Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state claim plaintiff's section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff's due process rights by arresting him without probable cause and then detaining him for 37 days until determination was made that plaintiff was not parole violator and had been detained in error. Any alleged illegality in stop of vehicle in which plaintiff was passenger did not invalidate his arrest, which was based on arrest warrant that described individual with same name, day and month of birth and same first three digits of Social Security number as plaintiff. Moreover, continued detention of plaintiff was reasonable where plaintiff gave inconsistent statements, which at first denied that he was same individual named in warrant and then claimed that he was same individual, but that parole status mentioned in warrant had expired. Finally, plaintiff's allegations of mistreatment while in jail were too improbable and contradictory to state viable cause of action, and plaintiff's action otherwise became futile upon his death where plaintiff was only witness who would have supplied favorable testimony on his behalf. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on pleadings plaintiff's complaint alleging that defendant-drug company committed fraud by systematically taking prescriptions that were written on cheap forms of two popular drugs and illegally filling said prescriptions with expensive forms of said drugs, where plaintiffs failed to satisfy enhanced pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) by alleging adequate grounds for its suspicion of fraud. Plaintiff asserted only handful of examples of alleged improper substitution out of alleged nationwide practice of improper substitution of drugs, and plaintiffs otherwise failed to provide firsthand facts or data to make its suspicions about defendant's conduct plausible. Ct. also rejected plaintiff's claim that fair notice pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a) applied to instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on res judicata grounds plaintiff's Title VII action alleging national origin discrimination where Dist. Ct. had previously dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's prior section 1983 action alleging same national origin discrimination claim against defendant and others. Dismissal without prejudice can support res judicata claim where, as here, Dist. Ct. had granted defendant's motion for summary judgment prior to case being dismissed without prejudice. Fact that Title VII action presented different theory of liability and contained additional state-law claim for emotional distress did not require different result. Moreover, fact that EEOC had not yet issued right-to-sue letter at time section 1983 action had been filed did not preclude application of res judicata.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice five section 1983 lawsuits filed by plaintiff-prisoner as sanction for plaintiff's failure to disclose existence of three other federal pending actions on certain court-issued form. Said form in each of instant five cases warned plaintiff that failure to list all lawsuits that plaintiff had filed could result in dismissal of his case, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant's failure to disclose three other cases that had been pending at time plaintiff had filed instant five cases constituted fraudulent misrepresentation of his litigation history, where defendant did not deny having read said warning. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was not required to accept plaintiff's explanation that his omission was innocent even though he claimed that he was only following advice of another inmate to ignore instant request for his litigation history.

In proceeding under Fair Labor Standards Act alleging various violations of minimum wage and maximum hours provisions, Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs' request to proceed as class action under Rule 23(b)(3) pursuant to Dist. Ct.'s supplemental jurisdiction where class action concerned plaintiffs' state-law minimum wage claims pertaining to employer's use of tips received by its employees. While Dist. Ct. found that there was clear incompatibility between FLSA proceeding and proposed class action proceeding where potential plaintiffs in FLSA proceeding must opt into said action while class members in Rule 23(b)(3) action must opt out of said proceeding, Ct. of Appeals found that there is no categorical rule against certifying Rule 23(b)(3) state-law class action claims in FLSA proceeding. Ct. further rejected Dist. Ct.'s belief that difference in size between larger state-law class action and smaller number of participants in FLSA collective action supported Dist. Ct.'s finding that state-law action substantially predominated over FLSA action so as preclude assumption of supplemental jurisdiction over state-law class action.

Dist. Ct. erred in establishing total attorney fee award in class action at $13 million and awarding one attorney her proportionate share of $2.7 million rather than $8.4 million that said attorney had requested. Special master failed to justify $13 million as ceiling on fees, where award was based on $110 million (cash and in-kind relief) class action award, and had improperly rejected $18.75 million in attorney fees requested by all attorneys representing class. Ct. then awarded complaining attorney 22 percent ($4.125 million) of $18.75 million total fee, which was based on comparison of relative time invested by different attorneys, multiplied by reasonable hourly rate, as well as estimation of relative costs incurred by said attorneys.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on statute of limitations grounds plaintiff's action alleging that defendants violated Equal Credit Opportunity Act by making offer to modify plaintiff's mortgage on terms that were unfavorable to her and were based on her race. While plaintiff did not allege that she applied for extension, renewal or continuation of credit within applicable two-year limitations period, defendants made instant offer within applicable two-year period so as to potentially trigger protections under the Act. However, error was harmless where plaintiff, in related FHA discrimination claim, presented only inadmissible evidence in form of affidavits from individuals not identified in discovery or from individuals, who had no personal knowledge of circumstances surrounding plaintiff's mortgage, to support claim that race played role in defendants' conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding to state court purported mass action comprising of 29 state-court actions that defendant-airline manufacturer had removed to Dist. Ct. under Class Action Fairness Act, 28 USC section 1332(d), 1453(a) and (c). While plaintiffs had argued in state court, in objections to defendant’s motions to dismiss on forum non-conveniens grounds, that resolution of instant 29 state-court actions seeking damages arising out of plane crash would involve only one trial in Illinois on the issue of liability, defendant could not base instant removal on plaintiffs’ argument since, under section 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II) of CAFA, any initial proposal for joint trial cannot be made by defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' request, pursuant to Rule 65(d)(2)(C), to enforce terms of injunction that required defendants in underlying case to remove defamatory comments about plaintiffs from certain websites, including website involved in instant request. While operators of instant website refused to remove said comments, plaintiffs failed to show that operators, who were not parties in underlying lawsuit, took any action to aid or abet defendants in underlying action to violate terms of injunction after it had been issued. Fact that instant operators were technologically capable of removing subject postings did not establish that their failure to do so constituted aiding and abetting underlying defendants, where record showed that operators had no contact with underlying defendants after injunction had been entered.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for judgment as matter of law in section 1983 action alleging that defendants wrongfully terminated plaintiff-landlord’s existing HAP contracts and debarred him from participating in Section 8 housing program without providing him with due process. Plaintiff had no property right in expectancy to enter into new contracts under Section 8 program, and while plaintiff may have had property right in existing HAP contracts, he had no section 1983 remedy since he had available post-deprivation remedy in form of state-law breach of contract action. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to relief under substantive due process claim, even though plaintiff asserted that defendants’ official indicated that plaintiff was undesirable and unfit for Section 8 program, since plaintiff was not barred from renting his properties and could continue in his occupation as landlord.