Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on 11th Immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 act6ion, alleging that defendant-director of Ill. Dept. of Employment Security (IDES) deprived them of equal protection rights, when plaintiffs applied for unemployment benefits during COVID-19 pandemic, but never received any benefits or any notice that their applications had been denied, so as to allow them ability to appeal any denial. Defendant, who was sued in his official capacity, was entitled to 11th Amendment immunity from being sued in federal court, and exception to said immunity under Ex Parte Young, did not apply because plaintiffs’ allegations for said claim referred to only past conduct. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims, arising out of their contention that IDES failed to promptly provide them with appealable determinations regarding any denial of their claims for benefits and/or their hearing rights, where mandamus action offered plaintiffs adequate state-law route for remedy they seek.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police officer and Village’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights when officer, who responded to report that plaintiffs’ daughter had been victim of possible criminal conduct, shot plaintiffs’ family dog six seconds after officer appeared at plaintiffs’ front door. While Dist. Ct. relied on video contained in officer video-camera to find that officer was justified in shooting dog, Ct. of Appeals also looked at video and found that video did not support officer’s version of incident, since: (1) video did not reveal whether dog was growing or barking as officer claimed; and (2) video also did not reveal what dog was doing during six-second interval up to time video showed that dog had been shot. As such, because other evidence contained conflicting versions of incident, summary judgment could not be used to resolve said factual discrepancies in favor of officer.

Plaintiff filed action alleging fraud, fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of defendant’s hiring of petitioner for new position under assurances that defendant’s company was financially secure, but then terminating plaintiff one week later for purported financial reasons. During pendency of defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed motion to amend complaint to add new facts to support existing claims. Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s motion as moot, where it had also denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. During pendency of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff in footnote in her response sought to add new claim. Dist. Ct. denied plaintiff’s motion to amend and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s first motion to amend was moot, where she could proceed on her existing claims without new facts, and where defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. Plaintiff also failed to renew said motion, although Dist. Ct. gave her 30 days to do so. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly deny plaintiff's second motion to amend during pendency of motion for summary judgment, where it was too late to add new claim that alleged different fraud than was alleged in existing complaint, even though plaintiff asserted that facts contained in her proposed first motion to amend would have supported new claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison official’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant denied plaintiff due process during his prison hearing to determine merits of disciplinary charges arising out of his receipt of $10,000 check that plaintiff claimed was gift. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant, who had actually seized said check and conducted investigation that led to issuance of disciplinary charges based on defendant’s claim that check was actually contraband, sat next to hearing officer, controlled every step of hearing and directed actions of hearing officer to ensure that plaintiff would be found guilty of charges and would not get his $10,000 back. As such, plaintiff’s impartial decision-maker claim could not be resolved at summary judgment stage, where, according to plaintiff, defendant, as officer substantially involved in investigation of charges, cannot decide outcome of prison hearing. Moreover, plaintiff presented evidence that defendant told him prior to start of hearing that plaintiff’s $10,000 would not be returned to him regardless of outcome of hearing. Fact that plaintiff failed to produce direct evidence of any communication between defendant and hearing officer did not require different result. Also, Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion to add hearing officer as defendant in instant action.

