Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdicts on conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud affecting financial institution and commodity fraud arising out of scheme, whereby defendants committed acts of “spoofing” by placing commodity orders at CME that defendants never intended it execute, but were intended to manipulate market prices that favored prior orders placed by defendants. CME witnesses testified that CME rules required that orders be placed with intent to either buy or sell, that instant spoofing orders were withdrawn before they could be executed, and that spoofing was prohibited under said rules. Moreover, employee, who worked for defendants, testified that: (1) he knew spoofing was “wrong;” (2) defendants carried out spoofing scheme for sole purpose of manipulating market price to desired level; and (3) defendants placed spoofing orders frequently. Bank officials also testified that spoofing was not allowed under bank policy. Ct. rejected defendants’ argument that commodity and wire fraud statutes at issue in charged offenses were unconstitutionally vague. Also, CME and bank officials could properly testify to establish defendant’s notice of CME and bank rules prohibiting spoofing, as well as defendants’ intent to manipulate market. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding evidence of one defendant’s out-of-court prior statements that defendant claimed established his good intent in making instant alleged spoofing orders, where defendant failed to establish that said evidence was generated contemporaneously with execution of said orders.

In prosecution on charges of threatening to assault and murder two federal judges, three former U.S. presidents and current President, Dist. Ct. did not violate defendant’s due process rights by granting state’s motion to involuntarily medicate defendant to render her competent to stand trial. Record showed that defendant had struggled with mental illness for over 30 years and was determined to be not competent to stand trial with diagnosis of delusional disorder. During hearing on State’s motion, all three medical experts opined that defendant had substantial probability of obtaining competency by taking antipsychotic drug Prolixtin over period of time, and that defendant was unlikely to obtain competency without undergoing said treatment, which defendant was currently refusing to do. Under Sell, 539 U.S. 166, Dist. Ct. could properly impose involuntary medication order, where Dist. Ct. could properly find that: (1) government had important interest in bringing defendant’s charges to trial given serious nature of said charges, even though time for treatment plan, as well as time defendant had already spent in pre-trial custody would be longer than contemplated sentencing range for defendant; and (2) proposed treatment plan had substantial likelihood to render defendant competent and that any side effects of treatment plan were unlikely to interfere with defendant’s ability to participate in trial. However, remand was required, where Dist. Ct. had failed to include dosage range of proposed drug in its order.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on counts of mail fraud, use of fictitious name in furtherance of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Record showed that: (1) defendant acted as middleman, where individuals in Nigeria used fake online dating accounts to solicit hundreds of thousands of dollars from unwitting senior citizens; (2) victims sent money payments to defendant, where said payments were addressed to defendant under fictitious name; and (3) defendant took percentage of said payments for himself, converted balance of said payments to Nigerian currency and sent payments to Nigerian bank accounts. While defendant argued that government failed to establish his intent to defraud, defendant’s insistence on use of fake name to send him proceeds of fraud allowed jury to find that defendant had requisite intent to defraud. Ct. also rejected defendant’s contention that government failed to prove that he was member of any conspiracy or that he was unaware that proceeds he obtained involved unlawful activity.

Defendant was not entitled to new trial on drug conspiracy and drug distribution charges, even though defendant asserted that Dist. Ct. erred in admitting screenshots of text message between defendant and third party that defendant claimed was inadmissible hearsay evidence. While Dist. Ct. admitted subject text message as exception to hearsay rule under section 801(d)(2)(E) as statement made by co-conspirator, any error in admitting said text message could be deemed as non-constitutional error that was subject to harmless error analysis. Moreover, admission of subject text message was harmless, where record contained overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt on charged offenses that included multiple sets of text messages between defendant and other members of charged conspiracy that discussed drug trafficking, witnesses who testified as to how defendant and others used post office to further conspiracy and who testified as to defendant and others selling drugs on multiple occasions, and evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia taken from defendant’s hotel rooms.

Dist. Ct. did not err in terminating defendant’s pre-trial release and ordering him to be detained following hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss charges alleging cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into cellphone. Record showed that: (1) after defendant’s arrest, he was released on bond into custody of his mother and was subject to conditions of curfew, psychiatric treatment and restricted use of technology; (2) day after his release, defendant attempted suicide, and Pretrial Services subsequently reported that defendant had violated curfew over 30 times; (3) defendant was also arrested for allegedly stalking fourth ex-girlfriend; (4) defendant had second episode of suicide threat; (5) prior to hearing on motion to dismiss, Dist. Ct. learned from Pretrial Services that defendant made third threat to kill himself if Dist. Ct. denied his motion to dismiss; and (6) after Dist. Ct. conducted hearing on motion to dismiss, it deferred ruling on motion and revoked defendant’s pretrial release. While Dist. Ct. should have given defendant sufficient notice of its contemplation of pre-trial release revocation issue and should have provided reasons for said revocation, no error under Bail Reform Act occurred, where record showed that: (1) defendant had violated terms of his pretrial release; and (2) although defendant’s suicide attempts were insufficient, by themselves, to support instant revocation, defendant’s unpredictable and erratic pattern of behavior presented danger to others that was sufficient to justify instant revocation.