Criminal Law

Defendant's petition for leave to file successive postconviction petition properly denied, as Defendant failed to establish freestanding claim of actual innocence. Defendant made incriminating statement as to numerous offenses occurring in two-month period, and was then indicted on over 100 charges in 13 different cases. Given State's proffer of numerous eyewitness testimony in the 6 cases to which Defendant claimed he made false incriminating statements due to police coercion, there is no reasonable probability that if confessions were excluded he would not have pleaded guilty. Defendant failed to meet cause-and-prejudice test due to amply supportive evidence proferred by State, so that even if additional documents of police brutality at Area 2 of Police Department prevented introduction of his confession the Defendant would have proceeded to trial and would have been acquitted.

Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to presence of two uniformed security officers positioned behind Defendant during his trial for first degree murder. Nature and extent of security measures, by presence of officers, was not abnormal nor inherently prejudicial, and their presence did not result in actual prejudice to Defendant, who appeared at trial in street clothes and was not shackled or handcuffed, was never brought into courtroom while jury was present, and officers never spoke to him while jury was present.

Trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found in strip search of Defendant; given the amount of time that had passed and proximity of Defendant to the bushes where officers found cocaine, it was reasonable to infer that he possessed cocaine. Defendant abandoned the drugs (by placing them on a leaf near walking path) before he was seized. Court properly refused to allow defense counsel to use whiteboard to write interpretation of officer's testimony during his cross-examination. Defendant was properly sentenced to 3 years MSR for conviction of Class 1 felony, because he was sentenced as Class X offender based on his criminal history.

Trial counsel's performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness in giving erroneous legal advice that his statements to police were legal and that there was no meritorious basis to pursue motions to suppress statements. Defendant had, as confirmed by affidavit of his previous counsel, invoked his right to counsel, and police violated his sixth amendment right to counsel by questioning him thereafter without attorney present, including by having his mother, who was acting as agent of police, obtain a surreptitiously recorded incriminating statement. Defendant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel as little other evidence supported State's case.

After jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated discharge of firearm, aggravated unlawful use of weapon, and unlawful possession of weapon by felon; judgment entered on first two counts and vacated third count. Court properly vacated the third count, because legislature intended, as confirmed by Supreme Court, that unlawful possession of weapon by felon is less serious offense than aggravated unlawful use of weapon. Court acted within its discretion by considering as an aggravating factor the relative threat of harm caused by Defendant's conduct.

Section 113-3c of Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates reimbursement of costs applies only to counsel appointed under Section 113-3(b) of Code, and is not a basis on which a court can order State to cover expenses of daily trial transcripts for pro bono counsel. Recovery of transcript costs cannot depend on trial outcome, thus cannot be awarded based on the need for transcripts for appeal.

When a defendant is already serving a sentence on an unrelated offense, beginning point of that custody is when the defendant is charged, because at that time, defendant would be unable to be released because of outstanding warrant and failure to post bond on new charge. Thus, the defendant is entitled to credit from date charged, rather than from date that writ of habeas corpus was issued. Even if defendant agreed to a certain miscalculated number of days of credit, mittimus should be modified to give the correct number of days of credit.

Defendant was convicted of two offenses: aggravated battery of a police officer and resisting or obstructing a peace officer and proximately causing injury. Charges were based on the same single act, and the latter offense requires the act of resisting to also be the act that proximately caused the injury. Incident occurred when Defendant slammed door onto a police officer, and officer's hand went through pane of glass in door. Officer had come to Defendant's home upon report that Defendant had sent his children instant messages that he was suicidal.