Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction on charge of failing to register as sex offender after traveling in interstate commerce under Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 USC sec. 2250(a). Ct. rejected defendant's claim that govt. was required to present evidence that he had specific knowledge of his federal obligation to register as sex offender and found that: (1) govt. need only show that defendant had knowledge that he was required by some sort of law to register as sex offender; and (2) said showing was established when defendant stipulated that he was required under state law to register as sex offender. Ct. further rejected defendant's claim that Congress exceeded its authority under Commerce Clause when enacting sec. 2250(a).

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on double jeopardy grounds indictment alleging under paragraph 2 of 18 USC section 2113(a) offense of attempted bank robbery where defendant had previously been acquitted of attempted bank robbery under paragraph 1 of section 2113(a) arising out of same incident. Ct. rejected defendant's contention that paragraphs1 and 2 of section 2113(a) created only single offense and found that said paragraphs created different offenses under standard set forth in Blockburger, 284 US 299.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing defendant's indictment on charge of soliciting crime of violence in violation of 18 USC sec. 373 based on defendant's posting of personal information about juror who served on Matthew Hale jury, which found Hale guilty of soliciting murder of Dist. Ct. judge. Ct. rejected Dist. Ct. observation that instant posting was protected by First Amendment, where indictment properly charged section 373 offense, and where issue of plaintiff's intent in posting said information was properly question for jury to resolve.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendant qualified for career offender enhancement when sentencing defendant on drug distribution charge based in part on defendant's 1994 controlled substance conviction and his 2005 aggravated fleeing conviction. Ct. rejected defendant's argument that 1994 conviction was too old to qualify for career offender treatment, after finding that: (1) 1994 offense was committed within 15 years of commencement of instant drug distribution charge; and (2) defendant was sentenced to 5 years for 1994 offense. Fact that defendant only spent 121 days of incarceration on 1994 offense pursuant to his participation in Illinois Impact Incarceration program did not disqualify said offense for career offender treatment. Remand was required, though, under Corner, 598 F.3d 411, where Dist. Ct. improperly stated that it could not consider sentencing guideline disparity between crack and powder cocaine because defendant's guideline range was based on his career offender status.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on grounds that his counsel was ineffective for failing to re-file motion to suppress his arrest at defendant's second trial, even though original motion had been denied at first trial after trial court had found that police had probable cause to arrest defendant based in part on statements made by two individuals implicating defendant in murder. While defendant argued that statements made by said individuals were unreliable, trial court could properly conclude that one individual enjoyed heightened reliability due to his status as citizen informant, while other individual supplied some details from overheard conversation that supported reasonable belief that defendant was involved in murder. Although one individual gave modified statement after first motion to suppress had been denied, state court could properly have found that modified statement would not have changed earlier finding of probable cause.