Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' counterclaim seeking back rent and damages to roof of warehouse leased to plaintiff when plaintiff overstayed lease on warehouse by 17 months. Terms of lease, which called for plaintiff to make all structural and extra ordinary repairs to warehouse, required that plaintiff make repairs to roof, and Dist. Ct. could properly use actual repair cost to roof when calculating defendant's damages. Moreover, defendants satisfied conditions for seeking double fair market rental damages under Illinois Holdover Statute where record showed that plaintiff's 17-month, post-lease stay was both willful and wrongful. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in awarding defendants rental damages measured in terms of gross rental rate (that included costs of property, as well as insurance and taxes), rather than lower net rental rate, which reflects only cost of subject property itself.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sustaining constitutionality of several provisions of Indiana's Judicial Code that plaintiffs-candidates for judicial office claimed improperly prohibited them from answering questionnaire drafted by plaintiff Indiana Rights to Life, Inc. on abortion-related issues and improperly chilled their right to speak at political functions or raise campaign funds. Under Seifert, 608 F.3d 974, Indiana's Judicial Code prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign funds, or participating in political party functions or making statements on issues that are inconsistent with impartial performance of judicial office are not unconstitutional. Moreover, plaintiffs can seek advisory opinion as to whether statements responsive to instant questionnaire violate any provisions of Indiana Judicial Code. Additionally, Indiana may properly require plaintiffs to recuse themselves whenever their prior public statements appear to commit them to reach particular result in pending action before them.

Dist. Ct. did not err in certifying class action in instant section 10(b)-5 action alleging that defendants made false statements to hide true nature of financial condition of corporation that resulted in plaintiffs paying too much for stock in said corporation. Circumstances of instant case fit all requirements for class certification set forth in Basic, 485 US 224, in that subject corporation was large, publicly-traded financial-services holding company, and expert testified that market for corporation's shares was sufficiently-efficient to permit plaintiffs-investors to use fraud-on-the-market doctrine as replacement for person-specific proof reliance and causation. Ct. further rejected defendants' contention that: (1) prior to certification of class, Dist. Ct. must determine that contested statements actually caused material changes in stock price; and (2) instant proposed class could not include short sellers of corporate stock who correctly anticipated that stock price would decline.

Dist. Ct. erred in reducing attorney fee request by 67 percent to reflect plaintiff’s limited success in claim alleging that defendant-state employer denied him due process by unilaterally reducing his base pay to repay defendant for money that defendant overpaid plaintiff while plaintiff was serving in military. While some sort of downward adjustment was warranted because Dist. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendant could not withhold up to $17,982.47 (out of $23,988 overpayment), Dist. Ct. failed to explain how it determined that 67 percent reduction was appropriate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in action alleging that defendant used excessive force in removing plaintiff from his car and initially placing plaintiff in handcuffs following a car accident, during which plaintiff allegedly experienced diabetic episode. Record showed that plaintiff may have been experiencing seizure at time defendant arrived at scene of accident, and question remained as to whether defendant unreasonably believed that plaintiff was intoxicated and posed risk of leaving scene of accident at time when defendant pulled plaintiff from car, threw him down to ground, and, according to plaintiff, caused him to incur broken hip and bruised lung. Ct. rejected defendant’s claims that Dist. Ct. should not have considered fact that plaintiff experienced broken hip or that plaintiff was undergoing diabetic episode when determining whether defendant used excessive force.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing Section 1983 action by plaintiff-physician and university professor alleging various violations of his constitutional rights when, according to plaintiff, defendants-university employees conspired to settle and report to state and federal authorities underlying medical malpractice action against plaintiff in effort to destroy his reputation and career and to retaliate against him for expressing criticism on matters within medical department. Dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliation claim was proper under Garcetti since: (1) plaintiff’s speech pertained to matters covering his official duties; and (2) limitations of Garcetti applied to instant co-workers who were acting at direction of plaintiff’s employer. Moreover, plaintiff’s equal protection claim was properly dismissed where, under applicable law, defendants were under duty to report medical malpractice claim against plaintiff to federal and state authorities. Plaintiff additionally could not establish due process claim based on alleged defamation of plaintiff where plaintiff remained in his current job.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that Virginia law, as opposed to Illinois law, applied to plaintiff’s products liability claim alleging that defendant-manufacturer of Children’s Motrin was negligent, and that said product caused plaintiff’s TEN diagnosis. Plaintiff was living in Virginia at time plaintiff first took Motrin and obtained her first medical treatment arising out of her allergic reaction to said drug. Fact that plaintiff subsequently moved to Illinois did not cause Illinois to have most significant relationship to instant lawsuit since such result would encourage forum shopping. Moreover, jury could properly find that plaintiff’s repeated taking of Motrin in face of warnings on label and in spite of her allergic reaction constituted contributory negligence, which under Virginia law, was complete defense to liability for defendant’s negligence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking to invalidate defendant’s trademark obtained under Lanham Act with respect to defendant’s design of round beach towels. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant’s trademark was functional, and thus was not protected under Lanham Act, since round design of towel produced benefit to consumer other than information about manufacturer’s identity. Moreover, round design of towel had effect on cost or quality of towel that rendered defendant’s trademark functional under TrafFix Devices, 532 US 23.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his Crohn’s disease, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel to assist him in his claim against defendants. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases, and Dist. Ct. appropriately denied first request where plaintiff had failed to show that he made adequate attempt to secure private counsel. As to second and third requests for counsel, Dist. Ct. could properly find from plaintiff’s submitted pleadings that case was not complex, and that plaintiff could competently represent himself. Fact that plaintiff ultimately lost on merits of case was not dispositive even though appointed counsel could have made better presentation of case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s request for declaration that its folding chair did not violate defendant’s rights under Lanham Act even though defendant had previously obtained trademark for x-frame design of its folding chair. Record supported Dist. Ct.’s finding that defendant’s x-frame design was functional, and thus not protected under section 1115(b)(8) of Lanham Act. Moreover, defendant failed to show that any of its folding chair features produced distinctive appearance that would assist customers in identifying product’s source.