Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on grounds of improper claims-splitting plaintiffs’ section 1983 and Title VII claims that challenged defendant’s executive order during COVID-19 pandemic that required personnel in primary and secondary schools to be tested regularly unless they had been vaccinated against it. Record showed that: (1) plaintiffs had previously filed in state court similar lawsuit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief, and they subsequently filed instant federal lawsuit seeking monetary relief for same conduct; and (2) by time of instant dismissal, state court action had been dismissed as moot because executive order had been rescinded. As such, dismissal of instant lawsuit was appropriate, where Illinois law permits only one lawsuit concerning any single set of events, no matter how plaintiffs choose to allocate legal theories or remedial requests, and here, all legal theories or remedial requests related to instant test or vaccinate order that arose from one set of operational facts. Also, all of plaintiffs’ theories and remedies could have been resolved in state court lawsuit.

In action seeking recovery for damages caused by defendant’s 18650 battery that exploded in plaintiff’s pocket, record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s finding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over defendant. Record showed that defendant was corporation organized in Republic of Korea with its headquarters and principal place of business located there. Moreover, defendant has no offices, warehouses, other places of business, employees, or agents in Indiana, Also, defendant is not licensed in any state of U.S., including Indiana. Dist. Ct. found that defendant had sufficient contacts with Indiana to permit exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over defendant, and that there was sufficient nexus between defendant’s marketing of instant 18650 battery in Indiana and plaintiff’s injuries. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that remand was required because record did not contain sufficient facts to determine whether requirements of stream-of-commerce theory applied to support exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, i.e., whether defendant was aware that its battery was marketed in Indiana. Ct. of Appeals also observed that Dist. Ct. needed to answer question as to whether defendant knew or expected that its 18650 battery reached Indiana consumers and what efforts it took to control distribution of said battery.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated his 8th Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying him anesthesia when making two unsuccessful attempts at removing two-inch screw that plaintiff had inserted into his elbow. Record showed that plaintiff experienced pain when defendant attempted to remove embedded screw, and that defendant explained to plaintiff, when denying his request for anesthesia, that “You stuck a screw in your arm, not me, and this is a consequence of your actions.” Ct. of Appeals, in reversing Dist. Ct., found that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding defendant’s culpable state of mind that could support finding of deliberate indifference, especially where record supported finding that defendant did not exercise any medical judgment when denying use of anesthesia, but rather based denial on personal animosity toward plaintiff based on desire to punish plaintiff or otherwise inflict or prolong pain.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed on mootness grounds appeal of Andrew Shalaby, who is California-licensed attorney, who was appealing Dist. Ct. order that revoked Shalaby’s pro hac vice admission in underlying lawsuit. While Shalaby contended that Dist. Ct.’s order violated his First Amendment rights and was based on legal and factual errors that generated reputational harm, record showed that parties in underlying lawsuit had settled matter, and that case had been dismissed. As such, dismissal of Shalaby’s appeal was appropriate, since there was no lawsuit to resume his pro hac vice status, and his interest in vindicating his reputation did not present Ct. of Appeals with claim of redressable injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s copyright infringement action, where plaintiff asserted that defendant had used certain documents in bond offerings without plaintiff’s permission, where plaintiff had copyrighted said documents. Plaintiff was not entitled to copyright protection with respect to said documents, because plaintiff’s documents lacked sufficient originality for valid copyrights. Record showed that plaintiff’s documents were very similar to documents that had previously been prepared by Idaho Housing and Finance Association, and remaining non-trivial language that had been added by plaintiff in documents, which included short phrases and functional language, could not be copyrighted. As such, plaintiff could not pursue instant copyright infringement action against defendant or anyone else.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’ s action, alleging that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiff’s contracts with third-parties when it manipulated price of ethanol downward, which caused plaintiff to receive less money on said contracts. Dist. Ct., in attempting to apply Nebraska law to plaintiff’s lawsuit, concluded that: (1) plaintiff could not proceed as alleged in instant complaint because plaintiff had failed to identify third-parties with whom it had contracts with which defendant had interfered; and (2) plaintiff could not use theory of its claim, i.e. section 766A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, where section 766A claims had not yet been recognized as cognizable by Nebraska Supreme Court. Dist. Ct. further observed that had it determined that Nebraska law recognized section 766A claims, it would have allowed plaintiff to amend its complaint and attach specific contracts. Ct. of Appeals, in vacating Dist. Ct.’s order, found that Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff must plead more than generalized allegation that it had valid third-party contracts that were affected by defendant’s alleged manipulation of ethanol market. However, remand was required, because, although Nebraska Supreme Court has not resolved whether plaintiff could use section 766A theory to proceed on tortious interference with contract claim, Dist. Ct. should have examined Nebraska case law to determine how Nebraska Supreme Court would rule on said issue. Moreover, on remand, Dist. Ct. may want to certify question to Nebraska Supreme Court.

