Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison authorities’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs-pre-trial detainees’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants’ placement of cameras in semi-private toilet areas of holding cells in courthouses in county violated plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment privacy interests and intruded upon their seclusion under Illinois state law. Applicable rules prohibited prison personnel from viewing individual’s private underclothing, buttocks, genitals or female breasts while he/she/they were showering or changing clothes unless said individuals qualified for strip search. Ct. of Appeals found that three of four plaintiffs lacked standing to bring instant lawsuit, where they could not identify which holding cell they had occupied or assert that they had occupied holding cell that had camera. With respect to merits of claim, Ct. of Appeals found that use of cameras in courthouse holding cells was reasonable, since it was limited in nature and was justified based on security reasons. Also, plaintiff could not proceed on her intrusion by seclusion claim, where she asserted only general anguish and embarrassment from being recorded while using holding cell toilet.

Dist. Ct did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his 8th Amendment rights by rendering deficient medical care, using excessive force and inflicting sexual assault. Record showed that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit, and Dist. Ct. could properly have found that dismissal of the instant lawsuit was warranted as sanction for plaintiff’s submission of forged document in effort to establish excuse for having failed to exhaust said remedies. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s claim that dismissal of sexual assault claim was too severe of sanction, where Ct. of Appeals found that defendants spent over $8,000 to establish forged nature of document, and where plaintiff set in motion waste of defendants’ resources. Fact that plaintiff had no prior history of litigation misconduct did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-prison official’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action, seeking monetary damages and alleging that defendant retaliated against him for filing grievance against defendant by placing him in cells with known violent prisoners. Dist. Ct., in construing plaintiff’s claim as First Amendment retaliation claim, properly found that, under Bivens doctrine, federal prisoners cannot recover monetary damages for violations of First Amendment rights. Moreover. Ct. of Appeals further found that plaintiff could not pursue Bivens claim for monetary damages for any Eighth Amendment claim against defendant for failure to protect him against acts of violence from his cell-mates arising out of defendant’s cell assignments. (Dissent filed.)

Plaintiffs, individuals who opposed hunting and generated documentary films of hunters for public’s education, filed instant pre-enforcement, First Amendment challenge to “hunter harassment” Wisconsin statute (Wisc. Stat. section 29.083(2)(a)(7)) that made it crime to interfere intentionally with a hunter by “maintaining a visual or physical proximity” to the hunter, by “approaching or confronting” the hunter, or by photographing, videotaping or otherwise recording activity of the hunter. Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, after finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring as applied challenge to instant Wisc. Statute, and that plaintiffs’ facial challenge to Wisconsin statute failed on its merits. Ct. of Appeals, though, held that plaintiffs had standing to bring instant claim, even though they had not been charged with violation of said statute, where plaintiffs offered evidence of well-founded fear of prosecution for activities protected by First Amendment, but proscribed by instant statute. Ct. of Appeals also found that plaintiffs’ challenges were meritorious, where statute was both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. (Dissent filed.)

