Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals disbarred from Seventh Circuit Bar Illinois attorney, who had been disbarred by Illinois Supreme Court due to claim that attorney had fraudulently over-billed clients. Ct. rejected attorney's request that he be allowed to voluntarily withdraw from Bar, even though attorney had made said request during pendency of Illinois disciplinary proceedings, where attorney had failed to alert Ct. to pending nature of Illinois disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, attorney's request to resign from Bar to avoid another disbarment order is invalid reason to permit voluntary withdrawal.

Dist. Ct did not err in denying defendant’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate default judgment even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over him where defendant claimed that he was never served with complaint when he resided in United Kingdom. Plaintiff produced return of service identifying defendant and noting when and where defendant was served with complaint, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had failed to rebut instant presumption of service (and was otherwise not credible) where record showed that defendant had made several attempts to evade service, and where defendant could not rule out possibility that he was served with complaint at time and place specified in return of service.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant subjected plaintiff to false arrest during traffic stop for driving under influence and other traffic violations even though plaintiff asserted that officer falsified results of field sobriety tests. Dist. Ct. could properly find that officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving prohibited vehicle in violation of local ordinance, and existence of said probable cause served to preclude plaintiff from maintaining any false arrest claim. Fact that defendant was not charged with ordinance violation was irrelevant. Moreover, while plaintiff switched legal theories in Ct. of Appeals, by arguing that officer violated his 4th Amendment rights by unreasonably detaining him after initial traffic stop, defendant forfeited said issue by not raising said theory in Dist. Ct. and could not rely on plain error rule in instant civil matter to resolve new issue on appeal.

In action alleging that defendant was negligent in mixing glyphosate into special blend of herbicide that plaintiff used on his corn crop, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment after excluding plaintiff's expert witness and concluding that plaintiff could not prevail without said testimony. Plaintiff had failed to timely disclose his expert witness, and although plaintiff argued that untimely disclosure was harmless, plaintiff waived said argument for failing to raise it in Dist. Ct. Moreover, expert's testimony, which failed to identify source of glyphosate, could not have established plaintiff's negligence claim where expert could not identify defendant as source of glyphosate or offer any testimony that defendant breached any duty of care.

In class action alleging that defendant-City violated federal securities law by failing to disclose to prospective bond buyers material information about conversion of power plant that was subject of said bonds, Dist. Ct. erred in staying under subsection 4(b)(3)(D) of SLUSA state court action filed by one named plaintiff in federal class action, which sought under Wisconsin Public Records Law large number of records relating to power plant conversion project. Instant request for records under Wisc. statute did not constitute discovery demand for purpose of seeking stay under SLUSA and was otherwise outside purpose for seeking stay of state-court discovery under SLUSA where requesting party would be responsible for costs expended to comply with request.

In citation to discover assets proceeding filed after creditor obtained $124 million default judgment against debtor in fraud action, Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that certain assets held in trusts established by debtor on behalf of his children actually belonged to debtor and were susceptible to being turned over to creditor in partial satisfaction of default judgment. Doctrine of issue preclusion prevented children from re-litigating date that debtor's fraudulent conduct began for purpose of identifying assets covered by instant turnover order, even though children were not parties in underlying fraud action, since debtor's interests in underlying fraud action were similar to children's interests in defending against imposition of constructive trusts in instant supplemental proceedings. Ct. also rejected children's argument that instant turnover order was improper because: (1) creditor failed to track assets that had been transferred to children's trusts to prevent commingling of said assets from legitimate assets; (2) creditor failed to issue second set of citation to discover assets pleadings after Dist. Ct. had entered final nunc pro tunc order in underlying fraud action that had effective date that pre-dated initial citation pleadings; (3) Dist. Ct. acted beyond scope of instant supplemental proceeding by adjudicating substantive property rights of children in trust assets; and (4) children were entitled to jury trial to determine ownership of trust assets.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying request by movant (one branch of Baha'is church) for issuance of contempt sanctions against respondents (other branches of Baha'is church) where movant asserted that respondents violated terms of 1966 injunction that precluded former branch of Baha'is church (which is now disbanded) from using certain trademarked names. While certain members in respondent branches were key officers in enjoined branch, movant failed to show that instant respondents (who were non-parties in 1966 lawsuit) were in privity with enjoined branch. Moreover, movant failed to demonstrate that instant respondents were legally identified with enjoined branch so as to make terms of injunction binding on respondents where record did not show either that respondent branches were substantially similar to enjoined branch of Baha'is church, or that key officers from enjoined branch actually played any role in governing instant respondent branches, or that respondent branches were in fact operating in effect as enjoined branch.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding defendant $72,747 in attorney fees as prevailing party in Lanham Act action where underlying facts showed that plaintiff was guilty of abuse of process in suing defendant. Moreover, Ct. found that any party seeking fees under Lanham Act must generally show that opponent's claim or defense was objectively unreasonable such that rational litigant would pursue such claim/defense only if it would impose disproportionate costs on opponent. In instant case, said standard was met where: (1) plaintiff had no possible meritorious Lanham Act claim; and (2) Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had filed claim in attempt to coerce price reduction on lamps sold by defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion to transfer instant breach of contract action under 28 USC section 1404(a) where instant action was mirror image of defendant's subsequently-filed breach of contract action filed in Virginia Dist. Ct., and where factors of convenience and public interest, such as material events regarding formation and enforcement of contract, as well as location of sources of proof favored litigating lawsuit in Virginia. Ct. rejected plaintiff's contention that Dist. Ct. was required to follow first-to-file rule so as to defeat defendant's transfer motion under instant circumstances.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant-assistant state's attorney's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s denial of his motion for summary judgment alleging both absolute and qualified immunity in plaintiff's lawsuit asserting that defendant, as well as others, coerced plaintiff into falsely confessing to crimes in violation of plaintiff's 5th Amendment rights. Dist. Ct. properly find that defendant was not entitled at this juncture to either absolute or qualified immunity based on his status as assistant state's attorney due to existence of factual disputes as to whether defendant was present at time of alleged coerced confession, and as to amount of defendant's personal involvement in alleged coerced confession. Moreover, said factual disputes deprived Ct. of Appeals of jurisdiction over defendant's appeal.