Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss instant breach of contract claim based on defendant’s contention that plaintiff lacked personal jurisdiction over it, where instant action was filed in Wisconsin and defendant’s controlling shareholder was native of Australia, who had never visited Wisconsin. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s motion was untimely under Rules 12(a), 12(h), where Ct. found that although 21-day rule contained in Rule 12 applied to responsive pleadings to complaints that assert affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not apply to instant motion to dismiss.

Dist. Ct. erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff’s arrest record in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4^th Amendment rights by stopping his vehicle for no apparent reason and threatening him at gunpoint. While jury eventually found in defendants’ favor after defendants claimed that plaintiff’s allegations were untrue, admission of plaintiff’s arrest record constituted reversible error, where: (1) such evidence is generally inadmissible due to its tendency to inflame jury; and (2) contrary to Dist. Ct.’s belief, such evidence was inadmissible for impeachment purposes where plaintiff made no factual claims regarding said arrests and was irrelevant as to whether plaintiff was law-abiding citizen. Dist. Ct. also erred in: (1) admitting evidence that plaintiff had filed two prior lawsuits against City of Chicago since such evidence was admitted only to establish litigious nature of plaintiff; and (2) admitting background testimony from police officer as to circumstances that would prompt him to pull gun on member of public, where such testimony was speculative and was contradictory to stipulated facts.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-hospital and its administrators’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived plaintiff-radiologist his due process rights when it cancelled both his medical privileges and his corporation’s exclusive contract to practice radiology at defendant-hospital. Plaintiff failed to show that cancellation of hospital privileges was property interest protected by Constitution, where plaintiffs failed to show that said cancellation seriously harmed his medical practice, especially where plaintiff was on physician list for different hospital. Fact that instant hospital had established procedure for terminating medical privileges did not require different result, since such procedures by themselves did not create property interest. Moreover, instant defendants from private hospital were not state actors for purposes of pursuing section 1983 action.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action filed by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendant violated his 8^th Amendment rights by delaying surgery on his injured hernia. While Dist. Ct. believed that language in 2012 settlement that released instant defendants from “any and all actions” resulting from incidents involving plaintiff while he was incarcerated precluded plaintiff from bringing instant claim that arose out of 2013 delayed surgery on his hernia, instant settlement contained references to plaintiff’s 2006 and 2009 lawsuits against defendants that effectively limited scope of release so as to not preclude plaintiff from bringing instant lawsuit. Moreover, while plaintiff may have known by date of 2012 settlement about need for surgery that formed basis of instant 2013 lawsuit, record did not indicate that both plaintiff and defendants had anticipated by date of settlement that defendant would intentionally delay surgery so as to bring instant lawsuit within scope of settlement. Ct. also rejected defendants' contention that instant lawsuit was barred under either res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrines arising out of 2012 settlement.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-police officer’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated her 1^st Amendment rights by transferring her to undesirable position in retaliation for making internal complaint about fellow police officer, who had verbally assaulted and physically intimidated her over work-related report plaintiff had drafted. Plaintiff’s internal complaint did not qualify as protected speech because plaintiff did not speak on matter of public concern, but rather spoke as employee over matter that was intimately connected to her job. Moreover, Ct. noted that internal complaint focused on her personal interest in protecting herself from harassment from co-worker and found that making internal complaint about co-worker misconduct was part of her employee duties.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest on charges of improper lane usage and resisting arrest, as well as used excessive force when arresting plaintiff. Videotape of incident, as well as plaintiff’s concession that he could not recall whether he had used turn signal, were sufficient to create probable cause to arrest plaintiff on improper lane usage charge given officer’s statement that plaintiff had not done so. Moreover, videotape supported officer’s testimony that plaintiff failed to follow officer’s directives to return to his car and failed to cooperate while officer was attempting to pat down plaintiff, which in turn gave officer probable cause to arrest plaintiff on resisting arrest charge. Also, officer’s push of plaintiff on side of car did not amount to excessive force, where: (1) officer could use some amount of force when faced with safety issues; and (2) plaintiff posed safety risk to officer where plaintiff refused multiple commands to return to his car and acted strangely during instant pat down session. Fact that state court dismissed resisting arrest charge did not create triable issue in instant action, where record otherwise showed that officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on both charges.