Criminal Law

Defendant was found unfit to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services for a period of seven years. Defendant appealed, arguing that section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections applies to determining the length of a civil commitment and that he was entitled to serve only 85 percent of his commitment term. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the legislature did not intend for the 2009 amendment to the statute to apply good time credit to defendants found “not not guilty” who were subject to involuntary civil commitment. (LAVIN and COGHLAN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by finding that his fitness had been restored and in allowing him to proceed pro se despite his mental health issues and non-compliance with medication. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court judgment finding defendant to be fit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there was conflicting testimony and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel. (STEIGMANN and ZENOFF, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver and cannabis trafficking and was sentenced to 15 years and 23 years, respectively. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a confession on the basis that he had invoked his right to remain silent and that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence and testimony regarding a shooting. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s statements did not unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent and that evidence of the shooting was relevant and admissible under Rule 403. (BOIE and WELCH, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence and sentenced to 36 months in prison. Defendant was assessed various fines and fees and subsequently sought to have the fines revoked under section 5-9-2 of the Code of Corrections. The trial court denied his petitions to revoke the fines and the appellate court affirmed. Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, asking it to determine whether the same rules of civil procedure apply to both section 2-1401 Code of Civil Procedure as well as section 5-9-2, whether section 5-9-2 allows a trial court to revoke mandatory fines, and whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. The Supreme Court answered the questions in the negative and affirmed the judgments of the lower courts. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring and O’BRIEN, specially concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated discharge of a firearm and received a total sentence of 60 years in prison. Defendant raised numerous issues on appeal, including that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements he made to police after asserting his right to counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the State failed to satisfy its burden that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and that it could not conclude that the trial court’s failure to suppress the resulting evidence was harmless error. (C.A. WALKER, concurring and TAILOR, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of being an armed habitual criminal and was sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk and search defendant for weapons and that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court affirmed, finding that police had probable cause for the search and that changes to the criminal code that would have resulted in one of defendant’s predicate offenses being a juvenile offense were not retroactive. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COGHLAN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition and was appointed post-conviction counsel. Defendant then filed a pro se objection to post-conviction counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate. The trial court denied defendant’s petition and declined to consider petitioner’s objection. Defendant appealed, arguing that this violated his right to procedural due process. The appellate court affirmed, finding that due process did not require the trial court to counsel to consider defendant’s objection to his counsel’s performance because defendant would have the opportunity to raise any complaints regarding representation on appeal. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to four years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove that a particular conviction identified in the indictment was an adult conviction because he was 17 years old at the time of the offense. Defendant also argued that the UUWF statute violates the Second Amendment under a new test articulated by the Supreme Court. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have changed absent the alleged error and that the case cited by defendant in support of his Second Amendment claim was inapplicable to defendant’s case. (C.A. WALKER and TAILOR, concurring)

Village of Niles appealed from a circuit court judgment confirming the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission’s award of partial disability benefits of the claimant. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, reversed the Commission’s PPD award, and remanded with directions on how to properly calculate the amount of compensation that the claimant was entitled to. (HODLRIDGE, MULLEN, CAVANAGH, and BARBERIS, concurring)