Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4^th Amendment rights, when it arrested him on charges of obstruction and resisting arrest after plaintiff had been initially stopped for playing loud music in his car. Record contained sufficient probable cause to support defendant's stopping and arresting defendant for speeding, and thus any issue as to whether defendant had probable cause to stop plaintiff for playing loud music or for arresting plaintiff for obstruction and resisting arrest was irrelevant. Fact that defendant did not arrest plaintiff for speeding did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion for judgment on pleadings in plaintiff’s action alleging under state law that defendants sold dangerous generic drugs and failed to warn of their risks. Plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted under Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) since, under Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, FDCA preempts any state law that requires companies to improve generic drug labels, as well as any claim that defendant failed to provide adequate information on said labels. Moreover, plaintiff could not proceed on her proposed amendment to her complaint alleging that defendants violated state law by failing to update generic drug label to match updated label on brand name drug, where: (1) plaintiff failed to raise said theory in her complaint; and (2) plaintiff never sought in Dist. Ct. to amend her complaint to add such theory.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 claim alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by failing to accommodate his Muslim religion, where basis for dismissal was Dist. Ct.’s belief that res judicata applied to preclude plaintiff from prosecuting instant action due to prior decision by Illinois Ct. of Claims that denied plaintiff’s similar lawsuit. Res judicata could not apply to preclude plaintiff from seeking relief in instant lawsuit since: (1) Illinois law affords preclusive effect only to final judgment rendered by “court of competent jurisdiction;" and (2) Illinois Ct. of Claims is not “court” within meaning of article VI of Illinois Constitution. Moreover, Ct. of Claims lacked jurisdiction to consider any claim based upon federal statute or federal or state constitutions.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison warden and prison medical provider’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs, where plaintiff died after suffering asthma attack while he was in solitary confinement in prison. While plaintiff’s estate alleged that defendant-warden was deliberately indifferent by failing to install emergency buttons in segregation unit that caused delay in plaintiff receiving treatment and by failing to ensure that position of permanent medical director was filled by medical provider, plaintiff failed to provide evidence that warden had actual knowledge of specific facts that would support inference that absence of emergency call buttons created substantial risk of harm. Fact that such buttons were installed in other parts of prison did not require different result. Plaintiff also failed to show that lack of permanent medical director had any effect on inmate health and safety. Moreover, plaintiff could not proceed on instant Monell action against medical provider for failing to properly train one of its nurses on 911 protocol, where plaintiff failed to show that: (1) said failure produced multiple injuries; and (2) lack of asthma-specific 911 training created substantial risk of harm, and that medical provider knew of such risk.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ (prison doctor and prison medical provider) motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs for two-month period of time when plaintiff’s rare form of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma went undetected. Record failed to show that prison doctor’s chosen course of treatment, which began with antibiotics, was substantial departure from accepted medical judgment. Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that doctor knew that treatment with additional antibiotics would be ineffectual, but still persisted with said treatment anyway. Also, plaintiff failed to establish Monell claim against prison medical provider, where: (1) plaintiff failed to present evidence to support claim that prison doctor was final policymaker for medical provider; and (2) plaintiff failed to show that prison doctor was individually responsible for any deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Partial Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-former employee, alleging that defendant violated False Claims Act when it breached Army contract by using unlicensed electricians as journeymen and billing government for their services. Instant contract did not require that defendant’s electricians be licensed, and thus defendant was not in breach of its contract with government when it submitted invoices for electrical work performed by unlicensed electricians. Fact that defendant generated emails interpreting Army contract to prohibit use of unlicensed foreign individuals from performing electrical work did not require different result. Dist. Ct. also did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated for protesting defendant’s conduct that formed basis of his False Claims Act claim. Plaintiff failed to show that he had engaged in protected conduct, where: (1) at time plaintiff registered protest he had not read applicable agreement; and (2) no reasonable employee in plaintiff’s position would have believed that defendant was defrauding government at time he registered protest.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-loan servicing company’s motion for summary judgment in action under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) alleging that defendant failed to timely provide plaintiffs with information about their mortgage payments as required under RESPA, which caused them to incur certain damages. While record supported plaintiffs’ claim that defendant had violated RESPA by failing to provide adequate response to plaintiffs’ inquiries, dismissal of the instant complaint was nevertheless appropriate, where: (1) plaintiffs failed to present evidence linking their claimed damages (damage to their credit rating and increased interest rates by terms of loan modification agreement) to any failure to provide timely information under RESPA; and (2) other unrelated factors, including plaintiffs’ foreclosure action, resulted in claimed damages in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action under Fair Credit Reporting Act, alleging that defendant-credit reporting agency failed to conduct reasonable reinvestigation regarding plaintiff’s claim that his name had been forged on Toyota car lease, which, in turn, caused him to incur negative comment on his credit report. While plaintiff claimed that former girlfriend had forged his signature on lease, and that defendant should have done something more than asking Toyota to confirm accuracy of credit report by confirming that plaintiff’s name was on said lease, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had no duty to verify accuracy of plaintiff’s signature, since Toyota was in better position to determine validity of its own lease. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that reinvestigation was inadequate because defendant failed to either hire handwriting expert to determine validity of signature on lease or ask Toyota employees involved in lease extension to advise whether signature on original and extension leases were of same person. Also, plaintiff failed to include in record both original and extension leases so as to support his forgery claim.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support ALJ’s finding that plaintiff acted willfully in failing to keep required records of its daily transactions so as to preclude renewal of plaintiff’s license to import high explosives as part of its fireworks business. Team of ATF investigators found 73 instances in which plaintiff’s records did not match amounts of fireworks added or removed from plaintiff’s inventory, and that said discrepancies totaled approximately 870 net pounds of missing explosives. Moreover, ALJ could properly find that plaintiff’s failure to keep accurate records was willful, where: (1) plaintiff’s owner had long history working in fireworks industry and had sufficient knowledge of ATF regulations; and (2) owner made decision to defer recordkeeping responsibilities to his brother, who had known history of failing to keep accurate records in similar company, which also had its license revoked because of said faulty recordkeeping.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for issuance of preliminary injunction in action seeking reimbursement from defendant-State for services provided to Syrian refugees under federal resettlement plan. Under section 1522(a)(5) of Refugee Act, defendant could not refuse to provide services to refugees based on their nationality, and record showed that defendant had violated section 1522(a)(5) by refusing to pay for services provided to any refugee whose country of origin was Syria. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that instant denial was not based on nationality, but rather was based on compelling interest in protecting its citizens from threat of terrorists posing as refugees.