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-prisoner’s 1^st Amendment rights by preventing him for fasting properly during Ramadan. Record contained dispute as to why defendant did not receive appropriate “meal bags” for two days during Ramadan, which precluded issuance of summary judgment in defendants’ favor, and Ct. rejected defendants’ claim that denial of said meal bags did not constitute substantial burden on plaintiff’s free exercise of religion rights, since jury could find that defendants effectively forced plaintiff to choose between his religions practices and daily nutrition. Moreover, jury could find that all named defendants were personally involved in denying instant meal bags, and that plaintiff was eligible to receive nominal and punitive damages.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act lawsuit, alleging that defendant gave bribes and kickbacks to customers who purchased defendant’s medical supplies, which resulted in U.S. govt. making inflated reimbursements for said purchases. Basis for said dismissal was perception that plaintiff’s lawsuit was too similar to prior lawsuit that alleged similar kickback scheme by defendant, so as to preclude plaintiff from being required “original source” of allegations contained in his complaint. Fact that instant complaint contained allegation that different purchaser received kickbacks from defendant did not require different result, where: (1) body of information contained in instant lawsuit did not materially add to publicly disclosed allegations in prior lawsuit; and (2) concept in instant complaint that defendant bribed nursing home facilities to purchase defendant’s products was briefly mentioned in prior lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion in instant Anti-Injunction Act claim to enjoin state court from proceeding in defendant’s underlying lawsuit against plaintiff to enforce promissory note and guaranties, even though: (1) defendant had previously filed same claim on note and guaranties in federal court, which had granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss said claim without prejudice to filing amended federal complaint; (2) instead of filing amended complaint in federal court, defendant filed notice of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which was granted by federal court; and (3) state court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss said lawsuit even though instant plaintiff had argued that prior federal court’s dismissal with leave to amended complaint precluded state court action on grounds of res judicata. Instant request for injunction was improper under Full Faith and Credit Act, where plaintiff had raised and lost its res judicata argument in state court. Moreover, party seeking injunction under exception to Anti-Injunction Act must show that state court preclusion was clear “beyond peradventure,” and plaintiff could not make such showing where, under Illinois law, federal court’s dismissal without prejudice was not final decision that was subject to res judicata defenses. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that prior voluntary dismissal should have been considered as precluding subsequent state court action, even though plaintiff argued that: (1) instant Rule 41(a) motion to voluntarily dismiss was filed only after federal court had rendered “adverse ruling” that dismissed complaint without prejudice; and (2) under doctrine of springing finality, federal court’s initial dismissal without prejudice to filing amended complaint ripened into final dismissal on merits where defendant had ignored prior federal court’s instruction to file amended complaint.

Ct. of Appeals denied plaintiffs-pro se prisoners’ motion seeking leave to appeal of Dist. Ct.’s denial of their motion for class certification in action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated plaintiffs' 8^th Amendment rights by providing inadequate mental-health services and by permitting overcrowding at state’s prisons. Dist. Ct. denied motion for certification of class on ground that plaintiffs, as pro se prisoners, could not adequately represent proposed class of all current and future prisoners in Wisc. Dept. of Corrections, and Ct. of Appeals denied their petition for leave to appeal, since: (1) instant case did not raise novel issue of law; and (2) Dist. Ct. generally does not abuse its discretion when denying class certification motion raised by pro se litigants. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for appointment of counsel under Rule 23(g), since: (1) purpose of Rule 23(g) is not to enable pro se plaintiffs to obtain recruited counsel in conjunction with class certification, but rather to ensure that proposed class counsel is adequate; and (2) plaintiffs failed to show that they made any effort to retain counsel for themselves.