Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first-degree murder of his parents, sister, and brother-in-law. Court properly applied forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and properly admitted testimony of Defendant's other sister that deceased sister had called her six weeks prior to murders and told sister that he would kill her if she told them that he had obtained credit in their parents' names. Court properly admitted testimony of detective that sister initially gave opinion that Defendant was involved in murders, and properly admitted computer records of airline (on which Defendant flew to California shortly after murders) indicating that Defendant was dangerous. Circuit court properly denied Defendant's burdensome subpoena requests to conduct statewide review of murder cases, both death penalty and non-death penalty. Illinois death penalty statute conforms to Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment analysis and does not run afoul of its Apprendi v. New Jersey decision. (FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

State has a right to appeal from a finding of no probable cause in a Sexually Violent Persons (SVP) proceeding, as such finding is a final and appealable civil order. Evidentiary standard for SVP probable cause hearing is that State need only present enough evidence to establish a plausible account on each of the required elements for SVP, when all reasonable factual inferences are considered. Court should not attempt to determine definitively at SVP probable cause hearing whether each element of State's claim can withstand close scrutiny as long as some "plausible" evidence, or reasonable inference based on that evidence, supports it. (FITZGERALD, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, KARMEIER, and BURKE, concurring.)

Statute requiring three-month suspension of driving privileges for drivers convicted of, or on court supervision for, underage consumption of alcohol is not unconstitutional, as it bears a rational relationship to safe and legal operation of motor vehicles, and is a reasonable method of promoting public interest. Secretary of State does not have discretion in whether to issue suspension, as suspension is mandatory under statute. Proportionate penalties clause does not apply because suspension is not a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.(FITZGERALD, concurring; GARMAN, specially concurring, with opinion, joined by THOMAS; FREEMAN, dissenting, with opinion, joined by BURKE.)

Defendant convicted after jury trial of first-degree murder. Court within its discretion to admit 23 crime scene and morgue photographs showing stabbing victim's body, as their probative value outweighed prejudice. One highly ambiguous remark by State during closing argument that the Defendant's brother "knew" was not enough to warrant mistrial. Not error to allow forensic scientist that he had received Defendant's fingerprint card, as evidence showed it was obtained after arrest, and connection of card to prior offense is tenuous. Defendant was entitled to monetary credit toward costs and fees, because his offense was "bailable" under Section 110-4 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Because he was granted bail, State either failed or did not attempt to satisfy its burden of showing that his release would pose safety threat. (McBRIDE and GARCIA, concurring.)

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in, following a probable cause hearing, denying Respondent's petition for discharge from commitment as sexually violent person and refusing to hold full hearing. Two experts differed in their opinions as to whether Respondent remained dangerous or should be discharged. Even though Respondent was age 71 and thus per some research was at less risk for recidivism, court properly gave greater weight to one expert's opinion that his pedophilia and personality disorder were conditions affecting his emotional and volitional capacity and predisposing him to sexual violence, as compared to other expert who saw Respondent only once and based many of his findings solely on what Respondent told him. (GOLDENHERSH, concurring; STEWART, dissenting.)