Criminal Law

In prosecution on tax evasion charges stemming from defendant’s scheme to establish limited liability corporations in attempt to shield defendant’s income from U.S. gov’t., clerical error contained within prefatory language of indictment regarding dates in which defendant committed tax evasion did not render two counts of indictment alleging tax evasion legally insufficient. Although said wrong dates had potential for confusion, remaining allegations in both counts contained accurate dates regarding commission of charged offenses that otherwise contained necessary elements of tax evasion. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that evidence at trial that established correct dates of tax evasion as alleged in body of indictment constituted constructive amendment of indictment.

In prosecution on drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence that police agents found personal quantity amount of cocaine in jeans located in bedroom connected to defendant, even though said cocaine was found 26 days after police discovered quarter kilogram of cocaine in co-defendant’s car that formed basis of charged offense. While defendant argued that personal use cocaine constituted improper propensity evidence, personal quantity cocaine evidence could be admitted on issue of identity where discovery of personal use cocaine had some tendency to make it more probable that defendant, who lived in home where one of phones used to make arrangements for drug deliveries was located, and who occupied bedroom where jeans containing cocaine was found, was individual recorded in telephone drug conversations with co-defendant. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that he was arrested without probable cause, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call defendant’s brother and sister-in-law as witnesses at trial and in support of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements. While defendant argued that, when considering instant probable cause question, state trial court had improperly found that he was not under arrest until he had been taken to police station where parties had stipulated that arrest occurred at defendant’s home, relevant state appellate court: (1) corrected said error and addressed probable cause issue with respect to what police knew at time of his arrest at his home; and (2) used relevant 4th Amendment principles to resolve said issue that effectively precluded Ct. of Appeals from reaching merits of defendant’s 4th Amendment claim. Moreover, trial court was not ineffective for failing to call defendant’s brother and sister-in-law as witnesses where said witnesses: (1) could not provide testimony regarding alleged coercion by police at police station that formed basis of defendant’s motion to quash his post-arrest statements; and (2) provided version of facts that conflicted with parties’ stipulated facts.

In prosecution on drug and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error when it allowed alternate juror to be present in jury room while jury deliberated defendant’s guilt. While Dist. Ct. violated Fed. Rule of Crim. Pro. 24(c)(3) by allowing alternate juror to be present in jury room during deliberations, defendant failed to show how said error affected his substantial rights where: (1) Dist. Ct. verbally instructed all jurors that alternate juror could not engage in deliberations; and (2) alternate juror was not polled about verdict and gave no indication to court or parties that she had participated in deliberations.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on unlawful possession of firearm by felon charge under 18 USC section 922(g)(1), even though pistol that defendant possessed was inoperable because it had significant damage, missing parts and extensive corrosion. Instant pistol qualified as firearm under instant statute where pistol was always designed to be gun, and record otherwise showed that said pistol was not so dilapidated as to be beyond repair.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his guilty plea to reduced first-degree reckless homicide charge where defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate certain witnesses who could have supported his self-defense claim by testifying that they witnessed struggle in car in which both defendant and victim occupied. Proffered testimony did not add anything new to defendant’s hypothetical defense, and thus defendant was unable to show that said evidence would have changed counsel’s advice to plead guilty to instant reduced charge. Ct. similarly rejected defendant’s contention that: (1) trial counsel should have requested mental evaluation of defendant to determine defendant’s competency to enter into guilty plea where, although defendant had been diagnosed with mental illness, there was no medical evidence to suggest that he was not competent to understand instant legal proceedings; and (2) his guilty plea was unknowing because trial counsel failed to advise him that he had ability to pursue self-defense claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 188-month sentence on charge of crack distribution where Dist. Ct. used pre-Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) guidelines to impose sentence, and where sentencing occurred after effective date of FSA. Fact that defendant received below-guidelines sentence under pre-FSA guidelines did not require different result, where govt. did not argue that defendant would have received same sentence under FSA guidelines. On remand, Dist. Ct. must also determine whether section 851 enhancement applicable for defendants distributing 50 or more grams of crack should apply.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of obstruction of justice arising out of defendant’s false responses to interrogatories in civil action indicating that, in his role as police officer, he had never used and never was aware of other officers using various forms of torture and physical abuse when interrogating suspects, where multiple individuals testified that defendant over period of decades had beaten, suffocated, electrocuted and held their bodies against radiator while attempting to extract statements from suspects. Fact that conduct that formed basis of instant obstruction charges under 18 USC section 1512(c)(2) did not occur in presence of court did not require different result. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly excluded evidence regarding merits of underlying civil action (i.e., that alleged tortured victim subsequently admitted to cellmate that he was guilty of his charged offense) since relevant issue was only whether defendant had lied when giving instant responses to interrogatories. Also, defendant’s false responses were material where core issue in underlying civil action was whether Chicago Police Dept. had policy or practice of torturing suspects.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call four witnesses to corroborate defendant’s claim that shooting of his girlfriend was accidental. Although state appellate court gave wrong reason for denying defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, where said court stated that defendant could not establish that outcome of his trial would have been altered given fact that defendant had close relationship with his proffered witnesses, other strong evidence of defendant’s guilt in record, including defendant’s flight from state after shooting, precluded defendant from establishing prejudice where proffered testimonies were only marginally exculpatory.