Plaintiff originally filed in Canada breach of contract action against defendant Menasha and trade secret violations under U.S. statutes against defendants Menasha and Deloitte. Contract contained forum selection clause that designed that any dispute arising out of contract be filed in Toronto Canada court. Deloitte, though, contested Canadian court jurisdiction over it, and plaintiff thereafter voluntarily dismissed trade secret actions against both defendants, and re-filed said actions in Illinois Dist. Ct. Menasha then filed motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds trade secret actions against it based on forum selection clause in contract. Dist. Ct. could properly grant said motion as to defendant Menasha, where trade secret actions arose out of said contract, and where plaintiff agreed to litigate said claims in Canada. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in also dismissing on same grounds defendant Deloitte, where Deloitte had not signed agreement containing said clause, and where Deloitte continued to insist that Canadian courts had no jurisdiction over it.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s action under Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), alleging that defendant was "person" who knowingly benefited from its participation in venture with entity that it knew or should have known had engaged in act of sex trafficking. In this respect, plaintiff alleged that: (1) plaintiff-minor fell into hands of street sex trafficker who used now defunct Backpage.com to advertise on Backpage.com’s website minor’s availability for sexual encounters; (2) defendant should have known that Backpage.com was engaged in sex trafficking of minors on its website; and (3) defendant had close business relationship with Backpage.com, where defendant gave tailored advice and software to Backpage.com that allowed Backpage.com to expand its business, such that defendant knowingly benefited from its participation in Backpage.com’s venture. Ct. of Appeals held that said allegations were sufficient to state viable “participation liability” cause of action under TVPRA. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that plaintiff was required to allege and prove that it had at least constructive knowledge during relevant period that plaintiff-minor was specific victim of sex trafficking. Ct. of Appeals also found that defendant could not assert affirmative defense under section 230(c) of Communications Decency Act, 47 USC section 230, where plaintiffs’ complaint did not treat defendant as publisher or speaker of any third-party content. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-attorney’s action seeking, among other things, to enforce terms of settlement agreement between his former clients and third-party, where plaintiff had purchased from third-party, third-party’s right to collect on said settlement from former clients. Record showed that: (1) prior to instant dismissal order, different Dist. Ct. had entered 2015 order that barred plaintiff from acting as counsel in further efforts to collect on said settlement agreement, based upon New Jersey attorney ethical rule; and (2) plaintiff had failed to appeal 2015 order or seek any reconsideration of same. As such, plaintiff could not disregard now binding 2015 order by filing and prosecuting instant action, even though he believed that substance of 2015 order was legally wrong. Moreover, dismissal was appropriate sanction for plaintiff’s refusal to obey binding court order. Ct. of Appeals also imposed Rule 38 sanctions against plaintiff for filing frivolous appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s (nonprofit organization that pays cash bail for others as part of its goal in abolishing cash bail) request for issuance of preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Indiana statute that limited its ability to pay cash bail by precluding said payments for defendants who were charged with crime of violence, or who were charged with felony and who had prior conviction for crime of violence. Defendant asserted that said stature violated its First Amendment and equal protection rights. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that statute did not implicate First Amendment, since payment of cash bail is not inherently expressive conduct. Moreover, statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause, since statute was rationally related to State’s legitimate interest in regulating pretrial detention of defendants. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-telephone company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendant charged schools and libraries more than what was allowed under federal program that required that defendant charge schools/libraries telephone rates that were less or equal to rates defendant charged to similarly situated non-residential entities. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff failed to show existence of any customers that were charged lower rates and were similarly situated to schools and libraries that were charged higher rates, Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff did provide specific evidence showing that certain school and libraries were charged more than certain non-residential customers, and that proposed comparable entities appeared to be similarly situated. Also, plaintiff’s evidence that defendant had no method or procedure in place to comply with federal program requirements during relevant period supported his claim that defendant had acted with reckless disregard for truth or falsity of claims it had submitted for federal reimbursement. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that alleged falsity of claims was not sufficiently material, where government had continued paying said claims while it was aware of plaintiff’s allegations.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action, seeking to set aside under Rule 41(g) civil forfeiture of $33,783 that government had seized from plaintiff, where DEA agent believed that said money was proceeds from illegal drug activity. DEA sent required notice of forfeiture that provided plaintiff with deadline to contest said seizure. Plaintiff’s attorney sent wrong from, i.e. petition for remission, prior to said deadline, but realized mistake only five months after deadline had expired. Plaintiff filed instant action after DEA refused to return money. However, plaintiff could not use Rule 41(g) to request return of seized money since Rule 41(g) applies only prior to initiation of forfeiture proceedings, and forfeiture proceedings had been initiated by time instant lawsuit had been filed. Also, section 983(e) of CAFRA is exclusive statutory remedy for seeking to set aside declaration of forfeiture, but plaintiff could not use CAFRA, where plaintiff did not challenge sufficiency of notice she received from DEA.