Several plaintiffs (individuals and gun-rights organizations) filed challenges in different District Courts to ban on certain assault weapons and high capacity magazines in Protect Illinois Communities Act, as well as in Cook County, City of Chicago and City of Naperville ordinances, where said challenges were based on claims that said bans violated Second Amendment plaintiffs’ right to “keep and bear Arms.” Certain District Courts granted plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction to bar enforcements of said Act and ordinances, while other District Courts denied said requests. Ct. of Appeals, though, in finding that AR-15s and other semi-automatic firearms covered by said Act and ordinances were either too akin to military-use firearms or too akin to other weapons not possessed for lawful purpose such as machine guns, such that said firearms were not “bearable Arms” for purposes of Second Amendment. As such, according to Ct. of Appeals, there was nothing under Second Amendment to prohibit defendants’ regulation of said firearms and high capacity magazines, and thus it affirmed the denial of plaintiff’s requests for preliminary injunction in certain District Court judgments and vacated the granting of said requests in other District Court judgments. Ct. of Appeals also emphasized that plaintiffs might ultimately prevail should record be more developed to show that firearms/ high capacity magazines at issue in Act and ordinances not be sufficiently comparable to military-use weapons or other weapons that are not possessed for lawful purposes. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), alleging that defendant improperly redacted certain information regarding plaintiff’s transfer from ICE custody to officials in Decatur County, Indiana, where plaintiff was subject to criminal DUI prosecution. Record showed that out of 561-page response to plaintiff’s FOIA request, defendant produced 51 pages that contained redactions, which included redactions for attorney-client, work product and/or deliberative process privileges that qualified for exemption under 5 USC section 552(b)(5) and redactions for names of government employees that qualified for exemption under 5 USC section 552(b)(6) and (7). Dist. Ct., which conducted in camera review of un-redacted pages at issue in instant case, had sufficient information to make legally sound decision about whether instant exemptions applied to redacted pages, and plaintiff did not dispute that said exemptions applied to certain documents. Moreover, Ct. of Appeals rejected plaintiff’s argument that crime-fraud exception to attorney-privilege exemption applied so as to require disclosure of certain documents dealing with decision to transfer him to Decatur County authorities, where record contained no factual foundation to support claim that defendant engaged in criminal conspiracy with Indiana authorities to allow criminal prosecution to go forward.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, where plaintiff alleged that defendant used excessive force, when he shot and killed plaintiff’s decedent following high-speed chase. Record showed that defendant and other officers were observing what they thought to be drug purchase by decedent, and that following said purchase, decedent attempted to flee traffic stop by starting high speed chase that concerned speeds up to 115 miles per hour on highway and weaving in and out of traffic at dangerous speeds on Chicago streets. Decedent eventually stopped car on Chicago street because both lanes were occupied and corner had red light. Defendant then got out of his car with rifle, came up to 25 feet of front of decedent’s car, and directed decedent to stop and get out of his car. Instead, decedent moved his car forward in attempt to move into other, now free lane, and defendant shot and killed decedent. Defendant could use deadly force under these circumstances given decedent’s prior erratic and dangerous behavior, as well as decedent’s movement of car toward defendant, and no case law gave defendant notice that he could not use deadly force under instant circumstances. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant unreasonably created instant danger to himself by running toward decedent’s car with rifle, and thus could not cite to instant danger to excuse his use of deadly force.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in favor of defendants-police officials in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from committing suicide while decedent was in defendants’ jail for 19 hours awaiting a bond hearing Record showed that decedent’s arrest warrant already had set bond at $500, and that decedent had enough money in his possession at time of arrest to post bond. While plaintiff argued that defendants were responsible for decedent’s suicide because they did not immediately release him on bond, record also showed that decedent’s warrant was issued by court in Lee County, and Chief Judge in Cook County had issued order requiring bond hearings for all persons arrested on warrants issued by courts outside of Cook County. While plaintiff argued that Chief Judge’s order was inconsistent with Illinois statute that permits arrestees to waive local bond hearings, said alleged state law violation did not support instant section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, where: (1) plaintiff’s claim does not rest on violation of Illinois law, but rather violation of Fourth Amendment; and (2) violation of state law does not permit any damage award under section 1983. Moreover, plaintiff did not allege that instant 19-hour delay exceeded federal rule for how much time that police can take to present arrested person to judge to conduct bond hearing. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly find that decedent did not present risk of suicide to defendants throughout his detention.

Ct. of Appeals Justice granted defendant’s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, even though Dist. Ct. had denied defendant’s similar request. Record showed that requisite filing and docketing fees totaled $505, and that defendant had $573 in his prison account just prior to filing his notice of appeal. While Dist. Ct. based denial of defendant’s request on fact that defendant could pay entire docketing and filing fees at time he filed notice of appeal, Ct. of Appeals Justice found that defendant was entitled to take advantage of terms set forth in 28 USC section 1915(a) that required that defendant initially pay only 20 percent of greater of defendant’s average monthly deposits or balances in past six months in prison account and then pay balance of filing and docketing fees in installments based on 20 percent of defendant’s future monthly income until full debt is paid. Ct. of Appeals Justice further observed that: (1) drawing line for in forma pauperis eligibility at mere ability to pay full fee at time of initiating appeal runs contrary to intent of Congress; (2) prior cases have noted that prisoners with up to $2,000 in assets might be eligible for in forma pauperis treatment; and (3) there was nothing to indicate that defendant had depleted his prison account to avoid paying full fees at time of initiation of his appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying petitioner’s application under 28 USC section 1782(a) seeking broad discovery from respondent in petitioner’s lawsuit against respondent filed in Switzerland regarding respondent’s termination of dealership that covered sales of respondent’s products in Venezuela. Agreements between parties contained forum selection clause that required that litigation take place in Switzerland under Swiss law. Dist. Ct. could properly deny instant application under factors set forth in Intel Corp., 542 U.S. 241, where: (1) instant sophisticated parties made contractual choice to litigate disputes in Switzerland; (2) petitioner made broad requests for discovery in instant application under circumstances where Swiss court would likely view wholesale importation of U.S. discovery with degree of skepticism; (3) respondent agreed to provide discovery in Swiss court; and (4) parties essentially agreed to resolve their disputes in Swiss court with its more circumscribed discovery procedures.