Dist Ct. did not err in finding that defendant had engaged in fraud and breached contract to sell house to plaintiffs, and jury did not improperly award plaintiffs $905,000 in damages arising out of said fraud. Record showed that at time contract to purchase house was generated, defendant represented that closing would be on October 3, 2016, that house was gutted and scheduled for extensive renovations, that plaintiffs had until August 15, 2016 to obtain mortgage for house, that renovations would be completed in six months, and that house had all proper permits. However, at all relevant times, house was subject to stop work order because defendant had not obtained said permits. When plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage by deadline, plaintiffs sought return of their $117,500 earnest money, but defendant refused, and plaintiff filed instant lawsuit. Jury could properly find that defendant’s fraud causally related to plaintiffs’ damages, especially where its failure to timely renovate house due to existence of stop work order precluded plaintiffs from obtaining mortgage. Also, defendant’s refusal to return earnest money prevented plaintiffs from obtaining another house. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting statement from defendant’s representative that referred to plaintiffs (married males) as “fruit cups,” where said statement was relevant on plaintiffs’ claim that said statement was made with homophobic malice towards them. Fact that plaintiffs did not ultimately prevail on their punitive damages claim did not retroactively render “fruit cups” comment irrelevant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants- prison center and prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in deceased plaintiff’s section 1983 and Americans with Disabilities’ actions, alleging that: (1) defendant prison guard failed to protect plaintiff from attack by another prisoner where inmate blinded plaintiff in one eye; and (2) prison officials failed to accommodate plaintiff’s blindness in one eye by moving plaintiff closer to healthcare center for treatment. With regard to plaintiff’s failure to protect claim, plaintiff failed to establish that defendant-guard was aware of risk that other inmate posed to plaintiff prior to instant attack, and record showed that plaintiff had complained to guard only about horseplay incidents involving other inmate and never expressed fear for his safety. Fact that inmate had prior disciplinary history did not require different result. As to plaintiff’s ADA claim, plaintiff failed to establish any intentional discrimination on part of defendants, where record showed that plaintiff had not alerted defendants regarding difficulties about access to healthcare facilities or need for any accommodation. Plaintiff also conceded that he was able to go anywhere in prison facility and was able to access any prison program.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that plaintiff’s continued civil incarceration under state’s Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPCA), violated his constitutional rights, where plaintiff has been so incarcerated for over 16 years. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff could not proceed with instant lawsuit under Heck, 512 U.S. 477, where: (1) plaintiff sought not only monetary damages but termination of his incarceration under SVPCA; (2) under Heck, section 1983 cannot be used to contest fact or duration of confinement, unless conviction or disciplinary sanction that led to confinement had been previously invalidated on appeal or on collateral attack; and (3) plaintiff’s civil confinement under SVPCA has not been invalidated and instant action squarely challenged validity of his civil confinement. Fact that plaintiff is no longer in prison setting, but on home confinement does not require different result. As such, plaintiff must wait until he receives favorable termination of his civil confinement through different proceeding before he can proceed with his current lawsuit.