Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing three of four counts in plaintiffs’ section 1983 action alleging that campaign contribution limits set by Ill. Disclosure and Regulation of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act (Act) violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. Supreme Ct. precedent precluded plaintiffs from prevailing on contention that Act improperly: (1) set lower contribution limits for individuals than for corporations; (2) allowed political parties to make unlimited contributions to candidates during general election; and (3) lifted contribution limits for all candidates in race if one candidate’s self-funding or support from independent expenditure groups exceeded $250,000 in state-wide race or $100,000 in any other election. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject plaintiff’s fourth claim pertaining to ability of legislative caucus committees to make unlimited contributions to candidates during general election, where said legislative caucus committees are sufficiently similar to political party committees that can make unlimited contributions to candidates in general elections.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-law firm’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s legal malpractice action, alleging that defendant gave negligent advice to several LLCs co-owned and managed by plaintiff, which, in turn resulted in plaintiff violating federal disclosure laws when drafting LLCs’ financial statements based on said advice. Plaintiff could not bring any legal malpractice lawsuit on his own behalf because he did not have any personal attorney-client relationship with defendant, where plaintiff never asked defendant to represent him. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish that defendant was hired by LLCs for primary purpose of benefiting plaintiff, and primary purpose of retainer agreement between business entity and law firm is to benefit business entity and not owner of business entity. Fact that plaintiff’s and LLCs’ interests were closely aligned did not require different result.

Plaintiff timely filed instant section 1983 action alleging that his pre-trial detention violated his 4^th Amendment rights, because he was incarcerated without probable cause. Record showed that relevant limitations period was two years, and although plaintiff filed instant action more than two years after his initial incarceration, instant action was timely, because it was filed within two years of date he was released from custody. This is so, Ct. found, because instant “wrong” was ongoing throughout his detention and did not cease until his release from said custody.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant denied plaintiff-employee due process by delaying its required report of plaintiff’s backdated hours and wages to Wisconsin Retirement System, which, according to plaintiff, deprived him of five years of retirement. Plaintiff was not owed meaningful hearing prior to when instant alleged deprivation took place, and state provided meaningful post deprivation hearing in form of mandamus action to address any wrong caused by defendant’s alleged inaction. As such, said state court remedy precluded plaintiff from seeking federal due process relief.

Remand was required for Dist. Ct. to reconsider defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-decedent’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants used excessive force when arresting plaintiff, where, according to plaintiff, use of said force resulted in decedent’s death. Defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity, and record showed that all 11 defendants played different roles in apprehending decedent during incident in which defendants believed that plaintiff was attempting armed robbery and was fleeing scene after being observed by defendants. While Dist. Ct., in denying defendants' summary motion, found that contested facts existed with respect to liability of all defendants, Dist. Ct. erred in failing to make individualized assessment of facts with respect to each defendant, especially where each defendant had different degree of contact with plaintiff and had different assigned responsibilities with respect to plaintiff’s apprehension and investigation of plaintiff’s alleged armed robbery.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials denied him his 8^th Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, where Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Record showed that plaintiff had failed to file internal grievance within 14 days of occurrence giving rise to instant complaint, as required by Wisconsin law. However, plaintiff was not required to comply with said law prior to filing instant lawsuit, where his medical limitations arising out of his severe muscle disease, as well as defendants’ failure to assign study table for plaintiff to write out grievance during relevant 14-day period, made grievance process effectively unavailable to plaintiff. Result is same even if defendants had acted in good-faith in following prison rules with respect to assignment of tables to inmates.

In section 1983 action alleging that police officials employed by defendant-City used excessive force when attempting to arrest plaintiff on warrant for driving on suspended license, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from presenting evidence that arresting officer had been involved in incident that occurred 5.5 years earlier in which said officer had handcuffed and tased plaintiff and which plaintiff had filed federal lawsuit against said officer as well as others and had obtained settlement from defendant. Dist. Ct. improperly viewed plaintiff’s proposed testimony as propensity evidence that was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and used four-part test in doing so that had been rejected in favor of rule-based approach under Gomez, 763 F.3d 845. Moreover, plaintiff’s proposed evidence was relevant to show that arresting office knew that plaintiff had previous frightening encounter with him that could explain why plaintiff did not immediately stop her car when directed to do so and exited car away from said officer once plaintiff had eventually reached her destination. On remand, Dist. Ct. must weigh probative value of said evidence against potential prejudice, although Ct. noted that curative instructions to jury may be sufficient to allow use of proposed testimony.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s verdict in favor of defendant-Sheriff in section 1983 action by plaintiffs-prisoners alleging that defendant did not do enough to prevent either guards or public employees from stealing or losing plaintiffs’ personal property that had been tendered at time of incarceration. Record showed that theft-rate, although substantial, had been falling due to defendant’s implementation of additional controls so as to warrant finding that defendant had taken reasonable measures to address problem. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ argument that jury instruction defining deliberate indifference as conscious disregard of risk of theft by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent said losses misstated applicable law, since plaintiffs’ counsel failed to object to language of instant instruction. Also, Dist. Ct. was not required to tell jury that State of Illinois does not provide inmates with financial remedy for lost/stolen goods, where defendant’s counsel did not argue to jury that Illinois supplies remedy for lost/stolen property.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical/mental health needs, with respect to his requested treatment for his dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, as well as his neck and throat pain and his difficulty in swallowing. Defendants sent plaintiff to mental health specialists who determined that plaintiff was not suffering from either dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, and thus plaintiff could not establish any 8^th Amendment violation based on these alleged conditions. Moreover, defendants worked with or sent plaintiff to six specialists regarding his other medical conditions, which precluded finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent with respect to said medical conditions. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s claim that one defendant improperly failed to abide by recommendation of one of specialist regarding condition of plaintiff’s hand, where plaintiff could not show that said defendant’s continuation of pain medication for plaintiff’s hand was substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.

In section 1983 action by plaintiffs (prisoner and non-prisoner who sent prisoner at least 10 books), alleging that defendant-Sheriff violated their First Amendment rights by enforcing policy that limited inmates to three pieces of reading materials in their cells and resulted in confiscation of 30 “excess” books from plaintiff-prisoner’s cell, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing non-prisoner’s action, after finding that said individual lacked standing to pursue instant action since jail did not interfere with her ability to communicate with plaintiff-prisoner. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing instant action with respect to plaintiff-prisoner, since, although under Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, individuals who complain about loss/destruction of property have cause of action to recover for said loss only in state court and not via section 1983 action, Parratt does not apply to instant lawsuit that challenged jail’s confiscation policy. As such, remand was required to allow plaintiff-prisoner to identify precise jail policy at issue in lawsuit and to determine whether policy is valid.