebago Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed; mittimus modified.
Justice: 
BURKE
A sentence of natural life incarceration is a determinate sentence. A defendant sentenced to natural life incarceration must be given credit against that sentence for time spent in presentence custody. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

People v. Wade

People v. Wade
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Speedy Trial Act
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 112547
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed; mittimus corrected.
Justice: 
HYMAN
A defendant must make a clear objection to a continuance and demand for trial to invoke speedy trial rights, including when case has been set for trial. An agreed continuance tolls speedy trial period, regardless of whether case has been set for trial. A three-year term of Mandatory Supervised Release must be imposed when a defendant is convicted of a lower class offense but sentenced as a Class X offender. (NEVILLE and STERBA, concurring.)

People v. Moore

People v. Moore
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Reasonable Doubt
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 110793
Decision Date: 
Friday, March 22, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
REYES
Trier of fact could have reasonably found the arresting officers' testimony credible, as to their observations of Defendant disposing of a handgun by dropping it and kicking it under a bush, upon realizing officers were present. Even if false police testimony as to suspects dropping contraband in plain view ("dropsy" testimony) is common, that does not compel trier of fact to disbelieve an officer's testimony about the subject. Aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute is not unconstitutional. (LAMPKIN and HALL, concurring.)

U.S. v. Westmoreland

Federal 7th Circuit Court
U.S. v. Westmoreland
Criminal Court
Due Process
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 10-3961
Decision Date: 
March 25, 2013
Federal District: 
S.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new trial on conspiracy to commit murder charges based on claim that govt. conducted outrageous behavior when investigator engaged in affair with defendant’s wife, who was subject of murder conspiracy, during investigation of said charges, and that defendant possessed new favorable evidence. While affair tainted govt.’s case against defendant, said affair, by itself, was not so outrageous so as to bar prosecution on murder conspiracy charges, where there was no evidence that subject conduct involved any coercion of defendant to commit charged offense. Ct. also found that proffered new evidence regarding time frame of affair did not require that defendant receive new trial where defendant either was not diligent in obtaining said evidence prior to his trial, or was actually aware of said evidence prior to trial. Ct. also held that Dist. Ct.’s eight-year delay in rendering decision on motion for new trial did not constitute violation of defendant’s right to speedy trial where motion for new trial did not challenge his conviction or 20-year sentence, and where defendant otherwise failed to establish any prejudice arising out of delay.

People v. Warnock

People v. Warnock
Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Jury Trial
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (2d) 120057
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
McHenry Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
HUDSON
Record contains no explicit reference to waiving a jury trial or to conducting a bench trial. Court set case for jury trial, and two months later parties proceeded to a bench trial, with no reference to Defendant having waived a jury trial. Record shows no occasion on which Defendant was present in open court when jury waiver was discussed. Thus, Defendant did not validly waive his right to a jury trial. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

People v. Donelson

People v. Donelson
Illinois Supreme Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL 113603
Decision Date: 
Thursday, March 21, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court affirmed.
Justice: 
KARMEIER
State and Defendant, parties to a fully negotiated plea agreement, were mutually mistaken as to manner in which sentences of imprisonment must be served (whether consecutive or concurrent.) Lesser, 30-year sentences for which Defendant negotiated represented the maximum nonextended-term sentences for the attendant offenses, and were the specific sentences Defendant sought for home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Parties believed that those lesser sentences would not affect the maximum amount of time Defendant would spend in prison. Thus, sentence can be reconfigured, consistently with statutory mandates, so as to give Defendant the benefit of his bargain. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)